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ABSTRACT 
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A Study of the Public Discourse on British Imperial Presence in the Cape-to-Cairo 
Corridor, Military Reform, and the Issue of National and Provincial Identity, 1870-1900” 
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Marquette University, 2013 
 
 
 
The Victorian era was marked by the incremental expansion of the British Empire. Such 
developments were not only of enormous importance for government officials and the 
contributors of that expansion, but for the broader general public as well, as evidenced by 
the coverage and discussion of such developments in the Cape to Cairo corridor in the 
national and provincial presses between 1870 and 1900. Transcending the discussions 
surrounding the politics of interventionism, the public’s interest in imperial activities—
such as the annexation of the Transvaal, the First Anglo-Boer War, the Zulu War, 
Gordon’s mission into the Sudan, the Jameson raid and the Second Anglo-Boer War—
also led to debates about the status of military institutions and the necessity for military 
reform. Lastly, although these debates reflected on public understandings of British 
national identity, they also demonstrated specific provincial sympathies, suggesting that 
national identity was constituted differently in England and Scotland.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Beginning on the evening of 19 May 1900 and lasting over a period of several 
days, the streets and squares of British cities, towns, and villages were awash with 
merriment as the British public responded to the news that the town of Mafeking in South 
Africa which had been besieged by Boer forces for 217 days had finally been relieved by 
the British army.  In London, the “unparalleled demonstrations” included spontaneous 
parades of men, women and children marching throughout the city.
1
  In the city of 
Bristol, thousands turned out for a formal parade led by the Lord Mayor of the city, and 
in Kirkaldy, the event was marked by parading, setting out decorations, the ringing of 
town and church bells, and the setting off of fireworks.
2
  Elsewhere, in East Peckham, a 
village of 2,000 people in Kent, the residents likewise took part in celebrations such as 
spontaneous parading, setting out decorations, ringing the town and church bells, setting 
off fireworks, and cancelling school.
3
 
Assessing the events surrounding Mafeking Night, numerous scholars have 
contended that those activities were an isolated event and that the British public was 
detached from and relatively disinterested in the empire.  For instance, in examining 
Britain’s small wars of the Victorian era, Byron Farwell asserted that the “long peace” 
associated with the Pax Britannica left the British public largely unaware that from 
Waterloo to the end of the nineteenth century the nation was almost constantly at war 
                                                 
1
 Times (London), 21 May 1900, 12. 
2
 Bristol Mercury, 21 May 1900, 5; Fife Free Press (Kirkaldy), 26 May 1900, 2. 
3
 Donald Hodge, interview April 1995, Imperial War Museum (IWM), catalogue #11341; Census of 
England and Wales, 1901. County of Kent. Area, Houses and Population, Cd. 1171 (1902), 27.  
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some place on the globe.
4
  Focusing on economic matters, Lance Davis and Robert 
Huttenback have argued that the empire comprised only a small part of the British 
economy, and that for the most part the British public was not concerned with imperial 
markets.
5
  More recently, Bernard Porter’s inquiry into the Victorian culture and social 
awareness has boldly characterized the British public at that time as being largely 
“absent-minded” about imperial concerns.6 
Even so, while the British Isles were certainly detached from the peripheral 
empire due to the delay in communication during the first part of the nineteenth century, 
it is untenable to believe that the British public was oblivious to and unconcerned about 
the imperial wars, that the mere frequency of those wars did not leave indelible marks or 
impressions upon British society, and that the occurrences of Mafeking Night emerged 
spontaneously without a pre-existing cultural foundation.  Muriel Chamberlain has 
suggested that, instead of reflecting Britain’s indifference to the imperial wars, the idea of 
a Pax Britannica recognized that those wars posed little threat to the British homeland.
7
  
In that way, the effectuation of a Pax Britannica coincided with interests in extending a 
British hegemony, which was often ensured at the point of the sword.
8
  Other scholarship, 
such as that offered by John M. MacKenzie and Andrew Thompson, has done much to 
                                                 
4
 Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 339.  Farwell’s 
interpretation of the meaning of long-peace is to say the least remarkable, given that earlier in the same 
work he contended that in the second half of Queen Victoria’s reign the British public was increasingly 
aware and concerned about the imperial wars. Farwell accounted for this apparent contradiction by 
contending that by the early 1890s the constant imperial wars caused Britain to become numb to such 
developments.  Ibid., 218, 295. 
5
 Lance E. Davis and Robert Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of 
British Imperialism, 1860-1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
6
 Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford: 
University Press, 2004). 
7
 Muriel Chamberlain, ‘Pax Britannica’? British Foreign Policy, 1789-1914 (London: Longman, 1989), 9. 
8
 Sir Francis Patrick Fletcher, Pax Britannica in South Africa (London: Archibald Constable and Co., 
1905), x-xi; H. Whates, “A Year of Lord Lansdowne,” Fortnightly Review 70 (1901): 593; Bill Nasson, 
Britannia’s Empire: Making a British World (Stroud, UK: Tempus Publishing Ltd., 2004), 135-36. 
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show that, to varying degrees, the British public was engaged in imperial concerns and 
that the empire did exert some influence upon British culture.
9
  Additionally, Paul Ward 
has specifically contended that public support for imperialism formed a key element of 
British identity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  However, questions 
concerning the degree to which the British populace was positively disposed to the 
military and to the use of military force to advance Britain’s imperial position and status 
in the international community remain underexplored.
10
  Building upon the 
historiography, this dissertation contends that while the pageantry of Mafeking Night was 
certainly unique, it was far from being an isolated expression of British enthusiasm and 
support of the empire and the military.  Rather, the phenomenon of Mafeking Night 
should be seen as a culmination of decades-long support, interest, and engagement by the 
public in the empire and the military.    
The present study into the British public’s attachment to the empire and the 
British military began as an offshoot of my master’s thesis which addressed the 1916 
conscription debate in Great Britain.  At the time I was interested in understanding how 
Britain, by all accounts a non-militaristic state, came to implement a policy that was seen 
as the embodiment of militarism.  Historians and intellectuals alike have predominantly 
characterized modern Britain as non-militaristic essentially because it lacked the 
institutionalized forms of a mass military establishment associated with the continental 
                                                 
9
 John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984); John M. MacKenzie, “Passion or Indifference: Popular 
Imperialism in Britain, Continuities and Discontinuities over Two Centuries” in European Empires and the 
People: Popular Responses to Imperialism in France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and 
Italy, ed. John M. MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 57-89; John M. 
MacKenzie, ed. Popular Imperialism and the Military: 1850-1950, Studies in Imperialism, ed. John M. 
MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: The 
Empire in British Politics, c. 1880-1932 (New York: Longman, 2000). 
10
 Paul Ward, Britishness Since 1870 (London: Routledge, 2004), 30-31. 
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powers, i.e. conscription, mass armies, and the predominance of the military over the 
government and national economy.  In those regards, in 1914 the British military was 
certainly dwarfed by the military establishments of France and Germany.  Its armed 
forces were comprised of volunteers, and the principles of liberalism and civilian 
governance reigned supreme.  By these measures, Britain exhibited few signs of 
militarism, and during the Great War Britain saw itself as a bulwark against that form of 
militarism.  Indeed the country’s devotion to constitutionalism and fear of absolutism 
prevented its military from having an inordinate control over state affairs.  Consequently, 
while acknowledging the occasional outburst of jingoism, most discussions of British 
society have insisted that it was free of the influence or presence of militarism.   
But in examining the social environment of Britain at the turn of the century, I, 
like Anne Summers, was struck by the possibility that militaristic elements had become 
integrated into British society and were in part responsible for the unprecedented 
response to the call to arms in 1914.
11
  Despite the predominant amount of literature that 
has either dismissed or downplayed the presence of militarism in Victorian and 
Edwardian society, a select number of historians have pointed to a variety of militaristic 
elements within British society.  These have included the varied efforts of the Navy and 
National Service Leagues to raise awareness about the need to reform and professionalize 
the British military through the introduction of universal drill and compulsory military 
service, and the impact youth organizations such as the Boys’ Brigade and Boy Scouts, 
which were deliberately patterned after the military.  In addition, the cultural exchanges 
                                                 
11
 Anne Summers, “Militarism in Britain Before the Great War,” History Workshop 2 (1976):  104-123. 
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between Oxford and Heidelberg Universities and the dynamics of British patriotism have 
also come under scrutiny for militaristic characteristics.
12
   
Admittedly such cultural elements do not embody militarism in the traditional and 
strictest sense of the word.  However, the Oxford English Dictionary and Merriam-
Webster’s Dictionary include in their definitions of militarism references to “military 
attitudes or ideas,” the willingness to use the military “aggressively to defend or promote 
national interests, “military habits or mannerisms,” and “a strong military spirit or 
policy.”13  Consequently, these definitions raise questions as to whether the prevailing 
understanding of militarism, which centers on conscription and massive standing armies, 
has construed the concept too narrowly.  Given that some have sensed that militarism 
exhibited some presence in Victorian and Edwardian society, those discussions raise the 
question from whence did such influences arise.  More importantly, the discussion about 
martial tones in British society opens broader questions that transcend the specific 
question of militarism.  Namely, it invites renewed inquiries into the reciprocal 
relationship between the British public and the empire, especially in regards to military 
experiences and military institutions.   
By exploring the intersection between the Victorian era’s peripheral small wars 
and the British public sphere, therefore, the present work responds to MacKenzie’s 
invitation for further inquiries into the intersection of Britain’s colonial wars and popular 
culture, and Thompson’s desire for attention to the impact that imperialism had on 
                                                 
12
 See Hugh Cunningham, “Jingoism and the Working Class” Bulletin – Society for the Study of Labour 
History 19 (1969): 6-9; Idem, “Jingoism in 1877-1878” Victorian Studies  14 (1971): 429-453; Idem, 
“Militarism and Anti-Militarism in Britain,” in The Week of Studies on the Military Power in 
Contemporary Society (Rome: Fondazione Lelio e Lisle Basso, 1983); Thomas Weber, Our Friend “The 
Enemy”: Elite Education in Britain and Germany Before World War I (Stanford: University Press, 2008). 
13
 Oxford English Dictionary [OED] (2007), s.v. militarism; Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary 
(2003), s.v. militarism. 
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domestic politics and the empire’s role in shaping national identity.14  Taking into 
account that Britishness, as discussed by Linda Colley, Keith Robbins, Richard Weight, 
and Robert Colls, was and continues to be a construction that has existed above, and as a 
composite of, English, Scottish, Irish, and Welsh identities, it is only fitting to assess the 
British relationship with the empire along those lines.
15
  Indeed, while those communities 
almost certainly had a common point of reference in regards to the imperial wars and 
their repercussions, it is also highly likely that responses would not have been uniform, 
and that they would have been perceived differently and possibly co-opted for entirely 
different purposes and ends, depending on regional allegiances within the British polity. 
For simplicity’s sake, this work takes particular notice of ways those elements 
emerged in England, the “dominant” partner in the United Kingdom, and Scotland, a 
nation that has been seen to have a special relationship with the military.  Indeed, in 
contrast to England, a disproportionate percentage of the Scottish population served in 
the British military where they earned a reputation for being particularly hardy and 
seasoned warriors.
16
  This study will only delve tangentially into the relationship between 
the empire and Ireland because the complexity of Ireland’s place within the United 
Kingdom—as simultaneously colonized and colonizer—presents methodological issues 
beyond the present scope.  At the same time, although Wales certainly retained a sense of 
British identity, especially within the military establishment, it was overshadowed by 
England and Scotland.  Even so, inquiries into Ireland’s and Wales’s reciprocal 
                                                 
14
 John M. MacKenzie, ed., Popular Imperialism and the Military, 221; Thompson, Imperial Britain, 1-9. 
15
 Ward, Britishness Since 1870, 6-7. 
16
 Scotland’s military heritage has most recently been studied by Heather Streets in Martial Races: the 
Military, Race, and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914 in Studies in Imperialism, ed. John 
Mackenzie (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004).  
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relationships with the military experiences of imperialism and their role in the 
construction of “national” identity would certainly be warranted in other studies.  
In order to lend the argument some specificity, I will offer an overview of 
Britain’s experiences in a large swath of Africa in the late nineteenth century, which 
reveals much about the public’s awareness of and interaction with imperial questions and 
military capabilities.  In the first place, those instances reveal a certain inclination toward 
the “sureness” offered by aggressive military and political action to resolve imperial 
questions.  Such actions were frequently incentivized by promises of material gain and 
further underpinned by a Social Darwinist belief that British governance and rule of law 
were superior to what settlers and officials in Britain considered to be the barbarous and 
inefficient government of the indigenous populations.   
Such interactions increased in frequency and severity, and drew more public 
concern and scrutiny after the mid-1870s, at a time when the government in London 
began taking a greater interest in directing imperial policy.  The process culminated in 
1899 with the outbreak of what was the most significant of Victoria’s “Little Wars,” the 
Second Anglo-Boer War.
17
  Within that twenty-five year timeframe, a number of 
                                                 
17
 Although these wars collectively involved a British army that numbered close to a quarter of a million 
troops, the label “little wars” has been applied because these they were individually fought with relatively 
few forces compared with those of the Napoleonic Wars and the Crimean War.  For example, the British 
expedition force to China in 1860 and Wolseley’s command in 1874 against the Ashanti in West Africa 
numbered only 4,000 men.  The final relief of Lucknow in 1858 was accomplished with 5,000 troops.  In 
1879, before additional reinforcements arrived, Lord Chelmsford defeated the Zulu armies, which 
numbered in the tens of thousands, with only 5,000 British Regulars and almost the same number of locally 
drawn Auxiliaries.  British forces in the three battles of the First Anglo-Boer War (1880-1881) numbered in 
the hundreds.  A somewhat larger military commitment was devoted to the destruction of the Mahdi in 
1898, as Kitchener had under him at Omdurman 8,200 British and 17,000 Egyptians.  Coming at the end of 
the nineteenth century, only the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) was notably different as it eventually 
required that half a million troops be committed to the effort.  This would be prefiguring the military 
commitment that would be required in the First World War.  Aside from being a comparative term, like the 
origin of the term “imperialism,” the “little war” label had a critical edge to it, as Reynolds’s Weekly 
Newspaper used it in 1881 to headline an article that highlighted Britain’s ongoing military instability in 
8 
 
episodes stand out which provide a sufficient context for teasing out the public’s 
engagement in imperial politics.  This period can effectively be divided into three 
segments according to geography, and which opportunely fall in line with the general ebb 
and flow of Conservative and Liberal Party dominance.   
Three periods will be addressed in three sequential chapters.  The first, stretching 
from 1877-1881, contains the Annexation of the Transvaal (1877), the Zulu War (1879), 
and the First Anglo-Boer War (1880-81), and features the dominance of the Conservative 
Party under Benjamin Disraeli, a vocal advocate of the imperialist cause.  The second era 
and chapter will focus the discussion on the questions surrounding the Egyptian Crisis 
and the Mahdi Wars (1882-91), during which time the siege of General Charles 
“Chinese” Gordon at Khartoum plagued Gladstone’s Liberal Government and led to the 
creation of the first Salisbury administration.  Returning to South Africa, the final chapter 
covers the years 1895-1902 , that is, the period from the Jameson Raid to the capstone 
event of nineteenth-century British imperialism, the Second Anglo-Boer War.   
While these events represent only a segment of Britain’s imperial experience in 
Africa, they were among the most significant of the period, not just regionally but also in 
relation to developments occurring elsewhere in the empire.  In many ways they were 
representative of wider imperial events, and in order not to lose sight of that larger 
context, I will refer to other theaters of empire and the parallels drawn by contemporaries 
among those theaters.  In so doing, the spelling of place names in the Cape to Cairo 
corridor and beyond have been uniformly modernized.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Western and Southern Africa.  Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars, 1, 16, 123, 196, 244-247, 335, 340-
341. Cf. Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper 13 February 1881, 5. 
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In assessing the newspaper coverage of imperial activity, we find, in the first 
place, that the press both commented on and sought to shape the prevailing thoughts and 
opinions of the British government.  They thus reveal that imperial matters were a part of 
the national consciousness and not limited to the inner chambers of Whitehall, the veldts 
of South Africa, or the deserts of Egypt-Sudan.  As will be shown, the reading public had 
its own mind and convictions when it came to matters about the British Empire as a 
whole and military intervention specifically.  While the press did not necessarily reflect 
the opinion of the government, there were times when the commentary drove government 
policy, agenda, and action.  In terms of imperial activity, it will be seen that the public 
favored military action only so long as it could be accomplished cheaply, both in terms of 
finances and blood, and when it served a purpose deemed worthier than simple economic 
gain.  Continued colonial security, peace, and humanitarianism, all of which were then 
frequently augmented by a firm belief in upholding national honor, were deemed by the 
public to be much more important and justifiable reasons for action than economic gain 
alone.  However, when the empire and military intervention failed in those regards, the 
public actively questioned such errors of judgment.  
Reading newspapers and other forms of the popular press as source material on 
attitudes is, of course, problematic.   Indeed, one of the key challenges any historian 
confronts is tracing attitudes through written records.  Memoirs, diaries, and letters are of 
course vital sources in this respect, but such sources may provide only an incomplete 
account of a person’s personal reflections and feelings.  The challenge becomes even 
greater when attempting to ascertain the consciousness of a group of people.  This is 
especially true when dealing with public opinions on a national level, where the so-called 
10 
 
“national consciousness” was often splintered by political, social, cultural, historical, 
geographical, and economic influences into a multitude of perspectives.   
Nonetheless, as Michael de Nie has noted, the nineteenth-century British press 
can appropriately be seen as a reflection and product of the public’s awareness and 
engagement in the world around it.  In addition the press, in particular the local press, 
were for many the primary source of news and served effectively to connect the public to 
the societal and governmental issues of the day.
18
  As Lord Lytton noted in 1833: 
Large classes of men entertain certain views on matters of policy, trade or morals.  
A newspaper supports itself by addressing these classes; it brings to light all the 
knowledge requisite to enforce or illustrate the view of its supporters; it embodies 
also the prejudice, the passion and the sectarian bigotry that belong to one body of 
men engaged in active opposition to one another.  It is, therefore, the organ of 
opinion; expressing at once the truths, the errors, the good, and the bad of the 
prevalent opinion it represents.
19
 
 
This role was not lost upon the press itself.  In the summer of 1882 amid the Suez Crisis, 
the Aberdeen Journal editorialized: 
Bravo for leading articles!  “The duty of newspapers is, or ought to be, to put 
before the public in a plain, straightforward way, not merely the news of the day, 
but such considerations as, because of their common sense or fairness, may assist 
the public to understand political and other difficulties.”  What wisdom! and what 
conscious virtue!  Where but in the pages in which these words appear, are we to 
find the absence of prejudice, the pure love of truth, the high patriotism, the noble 
devotion to the good of the country, irrespective of party; or, in one word, the 
singlemindedness which alone can produce the “common sense and fairness” 
necessary for the guidance of a bewildered public in the struggle with its 
“difficulties.”20 
In addition, Alan Lee has contended that throughout the eighteenth century, the press 
served a vital function of horizontally connecting the various segments of the reading 
                                                 
18
 Michael de Nie, The Eternal Paddy: Irish Identity and the British Press, 1798-1882 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 28-30.  
19
 Edward Lytton Bulwer, England and the English, vol. xlviii (Paris: Baudry’s European Library, 1833), 
245. 
20
 Aberdeen Journal, 31 May 1882, 4. 
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public—a purpose that de Nie insists carried over into the nineteenth century.21  The 
public then would almost certainly have gained an appreciation for that exchange of ideas 
through the editorials, which would refer to other concurring and conflicting opinions, or 
through serial columns such as the Pall Mall Gazette’s “Epitome of Opinion,” which 
purposefully encapsulated snippets of the editorial pages of the London and provincial 
papers on issues of national importance.  In this way, not only did provincials gain 
greater access to the opinion of the Londoners, but perhaps more importantly, Londoners 
became connected to the opinions on the periphery of the country. 
 In addition to reflecting sentiments, the nineteenth-century press was also an 
invaluable agent for creating public opinion.  Having largely been the mouthpiece of the 
government in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, by the mid-nineteenth 
century the press had effectively become a “fourth estate” and challenged parliament as 
the leading center of political discussion.
22
  At the end of the nineteenth century, imperial 
critics, such as J. A. Hobson, raised concerns that the press was effectively being co-
opted by imperialists in order to further to propagandize the public.  More recently, John 
MacKenzie and others have built upon that argument and explored more deeply how the 
empire became popularized.   The degree to which those efforts succeeded is the focus of 
Bernard Porter’s work Absent-Minded Imperialists.  As discussed previously, the 
conclusion he has come to is that the public remained mostly disinterested.  However, 
Simon Potter contends that such efforts by their very nature were necessarily rooted in a 
pre-existing foundation of support.
23
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It is those foundational sentiments and opinions that the present study is interested 
in exploring.  Both as a reflection of public sentiment and as an important proactive agent 
in driving public interest, the content of the national and provincial press provides a vital 
conduit for the researcher to create a composite interpretation of the public discourse.
24
  
However, both functions have their imperfections.  As a reflection, one must consider 
whether even the composite opinions by the press are fully representative of society as a 
whole.  For as de Nie points out, Victorians largely regarded the public opinion 
associated with the press to be closely attached to the middle class.
25
  As a proactive 
force, meanwhile, one must question—as does Porter—the degree to which such ideas 
were readily accepted by the public.  Taking those issues into account, when this 
dissertation speaks of the public’s opinions on the issue of imperialism, what is meant by 
this is the opinions of the public in so far as they were expressed by the press. 
Bearing these considerations in mind, this dissertation seeks to tease out the 
awareness of, involvement with, and responsiveness of the British public to the small 
wars that spanned the nineteenth century by focusing specifically on the Cape to Cairo 
corridor in the period between 1870 and 1900 because that theatre was home to some of 
the most significant events in those years.   
Second, recognizing that foreign policy was only one avenue through which the 
public connected with the empire, I seek to assess public concerns over questions 
regarding matériel and manpower.  As part of his study of the impact of imperialism on 
British politics, Thompson focused his attention on the development and modernization 
of the Royal Navy, justifying this approach on the grounds that up until the First World 
                                                 
24
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War, the Royal Navy was the paramount branch of service concerned with imperial 
defense.
26
  Nevertheless, from the middle of the nineteenth century onward, imperial 
matters raised considerable concern about the size, ability, efficiency, and 
professionalization of the army as well, which led to numerous calls for military reform, 
by the likes of Secretaries of War Edward Cardwell and Hugh Childers, as well as MPs 
such as Sir Charles Dilke and H. Spenser Wilkinson.  This debate created opportunities 
for the public to engage with imperial-military questions.  In such circumstances, 
questions regarding the appropriateness and ramifications of imposing universal military 
drill and service upon Britain’s civil society were of particular concern.  However, if 
connections with the military and its imperial exploits truly made inroads into British 
civil society, one would expect that they would transcend the context of politics and 
would appear elsewhere in civil society.   
Indeed such permeations did occur.   This dissertation argues that the public was 
not only aware of the empire, but deeply involved with and invested in imperial matters.  
Political questions and concerns regarding the place of Britain in the world were not just 
relegated to the halls of Parliament, but discussed and engaged by the press and the 
general public at large.  As a part of their being politically aware in general, the British 
public was very much mindful of imperial matters.  Moving beyond the national level, 
the work demonstrates that while English and Scottish communities engaged military 
aspects of British imperialism as a part of a national discourse and from common points 
of reference, those communities also engaged and consumed such matters uniquely and 
to varying degrees.  While England tended to relate to the empire and the military as 
national enterprises and institutions, members of the Scottish public was made keenly 
                                                 
26
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aware of their singular contributions to the empire and the military as a way of 
accentuating Scotland’s position as an equal partner in the United Kingdom.   Indeed, at 
the end of the nineteenth-century the press was integrally involved in promoting the 
martial character of the Highlander as an acceptable and esteemed symbol not only for all 
of Scotland, but the British Empire as well.  
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PART I 
THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON IMPERIAL INTERVENTION 
16 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS (1870-1881): THE 
ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL, THE ZULU WAR, AND THE FIRST 
ANGLO-BOER WAR 
From the time that Britain took possession of the Cape Colony in 1802 to the end 
of the nineteenth century, Britain’s presence in the Cape to Cairo corridor gave rise to a 
series of significant interactions with the native and Boer communities.
1
  In 1834, in an 
attempt to remove themselves from British rule, Boers began migrating northward from 
the Cape into the Natal, Orange River, and Transvaal regions.  These treks not only upset 
the inland peoples; they also did little to resolve the tensions between the British and the 
Boers.
2
  At the same time, British settler movements eastward from the Cape further 
unsettled relations with native and Boer populations, and by the late 1840s, settler 
interests, indigenous resistance, and a growing willingness on the part of the Cape 
government and Colonial Office to use violence often coalesced.
3
  For  the remainder of 
                                                 
1
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C.H.B.E.], vol. 8, ed. Erik A. Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 324-39. 
3
 Prior to 1846, Britain’s frontier wars with the native Xhosa were generally reactionary in nature, and a by-
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naked aggression to further the economic interests of the Cape.  Basil Le Cordeur and Christopher 
Saunders, The War of the Axe, 1847: Correspondence between the Governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Henry 
Pottinger and the Commander of the British Forces at the Cape, Sir George Berkeley, and Others, 
Brenthurst Series, ed. Eric Axelson, no. 7 (Johannesburg: Brenthurst Press, 1981) , 16; Clifton Crais, White 
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K. Mbenga, and Robert Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 265-269, 281-285, 293-305; 
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the nineteenth century, Britain’s relations with the Africans and Boers would 
intermittently be strained and frequently develop into open war, as Britons expanded their 
colonial boundaries in response to geopolitical threats to their hegemonic position at the 
Cape and in Africa as a whole, and as they actively pursued their own economic 
opportunities.
4
  
In examining the British presence in South Africa from the annexation of the 
Transvaal through the First Anglo-Boer War, this chapter will focus on how the press 
coverage and popular opinion concerning those events are suggestive of the parameters in 
which aggressive or interventionist policies were deemed acceptable.  The reaction of 
Britons to their government’s interventionism at the Cape between 1877 and 1881 serves 
as an important foundation against which their engagement with imperial adventures in 
the 1880s and 1890s can be weighed.  The first period included the use of coercive 
diplomacy against the Transvaal Boers, which led to wars against the Zulus and 
ultimately the Boers themselves.  In subsequent decades, diplomatic efforts and military 
force would be used as complementary tools, and in some instances, armed conflict—
including instances that were not authorized by the British state, such as the Jameson 
Raid—sought to drive the agenda.  The varied cases and forms of interventionism in the 
Cape to Cairo theatre from 1877 to 1900, then, provide a discreet set of information from 
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which to ascertain the extents and parameters under which intervention was deemed to be 
acceptable by the British public.    
THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL, 1877 
The annexation of the Transvaal was, in many ways, overshadowed by the 
attention paid between 1876 and 1878 to the so-called Eastern Crisis.  In the context of 
Britain’s imperial experience in the Cape to Cairo corridor, however, the event was 
crucially significant as it set the stage for two wars with the Boers and marked the first 
instance when the Colonial Office and not the “man on the spot” initiated action in 
southern Africa.  The public’s apparent approval of this action undertaken with the 
approval of the Colonial Office helps to establish the parameters within which saber 
rattling remained acceptable in imperial affairs.   
Only a few years after it had contained the Boer treks through a series of 
territorial expansions in the 1840s, the British government dramatically retraced its steps 
due to the increasing economic and administrative strain on the Cape Colony.
5
  Ignoring 
the complaints of the British residents and those Boers who preferred British rule, the 
British government had recognized the independence of the South African Republic (the 
Transvaal) and the Orange Free State through the Sand River and Bloemfontein 
conventions in 1852 and 1854 respectively.
6
  In doing so, the government hoped that the 
newly established republics would act as buffers between the Cape and the Basutos, and 
                                                 
5
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that Boer native policies could be influenced through diplomatic pressure.
7
  Those 
expectations fell short as persistent Boer-Basuto hostilities proved to be a growing thorn 
in the side of the British colonies at the Cape and in Natal.   
The discovery of diamonds along the northern boundaries of the Cape Colony in 
1867 significantly altered the colonial intentions of the British in the region and the 
nature of Anglo-Boer relations.
8
  Britons and Boers alike rushed into the areas of 
Bechuanaland and Griqualand West in search of personal fortunes, and the Boer 
republican governments particularly saw access to those resources as a solution to their 
financial problems.  These discoveries also increased the importance of southern Africa’s 
limited number of deepwater ports, such as Delagoa Bay, which were vital in connecting 
the hinterlands to international trade.  Recognizing that republican access to those 
resources would threaten the economic supremacy of the British in the region and 
provide immunity from British influence, Cape Governor Sir Philip Wodehouse annexed 
Basutoland in 1868 to block the Boers’ access to Delagoa Bay.9  Then, in October 1871 
amid legal arbitration negotiations with the Orange Free State for control of Griqualand 
West, Sir Henry Barkly, the newly appointed High Commissioner of South Africa, 
                                                 
7
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unilaterally declared British sovereignty over the region in order to pressure the Boers 
into participating in the formation of a confederation of South African states.
10
 
Instead of succeeding in manipulating the Boer republics into accepting 
confederation, however, Barkly’s action only encouraged their desire to remain 
independent and to resist calls for confederation.
11
  Indeed, far from being the feeble 
states that they had been in the 1850s, by the 1870s the Boer republics had increased as 
regional powers, and they renewed their efforts to gain access to the Indian Ocean via 
Delagoa Bay in 1874.
12
  These changed strategic circumstances roughly coincided with 
the beginning of Disraeli’s first government, in which George Herbert, the Fourth Earl of 
Carnarvon, served as Colonial Secretary.  Recognizing the geo-political circumstances, 
and motivated by socio-economic considerations, Carnarvon set in motion a 
confederation scheme that differed from the proposed confederation of the 1850s, in that 
it would necessarily have to include the Transvaal and Orange Free State.
13
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Carnarvon initially intended to achieve that goal diplomatically.
14
   Successive 
efforts in 1875 and 1876, however, failed to overcome the obstacles posed by the relative 
isolation and diversity of the various colonies and by stiff resistance from within the Cape 
Colony and the Boer republics.
15
  Those failures notwithstanding, Carnarvon remained 
convinced that circumstances in South Africa necessitated that the Colonial Office take 
whatever action was necessary to force the matter through.  Ultimately, he concluded that 
that action entailed the annexation of the Transvaal.  Although Britain later insisted that 
the action was absolutely necessary and justifiable, Carnarvon rarely explained his 
specific reasons for pursuing confederation.  He generally presented it as having self-
evident, intrinsic value, and as being a justifiable goal in and of itself.  In a letter to High 
Commissioner of South Africa Sir Henry Barkly, he wrote that “the safety and prosperity 
of the [Transvaal] would be best assured by union with the British Colonies, when no 
occasion for local wars would continue to exist.”16 
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News reached London in the autumn of 1876 that a war between the Transvaal 
and the Bapedi was exacerbating the internal fragility of the Boer republic, and 
Carnarvon saw a golden opportunity.
17
  He impressed upon Disraeli that    
by acting at once, we may prevent a [broader] war and acquire at a stroke the 
whole of the Transvaal Republic, after which the Orange Free State will follow, 
and the whole policy in South Africa, for which two years we have been laboring 
[will be] fully and completely justified.
18
  
 
The acquisition of which Carnarvon spoke was not the voluntary cooperation of the 
Transvaal in a scheme of confederation, but its coerced annexation.  To execute this task, 
Carnarvon chose Theophilus Shepstone, a man with thirty years of experience as a native 
agent for the Cape government.
19
  Carnarvon perceived that action had to proceed quickly 
in order to prevent the Boer-Bapedi conflict from expanding into a broader war and 
drawing in the British colonies, and also to ensure that the existing uncertain situation 
would lead to the annexation of the Transvaal.
20
  As Carnarvon wrote to Shepstone in 
October 1876: 
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The more that I consider the prospect of Affairs, the more important does it seem 
to me to obtain the Transvaal.  This will give us the key of the position and will 
solve many of our most pressing questions.  Lastly we can never hope that the 
opportunity will, if now lost, recur.
21
   
Informing Sir Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant Governor of Natal, of Shepstone’s mission, 
Carnarvon likewise made it clear that “under no circumstances does it seem possible to 
revert to the status quo.” 22   
When he appointed Shepstone as a special commissioner on 5 October 1876, 
Carnarvon had instructed him that, “if the emergency should … render it necessary,” to 
annex the Transvaal.
23
  Technically, Shepstone was restrained from making any unilateral 
proclamation of annexation, unless he was convinced that a majority of the Boers would 
accept British rule, and that the annexation had been approved by the high commissioner 
at the Cape.
24
  In any case, any resistance from the high commissioner’s office was 
effectively removed, when in February 1877 Carnarvon replaced Barkly, with Sir Henry 
Bartle Frere, an individual who was a more avid supporter of confederation.
25
  However, 
the fact that Shepstone was extraordinarily empowered to determine if circumstances 
were ripe for annexation essentially made the oversight of the high commissioner moot.  
Indeed W. J. Leyds, a man who held various offices in the Transvaal government in the 
1880s and 1890s, concluded that Shepstone’s instructions had essentially made him 
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“judge, jury, and prosecuting counsel in one, with the Republic as a criminal in the 
dock.”26 
Carnarvon rarely expressed concern that annexation without the approval of the 
Boers would violate the Sand River Convention.  Indeed two weeks before Shepstone’s 
commission was issued, he had informed Disraeli that he was “preparing a permissive bill 
to allow these colonies and states to Confederate.”27  By “these colonies and states,” 
Carnarvon clearly meant the Boer republics, and yet his most recent attempt to cajole 
them into confederation had been rebuffed only a couple of weeks earlier.  Far from 
offering honest assistance to the Transvaal as an equally sovereign state, Carnarvon had 
been working to exacerbate the troubles in the Transvaal in order to coerce it into 
confederation.
28
  Rather, Carnarvon’s reservations were rooted in the long-term viability 
of the annexation and whether such an action would create further turmoil in South 
Africa instead of lessening it.
29
  Having received reports that indicated that the English 
residents and many of the Boers looked to Britain as their only salvation, Carnarvon had 
some reason to believe that the annexation would occur amicably and with Boer 
approval.   
  Further, while Shepstone’s mission cannot be seen as a military intervention, it 
was not a purely diplomatic affair either, as the government deployed forces to the Cape 
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to “add weight and incline obedience to any declaration which Her Majesty’s 
Government might seem fit to make.” 30   Thus, two days after Shepstone departed for the 
Cape, Carnarvon ordered that the 2d Battalion of the 3rd “Buffs” Regiment of Foot, then 
stationed in Ireland, to mobilize for the Cape.  
Arriving in South Africa in early November, Shepstone waited to move until he 
was first convinced that his entrance into the Transvaal would not ward off the Zulus 
from attacking the Transvaal, and thus relieve the pressure on the Boers to accept British 
annexation.  In late December Shepstone informed President Burghers that he was in 
South Africa to inquire into the causes of the present native war, to resolve those 
disputes, and to prevent those disputes from arising in the future.  Then on 4 January 
1877, Shepstone crossed into the Transvaal with an entourage of twenty-five mounted 
policemen.
31
  While the greater part of the population was generally listless in the face of 
mounting external and internal problems and could be expected not to oppose adamantly 
what he offered, Shepstone was convinced that the sizeable number of ardent Boer 
nationalists in the general population, and particularly in the Transvaal government, 
would have to “see the strong arm before they [would] yield.”32  Any mystery as to 
Shepstone’s real intentions evaporated when he announced to Vice-President Paul Kruger 
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and the Attorney Genereal E. J. Jorissen that he was there to resolve the weakness of the 
Transvaal and the danger which it presented to itself and its neighbors, by “initiating a 
new state of things which would guarantee security for the future.”33  His insinuation was 
perfectly clear to the representatives of the Transvaal government.  Acting as an agent of 
the British government, Shepstone meant to annex the Transvaal.   
Responding that it was willing to discuss the causes of the Transvaal’s weakness, 
the Volksraad utterly refused to discuss any measures that would undermine the 
Transvaal’s independence.34  After meeting with President Thomas Burghers, however, 
Shepstone was convinced that the president himself was inclined towards embracing the 
security offered by British annexation, and consequently believed that he would soon be 
in a position to proclaim “Her Majesty’s sovereignty over the country.”35  Shepstone thus 
bided his time, and waited for the pot to boil over.  His silence not only kept the Boers off 
balance, but it provided him time to move the 1/13th “Buffs” up to Newcastle on the 
Transvaal border, with the expectation that the annexation would be accomplished more 
through a reliance on military power than on diplomacy.
36
  Ostensibly these troops were 
to be deployed “for the protection of the frontier.”  In reality, Shepstone desired troops 
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near at hand and ready to enter the Transvaal in the event “the exhibition of strong force” 
was needed “to control it and maintain the peace of the country.”37   
In early April, that moment presented itself.  Boer attempts at cajoling the Bapedi 
into signing a peace treaty had failed.  The Zulu under Cetshwayo were marching toward 
the Transvaal border; and the Boers had lost almost all confidence in Burghers’s ability to 
lead.  It was at this point that Shepstone acted.  With British troops poised to invade, he 
promised Burghers that if the Volksraad enacted constitutional and governmental 
reforms, he would refrain from taking any action.  Despite Burghers’s attempts, the 
Volksraad refused to take up the legislation, utterly rejected Carnarvon’s Permissive 
Federation Act, and issued a stern warning to Shepstone to refrain from interfering in 
their independence.
38
  Pragmatically, however, the Transvaal was in no condition to 
defend its independence militarily.  With British annexation immediately forthcoming, 
the Volksraad, in an act of desperation, gave emergency powers to Burghers in the hopes 
that the strength of their resolve would thwart Shepstone.  It did not.  Allowing Burghers 
to issue a formal protest for posterity, on 12 April 1877 Shepstone raised the Union Jack 
over Pretoria, the capital of the South African Republic.  He then dissolved the 
representative government, installed himself as the sole administrator of the territory, and 
imposed martial law.
39
  Brushing aside the objections of President Burghers and the 
Volksraad, as well as public petitions which insisted upon the independence of the 
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Transvaal and the rejection of British rule, Shepstone legitimized his action by insisting 
that “a large proportion of the inhabitants of the Transvaal…earnestly desire the 
establishment within and over it of Her Majesty’s Government.”40    
PUBLIC REACTION TO THE SHEPSTONE MISSION, 1877-78 
In one of its first assessments of the annexation, on 14 May, the Times astutely 
described the action as a “coup d’état,” and numerous papers, including the Times, 
forthrightly reprinted Shepstone’s own acknowledgement that he had annexed the 
Transvaal simply because he “could wait no longer” for the Boers to consent to Britain’s 
demands.
41
  Despite this admission, there was hardly any outcry against the action from 
the British public or the press, and these articles were deliberately framed to demonstrate 
that circumstances on the ground had forced Britain to act.  The Dundee Courier noted: 
It is a circumstance deserving of passing notice that the news of the annexation of 
a republic to the British Empire fails at present to excite here even a weak and 
ephemeral interest.  Questions are asked in Parliament about the reported 
annexation of the Transvaal republic, but they attract rather less attention than 
questions about “the Claimant” or the many other trifling matters on which 
Ministers are rightly catechized…The annexation of the Transvaal was of course 
not desired in the interests of the extension of the British empire; the act is 
probably one of these necessities which are so frequently devolved on powerful 
and civilized States coming in contact with weak, inferior, and semi-barbarous 
communities.
42
 
  
While the Dundee Courier’s observation was that the public was largely uninterested in 
the annexation question, the national and provincial presses did engage the issue.  On the 
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whole, like the Courier, they overwhelmingly approved of the action.  While 
acknowledging the protests that President Burghers and the Volksraad had lodged with 
the British government and the international community, the papers stressed the absence 
of any sizeable Boer objection to British rule and that the Volksraad had ultimately 
instructed the population to cooperate with the British.
43
  To that end, they largely 
reiterated Shepstone’s contention that the need to overturn the Sand River Convention 
had been forced upon Britain by the inability of the Boers to govern themselves, and that 
British rule would usher in greater security and prosperity to the region as a whole.
44
  
That such action was enthusiastically supported at the same time that Britain was 
“horrified at the prospect of Russian annexations in the East” was not lost upon the 
editors of the Liverpool Mercury.  Insisting that the timing of the annexation was “the 
only dark spot on an otherwise unexceptional transaction,” the paper maintained that    
there never was an annexation accomplished with purer motives, with less 
resistance, or with less injury to the populations, who are not even deprived of 
that measure of self-government which they had always proposed to retain, but 
only that ‘independence’ which they all knew they must, after more or less 
troublesome negotiation, abandon.
45
 
 
The façade of British altruism was somewhat laid bear with an acknowledgement by the 
Standard that the annexation of the Transvaal had, at least in part, been made necessary 
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by the Boer government’s  obstruction of British capitalists, who sought to profit from 
the mineral riches which lay within the territory.
46
 
The one small glimmer of opposition in parliament came primarily from a small 
contingent of the Irish Home Rule Party.  Identifying the plight of the Boers with 
Britain’s oppression of Ireland, Home Rule Leaguers Charles Stewart Parnell, Purcell 
O’Gorman, Frank Hugh O’Donnell, and Joseph Biggar hotly contested the annexation of 
the Transvaal.
47
  When Carnarvon’s South Africa Bill, which would allow for 
establishment of a South African Confederation, came before the House in July 1877, it 
became the occasion for an epic display of parliamentary obstruction.
48
  Amid 
considerable commotion and distraction, Parnell declared to the Commons that:  
As it was with Ireland, so it was with the South African Colonies…Therefore, as 
an Irishman, coming from a country that had experienced to its fullest extent the 
results of English interference in its affairs and the consequences of English 
cruelty and tyranny, he felt a special satisfaction in preventing and thwarting the 
intentions of the government in respect to this Bill.
49
   
 
He further accused the government of acting “on the immoral doctrine that the interests 
of the people of South Africa were subservient to the interests of the Empire at large.”  
The House was asked to sanction the annexation of the South African Republic, 
not because it was for the benefit of the Colonies, but because it was alleged that 
it would be beneficial to the Empire generally.
50
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In addressing what he considered to be the transgressions of the British 
government more specifically, O’Donnell charged that the “forcible annexation of the 
independent Republics of South Africa had taken place in a time of peace, and [was] in 
violation of the most solemn covenants entered into by Her Majesty's Government.”51  
This point, he insisted, had not gone unnoticed by continental powers, namely the 
Republic of the United Provinces, and he presented to the Commons protests from the 
Dutch government.  In appealing to “the free people of England,” the Dutch expressed 
their hope that the British would denounce the annexation as “an odious attempt and act 
of brigandage,” which violated “the guarantees given to the South African Republic in 
the name of the British Crown.”52  Even if the “Government had a right to declare war 
against the Transvaal Republic,” O’Donnell insisted that there was an enormous 
distinction between limited conditions that might be imposed after a “righteous war,” and 
“the needless exaction of unjust conditions.”    To that end, he rhetorically asked whether 
Germany or the United States would be justified in blotting out the Swiss Republic or 
federalizing Jamaica, respectively, for the only reason that it was in their best interest to 
do so.
53
   
These few Home Rulers were joined in their protests by the Liberal M.P. from 
Liskeard, Leonard Courtney, who would later become a leading figure of the Pro-Boer 
party. While not interested in the ramifications for Ireland, he was nevertheless deeply 
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concerned about the implications of the Transvaal annexation.
54
   “The Government,” he 
explained, 
has just annexed an independent Republic in South Africa. It may be said that it 
will involve no risk; but to that I reply, Wait till the end.  That act, without any 
justification of policy or principle, exposes the country to greater peril of war than 
my suggestions for the coercion of Turkey.
55
 
 
The majority of parliament and the general public were largely deaf to these 
voices.  In parliament Parnell and O’Donnell were consistently rebuked and informed 
that, because the annexation of the Transvaal was not pertinent to the Bill at hand, they 
were out of order to raise the issue; nevertheless, they held up the third reading for forty-
five hours.
56
  This type of criticism is of course highly ironic given that the Bill was 
meant to retroactively justify the annexation.  The select few M.P.s who did actually 
engage the issue, such as William Forster, a former Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies in the Gladstone administration, and imperialist Liberals Joseph Cowen and 
Alexander McArthur, insisted that such an action was necessary to prevent utter anarchy, 
that it prevented a “most destructive and bloody war,” and that the majority of the white 
population appeared to be in favor of annexation.
57
  Cowen went a step further to object 
to Courtney’s use of the term “annexation” to describe what had taken place in the 
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Transvaal because that label incorrectly “presupposed the exercise of physical force.” 
Instead, Cowen preferred the label of “incorporation,” which entailed a “union of mutual 
consent.”58  Cowen’s confidence notwithstanding, he was hardly the only critic to brush 
aside Courtney.  Thus, the Morning Post expressed its hope that the criticisms of the 
member for Liskeard would be the last heard in the present session of parliament, and 
that before the next session, Shepstone’s action would “come to be regarded by the 
present objectors as fait accompli that it is useless any longer to question.”59  
Notably absent from the discussion were the voices of the Peace Society and 
Workingman’s Peace Association which had been vocal in denouncing the “bellicose 
policies of theatrical Imperialism,” which were associated with Beaconsfield imperialism 
in other spheres during those same years.
60
  Between 1876 and 1878, Henry Richard, a 
Liberal M.P. and Secretary of the Peace Society, along with the broader peace movement 
had aggressively engaged the jingo call for war against Russia over the Eastern Question.  
Similarly, they had been and would be highly critical of the government’s aggressive 
imperialism in China, West Africa, Afghanistan, and toward the Zulus in South Africa.
61
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In so doing, the peace movement attacked on two fronts.  On the one hand, the Peace 
Society, which depended on the support of the Quaker community, took a peace-at-any-
price position on the government’s pursuit of Britain’s imperial wars.62  Others, such as 
Henry Richard and the Workingman’s Peace Association, however, took a more nuanced 
stance and emphasized a need for greater arbitration and a reduction of armaments, as 
well as pressing for non-interventionist policies on the grounds of “reason, justice, 
humanity, and the interests of mankind.”63  Richard consistently focused on the lack of 
sufficient justification for the extension of brute force.  To him, the Arrow, Ashanti, 
Second Afghan, and Zulu Wars were completely unnecessary wars of imperialism.  He 
contended that the Arrow War, sometimes called the Second Opium War, had been 
contrived to further the immorality of the opium trade.
64
  Similarly, he viewed the 
Ashanti, Second Afghan, and Zulu Wars as unnecessary and unrighteous; further, they 
had also been contrived by the men on the spot and then condoned by the government.
65
  
The onset of the Zulu War (about which more below) and British conduct in it were so 
egregious that Richard branded that war “the most inglorious war waged by the arms of 
England.”66  The results of such unjustified wars, Richard insisted, “were not triumphs of 
Christian civilization, but of barbarism and brute force.”67 
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However, Richard voiced no opposition or concern about the annexation of the 
Transvaal in parliament until after the First Anglo-Boer War broke out in December 
1880.  On that occasion, he submitted a memorial to Lord Kimberley, the Colonial 
Secretary, on behalf of the Peace Society and signed by twenty-five other Members of 
Parliament.  Richard insisted that the Transvaal had been fraudulently obtained, and that 
as such, Britain should renounce its aggression and restore Boer independence.
68
  Yet he 
had not expressed such views at the time of the annexation or during the debate over the 
South Africa Bill.  What Richard had petitioned for at the time of the South Africa Bill 
was the extension of a selective franchise to “native Africans who [had] acquired both 
education and property” in establishing a confederated government of South African 
States.
69
     
Given their consistent track record of vocally opposing untoward intervention and 
the opportunistic use of brute force to further British imperialistic interests, why then did 
the peace movement not levy charges against Shepstone and the British government for 
annexing the Transvaal?  Certainly the events of 1877 were well known to the British 
public.  The fact that there were individuals, such as Parnell and Courtney, who spoke out 
against the annexation on the grounds that it was an unrighteous act, only makes their 
silence all the more remarkable.  We have seen that although the annexation was effected 
by Shepstone with only a small police escort, with a contingent of the British army on the 
Transvaal border, Shepstone effectively telegraphed to the Transvaal government that 
refusal was not a viable option, but those troops did not intercede.  To be sure, regardless 
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of how the press spun the incident, the annexation was certainly not agreeable to the 
Boers, and the British absorption of the Transvaal was hardly altruistic or honorable.  But 
the peace movement’s silence was in all likelihood based on the fact that no actual 
fighting occurred, especially when compared to the Afghan and other campaigns. 
 Taken together, that silence juxtaposed against the overwhelming approval of the 
press suggest a number of key components to the British attitude toward the use of 
coercive military force.  First and foremost, the largely one-sided reception of the 
annexation strongly indicates that the normal grounds for objecting to “war” and brute 
military force were largely mitigated by the specific circumstances of the annexation.  
Namely, the annexation was not hampered by moral questions of the sort that had 
accompanied British interventionism in China or the destruction and bloodbath that 
accompanied other concurrent episodes of Beaconsfieldism, such as the Ashanti, Second 
Afghan, or Zulu Wars.  The complete lack of armed exchange, furthermore, almost 
certainly made the annexation of the Transvaal more palatable to the country.  Had there 
been a strong demonstration of military opposition by the Boers, the incident would 
likely have garnered more searching public commentary, if not outright, criticism, by the 
British public as a whole and by concerned pacifist groups.  As there was virtually none, 
the public was free to assume that British rule was completely acceptable to the Transvaal 
Boers, and therefore to assert that Britain was innocent of violating the Transvaal’s 
sovereignty.
70
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Given the relatively positive response at home, high-ranking officials within the 
Colonial Office declared that protests levied by the Boer government, Dutch citizens, and 
Transvaal Boers, and presumably those issued by the handful of critics in parliament, 
“were not worthy of consideration.”71  The end result was that in this instance, there was 
an almost universal acceptance of using strong-arm negotiating tactics to advance British 
humanitarianism and security, even by papers, such as the Leeds Mercury, which had—
like the Peace Society—staunchly criticized aggressive interventionism on the occasions 
of the Opium and Arrow Wars in 1840 and 1857.  Significant differences certainly 
distinguish the annexation and the Opium Wars, most importantly that in one case 
intervention was accomplished peacefully and in the other it resulted in war.  Still, the 
criticism of the Leeds Mercury for Palmerston’s China policy went further than merely 
condemning the expense of blood and capital; it challenged the justification of Britain in 
interfering in the right of the Chinese to self-government.
72
  
Further evidence that public attitudes about saber rattling were determined on a 
case-by-case basis and not on a systemic feature of British governance is suggested by 
the circumstances of Carnarvon’s resignation in January 1878.73  Just one year after his 
directives had provoked the absorption of the Transvaal, Carnarvon willingly resigned as 
Colonial Secretary as a protest to the rising tide of jingoism and the willingness of 
Disraeli and his cabinet to use force to defend British interests in the Near East amid 
Russian encroachments on the Ottoman Empire.
74
  Carnarvon’s resignation was 
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noteworthy as it exemplified a characteristic of British belligerence.  While he was 
perfectly willing to use the threat of military force to pressure the Transvaal into 
compliance, that mindset was far from a philosophical precept for him.  Instead, the 
decision of whether or not to use force was determined by the immediate circumstances, 
including the potential foe to be confronted, and the ends which were sought. 
THE ZULU WAR OF 1879 
Despite Carnarvon’s belief that the expansion of British hegemony would bring 
more tranquility and security to southern Africa, that desired effect did not materialize.  
In annexing the Transvaal, Britain now assumed responsibility for protecting the region 
from threats posed from Zululand.  In his former capacity as the commissioner of Native 
Affairs, Shepstone had developed cordial relations with the Zulu.  But as the self-
appointed administrator of the Transvaal, he took up the cause of the Boers in their 
border dispute with the Zulu, and convinced Sir Bartle Frere, who had been appointed 
high commissioner of South Africa, to effect the confederation of the subcontinent.  
Shepstone’s motivation was that he believed that no long-term peace could be found so 
long as the Zulu kingdom remained intact.  When the Boer-Zulu border dispute was put 
to an arbitration commission, its members ruled in July 1878 in favor of the Zulus.
75
   
Had the ruling been allowed to stand, it might have led to peace in South Africa. 
However, Frere perceived it to be a humiliating impediment to his and Carnarvon’s 
confederation designs for South Africa.  As such, although he had built a reputation as an 
evangelical defender of the oppressed, over the next several months Frere began taking 
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steps to subjugate the Zulus.  Emphasizing the menace posed by the Zulus, Frere asked 
that reinforcements be sent to southern Africa, and continued to present himself publicly 
as someone who desired to maintain peace through diplomacy.
76
  Sir Michael Hicks-
Beach, Carnarvon’s successor as the colonial secretary, responded that the government 
would not send troops and that—in addition to the Eastern Crisis and the brewing war in 
Afghanistan—it could not “now have a Zulu war in addition to other greater and too 
possible troubles.”77  That warning notwithstanding, when Frere informed the Zulu chief 
Cetshwayo of the commission’s findings, he inserted an additional set of stipulations, 
which were designed to dismantle the Zulu military and essentially strip the kingdom of 
its sovereignty.
78
  Submitted in the form of an ultimatum, those stipulations did not 
preclude the Zulus from requiring universal service in times of war, but they admonished 
that “the regiments were not to be called up without permission of the great council of the 
Zulu Nation assembled and the consent of the British government.”  In addition, the 
missionaries who resided within Zululand were to be protected, and Zulus were to be 
allowed to marry and attend school as matters of free choice.  To ensure that these terms 
were adhered to a British resident was to be stationed either within Zululand or on its 
immediate border.
79
  Confident that the Zulu would not comply with his demands, Frere 
ordered British forces to mobilize along the border of Zululand, and when the ultimatum 
expired on 11 January 1879, a force of 5,000 British Regulars and roughly the same 
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number of Auxiliaries crossed over the Buffalo and Tugela Rivers into Zululand and 
instigated hostilities.
80
  
Despite the high commissioner’s expressed “fear” of an imminent invasion from 
Zululand, most Natal colonials believed that their neighbors posed little, if any, 
substantive threat to the British presence in Natal.  Indeed, in early November 1878, a 
month before Frere delivered his ultimatum, the Natal Witness concluded that, while 
hostilities were a possibility, it would take “an overt act of defiance … or some violation 
of British territory” by the Zulus to instigate a war.81  Shortly thereafter, it noted that any 
fear of a Zulu invasion had all but subsided, and the paper reiterated its confidence that 
Cetshwayo would not initiate hostilities.  It went on to assert that “things were not yet 
ripe enough” to warrant a British invasion of Zululand and seemingly suggested that the 
mere mobilization of the British forces on the border would be enough to cause 
Cetshwayo to back down.
82
  Even after Frere had sent the ultimatum to the Zulus, the 
Witness argued that the chances of the crisis leading to violence were still quite remote.
83
   
Likewise, Lt. Col. Anthony Durnford of the Royal Engineers also believed that a 
war was completely unnecessary.  Durnford personally found Frere’s approach to native 
affairs in South Africa distasteful.  As a member of the arbitration commission that had 
decided the Blood River Territory dispute in favor of Cetshwayo, he attempted to 
adjudicate the matter fairly and opposed Frere’s belligerent posturing.  Moreover, he was 
concerned that the British public was being swayed by what he considered to be false and 
exaggerated reports from the Cape.  As late as mid-November 1878, Durnford believed 
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that there was utterly no reason for an offensive war against the Zulus because they posed 
no threat to Natal.  However, once the movement toward war was set in motion, the 
dutiful soldier kept any continuing reservation about the commissioner’s policies to 
himself.
84
  Given the weight of public opinion in Natal against any military action, it is 
likely that Frere deliberately fomented the myth of a Zulu threat in order to court British 
public opinion and government support for his plan to expand British hegemony and 
solidify South African confederation.
85
   
In the event, colonists and officials alike were confident that, although the Zulu 
army vastly outnumbered British forces in the colony, Britain’s technological advantage 
assured that the Zulus could be subjugated with relative ease.  The Natal Mercury went 
so far as to claim arrogantly that “this army could not be beaten the world over.”86  
Likewise, although Durnford believed the war to be unnecessary, he felt that if handled 
correctly, the invasion could be a bloodless affair and amount to nothing more than a 
“military promenade.”87   
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Reports from the high commissioner’s office and the Cape press, took time to 
reach Britain, arriving a little more than a week before the ultimatum was set to expire.  
But once the government and the British public became aware of Bartle Frere’s 
provocation, they became keenly interested in the developing controversy.
88
  In stark 
contrast to the overwhelming approval of Shepstone’s use of heavy-handed coercive 
diplomacy to expand the boundaries of British territory in southern Africa in 1877, the 
public was divided over the legitimacy of Frere’s instigation of a war with the Zulus.  
The perception was that the region was unstable and that the threat to Natal was 
questionable.  In general, editorial stances were split along party lines.  Liberal presses 
such the Bristol Mercury, Lloyd’s Newspaper, Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper, and the 
Daily News had track records of opposing the use of military force to advance British 
interests elsewhere in the world.  Earlier, they had come out against the Opium Wars in 
China in the 1840s and 1850s, which had been instigated by the men on the spot and 
approved by the Whig governments of Lords Melbourne and Palmerston.
89
  In 1879, 
meanwhile, the parallels and resemblances between the concurrent overreaches of Bartle 
Frere and Lord Lytton in issuing ultimatums to Cetshwayo and the Afghan Ameer, 
respectively, to force their compliance with British interests were not lost upon Liberal 
papers such as Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper.90  Noting that the ultimatum issued by 
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Lytton had led to a second war in Afghanistan, Reynolds’s expressed little doubt that 
Bartle Frere’s action would likewise result in a war, if one had not broken out already, 
and the paper charged that “Beaconsfield’s ‘ultipomatums’ [sic] which were marked by 
“blood, slaughter, and pensive devilment,” were “as efficacious as a dose of forked 
lightning in a powder magazine.”91  Reynolds’s further insisted that there was no 
justifiable pretext for war, and decried the history of Disraeli’s government for being 
traced in blood, arguing that “Britain was reaping the bitter fruits of imperial jingoism” 
by “continually drifting into costly wars, debt, distress, and destitution.”92 
While they may have acquiesced to the annexation of the Transvaal, Liberal 
papers found Frere’s arguments vapid and condemned him for exceeding his authority 
and for acting in conflict to the wishes of the Colonial Office.  For instance, in 1877 the 
Daily News had seemingly concurred with the Cape Times’s belief that “the annexation 
[of the Transvaal] gives peace to South Africa,” and “wars with the natives are things of 
the past.”93  Subsequently, they questioned the annexation policy, with the Reynolds’s 
Weekly arguing that it had done nothing but continue the contentions between the 
European and native communities, a sentiment which was echoed in the Daily News.
94
  In 
assessing the gravity of Frere’s ultimatum, the Daily News concluded that war with the 
Zulu was all but certain, if it had not already broken out.  Emphasizing the indefensibility 
of Frere’s demands, the editors argued that Britain would never have been drawn into a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nineteenth Century Britain, 1815-1914 (New York: McKay, 1960), 308.  For a detailed examination of 
British policy in Afghanistan, see T. A. Heathcote, The Afghan Wars, 1839-1919 (London: Osprey, 1980, 
reprint Staplehust, UK: Spellmount, 2003); and Christopher M. Wyatt, Afghanistan and the Defense of 
Empire: Diplomacy and Strategy During the Great Game (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011). 
91
 Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper, 5 January 1879, 3. 
92
 Ibid., 2 February 1879, 1-2; 9 February 1879, 3; 16 February 1879, 4.. 
93
 Daily News (London), 21 May 1877, 6 
94
 Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper, 1 December 1878, 4; 2 February 1879, 2, Daily News (London), 28 
January 1879, 4.  
44 
 
war with the Zulu had it not assumed responsibility for the Transvaal.  It further charged 
that, given the recent developments in South Africa, it was clear that insufficient attention 
was being devoted to assessing the means and consequences of territorial expansion:    
We can hardly want another South African kingdom on our hands.  As it is, our 
territories in that continent are too wide for the European population, which 
sparsely inhabits them; and it has been most desirable that the most friendly 
relations should be kept with the vast native population.
95
 
    
Likewise, the Bristol Mercury charged that the High Commissioner had instigated 
the imbroglio without the permission of the Government, precisely because he knew that 
they would not support his assessment of the situation or the use of force to resolve the 
matter.
96
  On the other hand, however, the paper charged that Frere had acted in concert 
with colonial public opinion.  The Mercury labeled colonists at the Cape as jingoes who 
believed that a successful war against the Zulu was essential for the future security of 
British South Africa.
97
  
In contrast, the Conservative press generally had fewer qualms about a military 
solution.  Writing just one day after Frere’s ultimatum was announced in Britain, the 
Standard upheld that action and argued that the mobilization of troops against the Zulu 
was justified in light of the “absurd and insolent claims of Cetywayo [sic].”98   Noting the 
lockstep opposition of the Liberals to “another little war,” the Derby Mercury condemned 
those who would put party matters before patriotism and objected to those who took the 
side of the “savage” in any colonial or foreign policy dispute.  The war at hand, the paper 
claimed, was not one of Britain’s making, but rather had been forced upon the country by 
the aggressiveness of Cetshwayo.  Moreover, while the paper acknowledged that 
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developments at the Cape raised questions about colonial self-rule and the financial 
burdens of imperial defense, such issues did not outweigh Britain’s responsibility to 
protect the Transvaal.
99
  The Conservative presses were joined in their support of the 
High Commissioner by at least some of the independent presses. For example, the 
Huddersfield Chronicle insisted that there was plenty of evidence to prove a war with the 
Zulu was not a war of aggression.  The Chronicle claimed, moreover, that this conflict 
was not designed to advance imperialism, nor was it intended to keep the nation in an 
excited state.
100
   
This variegated public response to the outbreak of the Zulu War differed 
considerably from the more unified and apparently sympathetic reaction to Shepstone’s 
annexation of the Transvaal.  The difference can, in no small way, likely be accounted for 
by the courses of the respective enterprises.  Whereas Shepstone had been able to achieve 
his mission without mishap and without an actual battle, Chelmsford’s invasion of 
Zululand was beset by numerous setbacks, which shocked the British at home and British 
colonials, who fully expected the invasion to be nothing short of a complete success.   
The greatest shock, and arguably one of the most humiliating and unexpected military 
disasters in any theatre in the Victorian era, came eleven days into the campaign.
101
  On 
22 January nearly half of Lord Chelmsford’s central column was annihilated at 
Isandhlwana en route to the Zulu capital at Ulundi. In that battle, nearly 1450 out of 1800 
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officers and men were massacred by a force of roughly 20,000 Zulus.
102
  The gallant 
defense of 140 men of “B” Co. 2/24th Regiment of Foot at Rorke’s Drift against 4,000 
Zulus mollified the sting of the disaster at Isandhlwana only slightly.
103
  Regrouping after 
Colonel Henry Wood’s decisive victory over the Zulus at Kambula (29 March), 
Chelmsford launched a second invasion of Zululand at the end of May, and by the middle 
of July his forces had secured the country after defeating Cetshwayo at Ulundi. 
As was so often the case in Britain’s small imperial wars, the opening shots at 
Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift took place before the government in London and the 
British public even knew for certain that war had erupted.
104
  Coming so soon after the 
start of the war, those events did much to shape, fuel, and encourage public interest in 
and the debate over the war.  If the public had been too preoccupied with the Afghan 
War, the Eastern Crisis, the collapse of the Glasgow Bank, and labor strikes to notice yet 
“another little war” in South Africa, it could hardly have failed to become astutely aware 
after Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift as the details were splashed across the pages of the 
provincial press.  The press’s interest in the Zulu war was evident in the personal tone 
with which the satirical journal Punch covered developments.  It claimed that Sir Garnet 
Wolseley himself had desired “Punch” at his elbow when he embarked at Portsmouth for 
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South Africa, insisting that “if anyone [could] make things straight” it was “Punch.”  The 
paper then pictured Mr. Punch variously offering advice to both Zulu and Afghan leaders, 
crushing of the Zulus single-handedly, and yet tipping his hat to the beleaguered figures 
of Bromhead and Chard at Rorke’s Drift.105   
For those already disposed against the war, these setbacks were seen as irrefutable 
proof of the incompetence of Frere and Chelmsford, respectively, as colonial 
administrator and military strategist.  In that vein, a chorus of voices in Parliament and 
the general public began calling for Frere to be censured on the grounds that he had failed 
to abide by the will of the cabinet and Parliament and that his unsanctioned and 
precipitous actions had been completely unnecessary to secure Natal against an invasion.   
While Lloyds’ Newspaper paid homage to the heroic stand of the 2/24th at 
Rorke’s Drift, it blamed Frere for that near disaster and the earlier catastrophe at 
Isandhlwana, and insisted that there were “few men in the country indeed who would not 
condemn the war as a most reprehensible and a wanton act of mischief on the part of 
Bartle Frere.”106  Even if that estimation of public opinion was accurate, such beliefs 
certainly did not prevent the public from enthusiastically sending off British regulars 
from Southampton bound for the Cape.  Indeed, while the paper reckoned that these new 
reinforcements would provide Chelmsford the means to “scatter the barbarous legions of 
the Zulu King,” it denounced the pattern of bombastic bluster and disastrous chauvinism 
which on so many occasions led Britain into trouble.  Frere’s actions were therefore only 
the most recent instance in which a government official had defied the Government’s 
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warnings and devoted himself to war and one can imagine that the shadow of the Afghan 
War loomed large in this judgment.
107
  
The editors of Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper broadened their earlier attack and 
linked the most recent failure in South Africa to what they saw as the systemic and 
inescapable failures of Beaconsfieldism and Tory governance.  Such actions made Britain 
financially poorer and morally weaker.
108
  In particular, the mounting costs and the 
disaster at Isandhlwana were, in their minds, the “bitter fruits of imperial jingoism.”  The 
editors of Reynolds’s, along with those of the North-Eastern Daily Gazette, pointedly 
charged that the Government had blood on its hands for sanctioning the High 
Commissioner’s “mischievous policy.”  As such, it should thus share in the blame for the 
South African debacle.
109
  Furthermore, in reflecting upon Lord Derby’s insistence that 
Britain’s first interest was peace and how men in the Government had recently dragged 
the country into wars with the Ashanti, Afghan, Zulu and Burmese, Reynolds’s 
subsequently argued that decisive action must be taken to “make it impossible for men 
like Sir Henry Layard and Sir Bartle Frere to call up fleets, or to send for reinforcements 
to execute a policy which the British people have never had the opportunity of 
considering in Parliament.”110   
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  The disaster of Isandhlwana, however, did little to dissuade the Conservative 
Aberdeen Journal and the Liberal Pall Mall Gazette, which had broken ranks with the 
other Liberal presses, from supporting the embattled high commissioner from the start.  
Arguing that Frere should be given the benefit of the doubt until the facts became more 
fully known, they encouraged the public not to rush to judgment.  They argued that Frere 
had not overestimated the Zulu peril, and postulated that, while it may have been rash to 
invade Zululand, a delay may have proved to be a far more dangerous course of action.
111
  
Even after Parliament moved to censure Frere in April 1879, the Pall Mall Gazette 
continued to defend him.  It insisted that it was completely disingenuous and “the wrong 
mode of … treating public servants abroad”  for officials, such as Lord Salisbury, to tout 
Frere’s “patriotism” and to refuse his resignation on the grounds that he continued to 
have confidence in his abilities, having voted earlier to censure the administrator.
112
   
While much of the public’s attention was focused on Frere’s supposed intention to 
foment another colonial war, Chelmsford did not escape criticism for his part in the 
disaster at Isandhlwana.  Despite Chelmsford’s attempts to lay the blame for the disaster 
on Durnford, the senior officer in the camp when the Zulus attacked, Liberal and 
Conservative papers alike, including the Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper and the Standard, 
concurred that a more able commander needed to be assigned.
113
  This stance was 
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particularly noteworthy coming from the Standard, a paper whose correspondent Charles 
“Noggs” Norris-Newman had accepted the mobilization of British troops as an 
appropriate reaction to the “absurd and insolent claims of Cetywayo [sic].”114  The 
obvious choice for this assignment was Britain’s premier military commander Major 
General Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had become a household name after proving himself 
against the Ashanti in West Africa in 1873-74.  So confident and familiar was the public 
with Wolseley’s abilities that some provincial newspapers argued that had he been in 
charge from the beginning, Isandhlwana would never have happened.
115
  
While the London and provincial press brought the war and the questions 
surrounding it home to the public through news reports, editorials, and occasional maps, 
illustrated broadsheets such as the Illustrated London News, the Graphic and the Penny 
Illustrated Paper effectively brought the public more intimately into contact with the 
dramatic course of the Zulu and other wars by splashing engravings of maps, the terrain, 
the events, and the personalities involved alongside written reports and analyses of the 
war.  In the case of the Zulu War, these included depictions of troop activity and battles, 
the embarkation and transit of the 91
st
 Highlanders and 60
th
 Rifles to South Africa, 
Buller’s defeat of the Zulus at Kambula, as well as the military and social life of Britain’s 
African adversary.
116
  In the aftermath of Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift, mosaics of the 
tragic and auspicious heroes of those incidents, appeared in the Graphic, Illustrated 
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London News, and the Penny Illustrated Paper.
117
  The overall effect of such publications 
was that many of those who fell at Isandhlwana, along with those who successfully 
fended off the attack at the mission station at Rorke’s Drift, were quickly elevated to hero 
status.  Significantly, the mosaic which appeared in the Graphic on 1 March integrated 
the heroes of the Zulu War with those of the war in Afghanistan, which was an unrelated 
but contemporaneous affair, and strongly suggests that the public understood the breadth 
of imperial activity within an interconnected framework.
118
 
IMPERIAL RETREAT:  
MIDLOTHIAN AND THE FIRST ANGLO-BOER WAR, 1879-1881 
Just a little more than a year after the close of the Zulu War, public interest was 
again focused on the African subcontinent as war erupted between the Boers and Britain.  
The public’s interest in South African affairs in the years leading up to the war and 
during the war itself cannot be divorced from the broader framework of empire and 
public awareness.  Moreover, the backdrop for the war and the public discourse about it, 
illustrate the reciprocal relationship that existed between imperial developments on the 
periphery and local matters in Britain itself, both on personal and national levels.   
That intersection is most clearly seen in the life of William Ewart Gladstone 
between 1879 and early 1880.  In February 1879, to Gladstone’s dismay, Britain was 
awash with jingoistic fervor as Prime Minister Disraeli authorized £6 million for a naval 
expedition to intervene on behalf of Turkey against Russian encroachment.  That fervor 
put Gladstone at odds with his own Greenwich constituency, some of whom 
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demonstrated in a mob-like fashion in front of his house, requiring police intervention to 
disperse the crowd.  In turn, Gladstone found that his political future depended upon 
severing his ties with Greenwich.  Turning down an opportunity to represent Leeds, 
Gladstone ultimately decided to challenge Lord Dalkeith for the Midlothian seat.   As 
Gladstone biographers H. G. C. Matthew and Roy Jenkins have noted, this move marked 
a pivotal turning point in parliamentary history.  It exemplified the tendency of Liberals 
to focus on deriving influence and power from more agrarian and non-English 
constituencies instead of potentially less predictable English constituencies, such as 
Leeds.  Indeed after Gladstone’s premiership of 1868-1874 all future Liberal prime 
ministers emerged from non-English constituencies.
119
 
In the forthcoming campaign, Gladstone made imperial affairs a central issue 
because he believed that the preceding years of Conservative governance had had the 
“effect of vexing and alarming the people of this country and compromising the interests 
of the empire.”120  He, therefore, denounced the jingoism associated with Disraeli’s 
Eastern policy, and what he believed were unjustifiable wars against the Zulu and Afghan 
peoples.  In addition, he accused Disraeli of fiscal mismanagement, by emphasizing that 
during his premiership the government had gone from enjoying a £6 million surplus to an 
£8 million deficit.
121
  Further, although he had publicly remained silent on the Transvaal 
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at the time of its annexation and throughout the debate over the South Africa Bill, 
Gladstone now added that action to the list of Beaconsfield’s imperial missteps:122 
They have annexed in Africa the Transvaal territory inhabited by a free European 
Christian republican community which they have thought proper to bring within 
the limits of a monarchy, although out of 8000 persons in that republic qualified 
to vote upon the subject we are told—and I have never seen the statement 
officially contradicted—that 6500 protested against it. These are the 
circumstances under which we undertake to transform republicans into the 
subjects of the monarchy.
123
 
 
In the Transvaal we have chosen most unwisely – I am tempted to say insanely – 
to put ourselves in the strange predicament of the free subjects of the Monarch 
going to coerce the free subjects of the Republic and to compel them to accept a 
citizenship which they decline and refuse.  If they refuse, it must be done by 
force.  And if we pass into Afghanistan and occupy Kabul and Kandahar, and, as 
some say we are going to do, occupy Heart – and I can see no limit to these 
operations, everything of that kind means a necessity for more money, and means 
a necessity for more men.
124
 
 
Such actions, he insisted, did not strengthen the empire; instead, like the threads holding 
down Gulliver in Gulliver’s Travels, they would coalesce and thereby considerably 
weaken Britain to the point where the country would become practically incapacitated.
125
 
 Gladstone intended that his Midlothian bid would represent more than a contest 
for a single seat in Parliament.  In headlining what he believed were the imperial and 
domestic failures of Beaconsfieldism, Gladstone intended to launch a popular crusade, 
and in so doing he revolutionized British electioneering.  While popular political crusades 
had been seen before, most notably with the Chartist movement of the 1830s, it was 
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unprecedented for a former prime minister to lead such a movement.  It was also 
innovatory, as Gladstone did not restrict his campaign speeches to the Midlothian 
electorate.  On the way to Edinburgh on 24 November, he gave campaign speeches at 
Carlyle on the English-Scottish Border, and then at Hawick, and at Galashiels in the 
Scottish Borders.  After spending only a week in Midlothian itself, Gladstone then 
headed north into the Central Lowlands and southern Highlands of Scotland, stopping 
along the way to speak in Inverkeithing, Dunfermline, Perth, Aberfeldy, and Taymouth.  
He then turned south and finished off the campaign with six meetings in Glasgow and 
Motherwell in Lanarkshire.  His campaign, however, reached out even more broadly than 
that, as the national and provincial press made his speeches available throughout Britain.  
Indeed it was this wider readership that was Gladstone’s intended audience. 126   
When the final votes were tallied, in April 1880, Gladstone and the Liberals were 
swept into power.  Receiving 55% of the popular vote and winning a net gain of 110 
seats, they quite literally reversed the results of the 1874 election.  Moreover, while the 
voting returns in Midlothian did not exhibit a drastic shift from previous years, the effect 
of the campaign could be seen elsewhere.  In Scotland, Conservatives retained only six of 
the eighteen seats they had won in 1874, the first and only time before the twentieth 
century that Conservative representation was held to single digits in Scotland.  In Wales, 
Tory candidates lost ten seats and were left with only four.  In England, for only the 
second time since 1832, Conservative representation dropped below 200 seats, something 
that would not be repeated until 1906 and then again in 1945.  Losing only three seats in 
Ireland, the Conservatives continued to outnumber the Liberals, but they themselves were 
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drastically outnumbered by the Home Rule party of Charles Stewart Parnell, who held 63 
out of the 103 seats.
127
 
Between 1877 and 1880, meanwhile, Boer nationalism and resentment of British 
rule had percolated in the Transvaal, and the Boers were encouraged by the Gladstone’s 
repudiation of the annexation.  Those condemnations, however, did not lead to an attempt 
by Gladstone to undo the annexation.  After the Queen’s Speech of 20 May 1880, 
Gladstone explained that his new administration would not endeavor to undo that legacy 
of Beaconsfieldism.  While he had personally disagreed with it in the first place, the 
positive consequences from that action, he argued, could not be denied.  He and others 
had promised to protect the native populations of the region, and British sovereignty 
provided that security.
128
   Believing that they had been betrayed by Gladstone, the Boers 
revolted against British rule in December 1880 and announced the reestablishment of a 
republic to be led by a triumvirate executive of Paul Kruger, Piet Joubert, and ex-
President J. W. Pretorius.
129
  Within days of that declaration, the Boers had ambushed 
and effectively wiped out a detachment of the 94
th
 Regiment at Bronkhorstspruit; had laid 
siege to British army garrisons at Potchefstroom, Pretoria, and five other towns in the 
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Transvaal; and had taken command of Laing’s Nek, effectively controlling the approach 
into the Transvaal from Natal.
130
   
The Boers struck at a time when the Cape was also woefully unprepared and 
undermanned, a point that was not lost upon the British public.
131
  London had drawn 
down the forces deployed in South Africa in the aftermath of the Zulu War to 3,500 men, 
and the Cape government was then involved in suppressing an uprising of the Basutos.  
Convinced, however, that the Boers were inferior fighters and insufficiently supplied, 
British leaders in South Africa overlooked their own shortcomings, and the public in 
Britain effectively lulled themselves into a false sense of security.
132
   
Throughout the Zulu War, Gladstone’s Midlothian Campaign, the Basuto War, 
and its correlations to the Government’s policies in Afghanistan, the questionable 
annexation of the Transvaal had never completely disappeared from the public 
discourse.
133
  The rising of the Boers, however, quickly returned that issue to the 
forefront of public discussion.  Far from being satisfied with merely relaying the news 
from Cape Town, Durban, and Potchefstroom, the national and provincial papers engaged 
the implications of the annexation, and expressed a variety of opinions, while offering 
myriad interpretations of events in South Africa that both reflected and shaped public 
awareness of imperial affairs.   
To be sure, the British public was concerned about the security of the nation’s 
imperial holdings.  The Boer rebellion coincided with the Cape’s war with the Basutos, 
exacerbating the challenge to Britain’s position in South Africa.  Some also claimed that 
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the rebellion was also deliberately timed and influenced by the Land War in Ireland, 
though the York Herald thought that it was highly unlikely that the Boers were paying 
that much attention to the domestic concerns of Britain.
134
  Even so, newspapers did their 
utmost to allay fears about the situation on the ground, with papers such as the Bristol 
Mercury and the Glasgow Herald insisting that British supremacy would be upheld.
135
  
The Huddersfield Daily Chronicle and the Standard, which likewise recognized the 
seriousness of the situation and acknowledged that imperial troops would likely be 
needed, nevertheless insisted that it did not believe the British “position in the Transvaal 
was in any immediate danger.”136  Holding the military ability of the Boers more openly 
in contempt, the Standard emphasized the inability of the Boers to protect themselves 
against native attacks, an issue which had made the annexation of the Transvaal 
necessary in the first place.  The need for additional troops, rather, was due to the 
vastness of the region and not to the fighting prowess of the Boers.
137
   Meanwhile, the 
Times assumed inaccurately that Britain possessed enough in the way of military 
resources in the region to disperse the Boers quickly.
138
  So convinced were Britons at 
home in the superiority of their forces that when news of the attack on the 94
th
 Regiment 
filtered back to Britain, a few presses questioned the accuracy of the report.  The 
Glasgow Herald was convinced that, if it were true, confirmation would have been 
provided by the Governor at Natal.  At the same time, there were reports that the Boers 
had been repulsed by British troops at Potchefstroom, whose commander, Colonel 
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Lanyon, sent reassurances that the “forces of the enemy cannot hold together.”139  While 
the editorial staff of the Times was forced to admit that its earlier dismissal of the Boers 
had been inaccurate, it nevertheless found it impossible to believe that the Boers were 
capable of launching simultaneous operations against both Heidelberg and 
Potchefstroom, while also coordinating an attack strong enough to wipe out the 
detachment of the 94
th
 Regiment.  It was much more likely, or so the editors of the Times 
initially thought, that those accounts had been fabricated by the Boers to elevate their 
abilities in the eyes of their enemies.
140
   
But if papers such as the Times and Huddersfield Daily Chronicle insinuated that 
the Transvaal was secure for the time being, others were not so confident.  Taking the 
reports of the Boer movements against Potchefstroom and  Heidelberg as accurate, the 
Daily News insisted that they proved that the Boers felt strong enough to assume the 
offensive, and that the elements committed there were “a part of the troops at their 
disposal.”141  Likewise, the Morning Advertiser, the voice of the London Society of 
Licensed Victuallers and the second-most read paper in the nation, insisted that “if the 
Boers have not reasoned all the chances out, and struck just at the right moment to 
enforce their arguments upon the cabinet, they are less clever than we take them to be.”142  
Indeed almost everyone, including the optimistic Huddersfield Daily Chronicle 
recognized quickly that the long-term pacification of the region would require the 
deployment of imperial reinforcements.
143
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Press attention to calls for reinforcements also raised the public awareness about 
the costs, both fiscal and material, and Britain’s imperial responsibilities.  
Acknowledging the public’s aversion to and weariness at having to rescue colonial 
administrations repeatedly from their own missteps, many papers insisted that this was 
not such a case.  The Huddersfield Daily Chronicle reminded the public that the 
annexation of the Transvaal had been undertaken by the government and was not a 
decision of the colonial administration at the Cape.
144
  Still, as far as the editors of the 
Standard were concerned, even though the government bore responsibility for the 
annexation, the acquisition of the Transvaal had been the “result of an accident, rather 
than a deliberate design.”145  The Boer rebellion was brought on by the actions of an 
ungrateful people, who had ignored the sacrifices that Britain had made on their behalf, 
and had rebelled against British rule despite being forewarned that such an action would 
be nothing but “folly.”146  For these reasons, the government and the nation had 
legitimate interests in taking steps to preserve the territory.    
Whether intervention would happen under a Gladstone administration was 
apparently of some concern to at least a portion of the public, who were no doubt mindful 
of the premier’s strong anti-imperial stance in his recent Midlothian Campaign.  Putting 
any such fears to rest, the Huddersfield Daily Chronicle insisted that despite Gladstone’s 
denunciation of imperial entanglements, he now showed signs that he was reconciled to 
defending the ground that had been previously acquired.  True, the paper acknowledged, 
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the British were withdrawing from Kabul in Afghanistan, but no move had yet been made 
to withdraw entirely from the Transvaal.
147
   
Another issue that emerged in the pages of the newspapers involved the need to 
uphold the nation’s honor.  Bemoaning on 22 December that the decisions of Lords 
Carnarvon and Kimberley had given rise to yet another imperial war, the Independent 
Dundee Courier contended:  
It would thus appear that troops will be required from home.  That is an 
unfortunate necessity, but perhaps it will not occur to anybody in this country to 
say that we should rather let the Transvaal go than be at the trouble and expense 
of recovering it.  There will doubtless be persons, however, who would give such 
advice were it not for the shame of the thing, and whose first thought, on hearing 
of the rebellion, will be that we should never have had this trouble at all if it had 
not been one of the iniquities of the late Conservative Government that they 
annexed the Transvaal.  But responsible statesmen will not speak in that way.
148
   
 
They were joined in this regard by the Manchester Guardian which, while arguing that 
Britain had never been justified in annexing the Transvaal and that it had no “clear right 
to overrule [the Boers’] will,” nevertheless insisted that “whatever may be done hereafter, 
they must not be allowed to show an example of successful rebellion.”149  The insinuation 
clearly was that if Britain acquiesced to the Boer demands other parts of the empire 
would find encouragement in this sign of national weakness.  The Birmingham Daily 
Post also feared that the success of the Boers would raise the hopes of natives living in 
the region and thus appeared conflicted over what Britain’s recourse should be.150  Such 
ramifications were brought closer to home by the Standard and the Aberdeen Journal, 
which placed the rising of the Transvaal alongside the disturbances in Ireland over rents 
and the land tenures, a situation that editors believed might also require the deployment 
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of troops, and the ongoing war in Afghanistan.
151
  The Journal conceded that while the 
“pestilent class of professional [Boer and Irish] agitators had different motives for 
resisting British rule, it insisted that as “men who are strangers to honest industry, whose 
heads are as light as their pockets, and who having nothing to lose were not indisposed to 
have their little world turned upside down.”152   
Newspaper readers, meanwhile, did not have a compartmentalized view of the 
empire, but placed specific imperial developments within a much broader framework.  
Thus, the Dundee Courier expected that the Boers were not only motivated to rebel when 
they did because of the preoccupation of the Cape with the Basutos, but also because they 
believed that the “strange immunity which the authors of treasonable disorders in Ireland 
have hitherto enjoyed, from any serious action on the part of the executive government, 
would also be extended to them.”153  Such views were not held by Conservatives alone, 
as they were also expressed by Liberal-minded papers such as the Leeds Mercury and the 
Newcastle Courant, which insisted that after the Boers had been shown the “folly of their 
ways” with a “prompt display of vigour,” the questions regarding Britain’s long-term 
position in the Transvaal would have to be rethought.
154
  At the time, however, the papers 
did not speculate as to the precise form the British position in South Africa should take.   
Still another segment of the press argued against taking any action at all against 
the Boers.  Trumpeting the false promises and what they portrayed as the proven failures 
of the Conservatives’ imperial policy in South Africa, many Liberal papers argued that 
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military intervention would only validate the injustice and blunders that had previously 
been committed against the Boers and the Basutos.  The Daily News, for instance, 
insisted that the Boer demand for independence was legitimate and in accord with the 
Sand River Convention, so long as the Boers acceded to Britain’s demands that the native 
populations should be protected and that a “uniform system of native government” could 
be agreed upon.  Even with this stipulation, the paper believed that it was highly likely 
that a compromise could and should be struck.
155
  The Sheffield and Rotherham 
Independent concurred and boldly stated: 
We do not want the Boers…Why in the world can we not acknowledge, honestly 
and frankly, that Sir Theophilus Shepstone made a blunder, and declare that we 
will not supplement it by greater?
156
  
 
Insisting that the government should take a position of magnanimity, the Liberal South 
Wales Daily News called for the “authors of mischief” to be punished and argued that 
others should be ordered to make peace.
157
   
Taken as a whole, the variety of positions in print demonstrates that the public 
was neither mindless about the imperial issues, nor was it of entirely one mind when it 
came to how Britain should respond to the Boers.  To that end, the public was keenly 
interested in reforming the relationship between the administration at the Cape and the 
government in London, so that the Cabinet would have more direct oversight of colonial 
affairs.  The hoped-for result was that the home country would be less likely to be drawn 
into wars and military interventions against its better judgment.   
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Given the speed with which the Boer uprising escalated, it is difficult to assess 
properly the public’s awareness of or interest in events as they unfolded.  The content and 
editorial pages of London’s daily papers indicate that on a broad national level, 
metropolitan readers were certainly attuned to what was going on in the Transvaal.  The 
degree to which provincial readers discussed the issue is more difficult to ascertain.  
Many of the provincial papers were published only weekly, and only days elapsed 
between when the first announcements of the Boers’ declaration of independence and the 
confirmation of the attack on the detachment of the 94
th
 Regiment at Bronkhorstspruit 
reached Britain.  The result was that the first reports by many provincial papers on 
developments in the Transvaal came after the attacks had been confirmed.    
Provincial attentiveness became more acute when the rumors of the Boer attack 
on the 94
th
 Regiment were proved accurate.  Between 20 and 24 December, the editorial 
columns of the Conservative Aberdeen Journal had been silent on the developments in 
South Africa, because they focused on the violence in Ireland over the land-tenure 
question.  Nevertheless, its readership would have seen coverage of the Transvaal 
rebellion in its news pages.
158
  On 28 December, however, the editorial page erupted.  
Labeling the the Boer attack at Bronkhorstspruit a “massacre” and that on Potchefstroom 
a “ruthless assassination,” the paper demanded an energetic response.159   
Concerned with the impact of recent developments on Britain’s national prestige 
and imperial mission in South Africa, the presses increasingly became consumed with the 
question, as repeatedly phrased by the Pall Mall Gazette’s “Epitome of Opinion” column, 
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“Should We Give Up the Transvaal?” 160  For those papers that had already come out in 
favor of military intervention, the Boer attack quite naturally did little to alter their views.  
Continuing to lament Britain’s past history with the Boers and admitting that the 
annexation had been a mistake, the Times nonetheless held firm that the “reconquest of 
the Transvaal was a necessary act.”  In appealing to the sword, the Boers gave Britain no 
choice but “to meet force by force.” Under no circumstances could Britain allow the 
Transvaal to boast that their independence came as a result of “their own forwardness in 
asserting it for themselves by arms.”161  The Standard, meanwhile, advanced that the 
annexation of the Transvaal should be protected on the grounds that British control 
provided necessary security not only for the Boers but for the native communities as 
well.
162
   
To a limited extent, the Boers’ opening attack did cause some presses to shift their 
opinion on the matter in favor of a more aggressive policy.  Just one day after arguing 
that the annexation should be reversed, the Daily News reacted to the news from 
Bronkhorstspruit by saying that it had eliminated any chance that the situation could be 
resolved peaceably now that the Boers had proved that they were fully committed to 
armed rebellion.  Moreover, because the Boers’ success would only further encourage 
their efforts and make it impossible for them to draw back, Britain had no choice but to 
crush the rebellion: 
A terrible calamity has befallen our arms … [but] it will be a still greater calamity 
for the Boers.  Their one victory will cost them as dearly in the end, as much his 
one success cost Cetewayo [sic].  But it will bring little satisfaction to Englishmen 
to feel that the Boers will be defeated and crushed before long.
163
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To that end, the paper insisted that Britain took no satisfaction in the “petty, although 
sanguinary and costly, struggle,” or the success which would inevitably come.  Nor was it 
sympathetic to the policies which gave rise to the war.  Rather, the Daily News justified 
crushing the Boers on the grounds that Britain had been drawn into the war by 
circumstances beyond its control, namely, by the aggressive actions of the Boers 
themselves.  Further, because the Boers remained in a position where they were 
essentially the masters of the Transvaal, it maintained that “it is all the more difficult for 
us to discuss terms of reconciliation.”164  Indeed, by early January,  a consensus point was 
seemingly reached—with Liberal papers such as the Aberdeen Free Press, the Daily 
News, the Leeds Mercury, the Bradford Observer, and the Scotsman, as well as 
Conservative papers like the Aberdeen Journal, the Standard, and the Daily Telegraph, 
and independent papers such as the Times—all collectively arguing that the question of 
the Transvaal’s independence could and should only be sorted out after Britain had 
reestablished its dominance in the area.
165
   
 Despite this apparent coming together, press opinion remained anything but 
unified.  Papers which had opposed the military suppression of the Boers from the onset 
deftly rebutted the arguments of those who favored it.  The Liberal-minded Northern 
Echo continued to question the legitimacy of Britain’s original act of annexation and 
argued that the security of Natal no longer depended on British overlordship of the 
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Transvaal.
166
  Speaking to the issue of national prestige and honor, the Liberal Weekly 
Dispatch advanced that Britain had sacrificed neither in granting the Orange Free State 
its independence in 1854, and that there was thus no reason to think that Britain would 
lose prestige by again granting the Transvaal’s demand for independence.167  
Additionally, the two Liberal papers from Liverpool, the Daily Post and the Mercury, 
commiserated with the plight of the Boers and held that those who would deny them their 
right to self-government were taking a position that was antithetical to British principles 
of liberty.  That position, the Mercury asserted, had caused the nation to be “so far 
steeped in blood as Macbeth was.”168  The only proper recourse was for the government 
to ignore the howls of the jingoes and to move forward by confessing past mistakes and 
reconsidering the situation of the Transvaal.  Thus, the Daily Post insisted, “anything is 
better than that England should exhibit herself to the world as the crusher of national 
feeling, the enemy of self-government.”169   
The defense of the Boers, also enjoyed the support of C. E. Trevelyan, who had 
previously served as governor of Madras and as the Indian finance minister.  In a letter to 
the Times, Trevelyan reminded readers of missteps in imperial administration and insisted 
that the war with the Zulu and the recent rebellion of the Boers warranted a complete 
reconsideration of Britain’s “shortsighted” imperial policy: 
We make ourselves directly responsible for preserving order over widely-
extended regions inhabited by warlike races with various conflicting interests, and 
forcibly compress springs of action which recoil in augmented force whenever an 
opportunity offers.
170
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Trevelyan thus encouraged Britons to apply what had been learned from their experiences 
in India, and to allow self-rule to flourish under an umbrella of British influence and 
protection.  The Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper took an even more pronounced and 
demonstrative pro-Boer stance, when it not only criticized the original annexation of the 
Transvaal but congratulated the Transvaalers for “the calm courage they have displayed 
in proclaiming the republic of which they were some four years ago defrauded.”171  In 
making this declaration the paper expressed its hope that the Boers would thus be 
conscious that not every Briton supported the policies of Sir Bartle Frere. 
ON THE WAR AND PEACE: JANUARY – MARCH 1881 
 In the first two weeks of January the British government announced that 
reinforcements, which included the 92
nd
 (Gordon Highlanders) Regiment and the 83
rd
 
(County of Dublin) Regiment of Foot, were being dispatched to Natal.
172
  Otherwise, as it 
had been throughout the greater part of 1880, Gladstone’s attention remained focused on 
trying to keep his government together as the Irish Land League’s demands for greater 
tenant rights threatened to split the Liberal Party and drag Ireland into civil disorder.
173
  
Indeed, while matters such as Ireland and the withdrawal from Afghanistan made were 
addressed in the Queen’s Speech and the subsequent parliamentary debates, the issue of 
the Transvaal was remarkably not discussed or even mentioned.
174
  But if Gladstone was 
deprioritizing the Transvaal matter in deference to other concerns, in practically every 
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edition, whether it was a daily or a weekly, the national and provincial news pages 
included full reporting on the latest happenings in the Transvaal.   
 In the month following the disaster at Bronkhorstspruit, discouraging news from 
the front flooded the pages of the national and provincial presses.  In the first place, 
Major General Sir George Pomeroy Colley, who had recently been appointed high 
commissioner and who was recognized as one of the most capable of the “Wolseley 
Ring,” was failing in his attempt to crush the rebellion.175  Setting out for the Transvaal 
on 10 January, Colley was soundly beaten at Laing’s Nek on 28 January and then at 
Ingogo on 7 February.  Second, and more disturbing, were reports that the Orange Free 
Staters were mobilizing to support their fellow Boers to the north.  These developments 
forced South African affairs onto the ministerial front burner, alongside the Irish and 
Afghan issues.
176
  Influenced by his colonial secretary, Lord Kimberley, the prime 
minister believed circumstances had changed to such an extent that it was now more 
advantageous for Britain to negotiate a settlement with the Boers, through which they 
would be granted independence so long as they agreed to permit British “suzerainty.”177  
In 1881, as defined by Sir Evelyn Wood, “suzerainty” meant that the Transvaal would 
have complete “self-government as regards its own interior affairs, but that it cannot take 
action against or with an outside Power without the permission of the suzerain,” Great 
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Britain.
178
  The precise meaning of suzerainty, however, remained undefined and would 
be debated by Boer and British officials in the decades to come.   
Kimberley therefore ordered Colley to present the Boers with the British offer and 
see if terms could be established.  Colley, however, was convinced that Britain should not 
abandon its position in the Transvaal in such an ignominious fashion.  To that end, he 
sought to put Britain on a stronger footing in negotiating a peace.  He placed an 
impossibly short deadline of forty-eight hours for the Boers to respond to the peace 
overtures, something he had been told would take at least six days.  When the Boer 
response was not forthcoming, Colley launched another offensive at the Boer line at 
Laing’s Nek, having been reinforced by the troops from Europe.179  Positioning his troops 
atop the dominant Majuba Hill on the night of Saturday 26 February, Colley was 
confident because of his position atop the hill, the quality of his men, and the inferiority 
of the Boer forces.  Fully expecting the Boers to withdraw at finding their position at 
Laing’s Nek compromised, he took no precautions in preparing his position against an 
attack.   Instead of fleeing at the sight of the British position, the Boers attacked the 
following morning, making use of abundant cover and their expert marksmanship.
180
  The 
result was a rout:  Of the 27 officers and 568 men who had moved out with Colley the 
night before, 20 officers and 261 men, including Colley himself, became casualties.  The 
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Boers, attacking with some 300 men, suffered only one man killed and six others 
wounded.
181
    
As they had done during the Zulu War, illustrated presses, including the Graphic, 
the Illustrated London News, and the Penny Illustrated Paper, encapsulated the course of 
the war with descriptive narratives and vignettes, complete with engravings of maps, 
fallen heroes, and troop movements.  In the case of the Penny Illustrated Paper, these 
were packaged into a section called “The Pictorial Chronicle of the Boer War.”182  
Examples of these works included the Graphic’s depiction of Colley’s 8 February assault 
on Laing’s Nek which included notations on specific troop positions.  Illuminating 
Colley’s stand on Majuba Hill, the Illustrated London News portrayed the general’s last 
minutes as those of a gallant hero who unswervingly faced the enemy with calm 
determination.
183
  These incidents would leave an indelible mark in the minds of the 
British public.  More than eighteen years after the fact, as Britain was on the verge of 
another war with the Boers, the Penny Illustrated Paper depicted these battlefields, with 
a caption “Places Tommy Atkins Doesn’t Forget; Laing’s Nek and Majuba Hill.”184  
In the spring of 1881, the nation was stunned and horrified by the sudden turn of 
events.  For the second time in three years the British military had been humiliated in the 
field by an opponent they had presumed to be inferior.  While Conservatives and Liberals 
pointed fingers at whose imperial policies were more to blame for getting the country into 
such a position, they were nevertheless largely unified on the question of how Britain 
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should proceed.   In harkening back to the original motives for refusing to recognize the 
independence of the Transvaal and with the cognizance of the interconnectedness of the 
empire, British honor had to be preserved in order to prevent future disturbances in the 
region.  The Times summarized the position:   
Unless we are prepared to retire from South Africa immediately and 
unconditionally, we must restore our authority where it has been defied, and treat 
only with those who submit to the representatives of the Queen.
185
   
 
This insistence came despite the paper having previously called Colley’s taking an 
aggressive forward position “unnecessary,” although “not without some appearance of 
justification,” given that it was fully known that reinforcements under General Wood 
were being more forward.
186
   Whether the Times was aware that Colley had been 
expressly ordered to wait for Wood is not certain, but its 21 February editorial indicates 
that the paper fully expected that Colley would wait, and that their combined forces 
would then move against the Boers.
187
  That reinforcements were required to handle the 
Boer rebellion was in and of itself cause for great concern and, according to the Times, 
ratcheted up public attention to events in South Africa.
188
  
The attention of the press more generally was focused less on Colley’s rashness 
than on the need to redeem British honor.
189
  The Liberal Daily Chronicle insisted that 
“Englishmen are not in the least likely, after what has occurred, to listen to proposals of 
independence until after the Boers have laid down their arms and submit – a contingency, 
it is to be feared, rather remote until they have received a severe repulse at the hands of 
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the British Army.”190  The Conservative Standard likewise maintained that the “English 
people” would not allow their honor to be trampled upon and that therefore the Boers had 
to be beaten to such an extent that they would be convinced of their complete inability to 
resist the power of Britain.
191
  Firing a direct rebuke at Gladstone’s calculation to 
withdraw from the Transvaal and echoing Disraeli’s Crystal Palace speech, the 
Conservative Daily Telegraph was so adamant that Britain effectively respond to the 
humiliation that it demanded that “the united nation proclaims that there must be no more 
of this piecemeal half-hearted policy, which is utterly disastrous to a great empire.”   
Charging that Gladstone’s imperial policy was wrongfully being dictated by financial 
considerations, the Telegraph further demanded “there must be no more counting by 
sixpences the cost of the things and reckoning up over narrowly to see that victory abroad 
may not compromise budgets at home.”192  
Provincial newspapers expressed similar sentiments, suggesting that such 
opinions were widely held.  Applauding the appointment of Sir Frederick Roberts to 
continue the war against the Transvaal, the Scotsman maintained that “unless Great 
Britain is prepared to give up her colonies in South Africa, and to bear the stain of defeat 
at the hands of a few hundred Boers, she must make her power felt.”193  In assessing the 
implications of Colley’s defeat, papers such as the Leeds Mercury, Manchester’s two 
Liberal papers, the Guardian and the Examiner, and its Conservative paper, the Courier 
Gazette, all expressed the belief that there was no hope of a quick end to the war because 
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it was utterly impossible for Britain to pull back.  To do so would welcome greater losses 
than just the Transvaal.  As the Manchester Courier Gazette concluded, the government 
is obligated “to secure speedy and effective victory, in order that our military credit may 
not fall into universal discredit.”194  The Essex Standard put the matter succinctly: an 
armistice and peace process at that time would be “hollow, humiliating, and ominous.”195  
And one “W. B. D.” even submitted a cautionary fifty-nine line poem entitled “Peace 
with Dishonour” to the Morning Post.196   
 Even so, not everyone believed that the defeat at Majuba Hill demanded a 
military response.  The editors of Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper, for instance, hoped that 
the disaster would convince the government of the errors of the “military spirit” which 
they believed had permeated British society and advance the cause of peace: 
This is our danger – that the military spirit, thinking only of conquest, of victory, 
of marches, and countermarches, decorations and promotion, may conduct 
England to ruin by the same road that Rome went to destruction.
197
 
 
The idea that a final peace would ensure British suzerainty also seemed to soothe some of 
the hot tempers.  Only a week after it expressed its conviction that Colley’s defeat made 
it impossible to proceed with peace negotiations, the Liberal Birmingham Daily Post 
changed its position:   
If the Boers are willing to subscribe to such terms of peace as are consistent with 
the national dignity and the particular merits of the case, Government, we are 
convinced, will not be deterred from doing its duty by the clamour of an 
interested party, however active and influential.
198
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The Daily News also took confidence in the knowledge that the peace negotiations were 
being led by Sir Evelyn Wood, who seemed assured that the peace concessions would in 
no way demonstrate British weakness.
199
 
Queen Victoria, meanwhile, was particularly upset at what she perceived as the 
government’s weak policies that had led to the disastrous war and which now seemed 
ready to ignominiously withdraw from the region:   
I do not like a peace before we have retrieved our honor…I am sure you 
[Gladstone] will agree with me that even the semblance of any concessions after 
our recent defeats would have a deplorable effect.
200
 
 
Yet Gladstone and Kimberley resisted such pressure and assessed the situation 
pragmatically.  They realized that Britain risked losing all of its holdings in South Africa 
if the Orange Free State entered into the war on the side of the Transvaal.  Concurrently, 
the Boers feared they would lose any leverage they had gained whenever British 
reinforcements under Roberts would arrive in the region.
201
  Thus, both sides had reasons 
for concluding a peace as quickly as possible.  The final peace treaty emerged in August 
and stayed true to Kimberley’s initial peace feelers, by providing for the independence of 
the Transvaal while insuring that Britain would retain the rights of suzerainty.
202
  By that 
time, the public had mostly lost its revengeful attitude and found the terms to be 
acceptable.
203
  It was, after all, what most of the country had favored at the onset of the 
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crisis.  But while that finalized peace treaty resolved the immediate conflict of 1880-
1881, the meaning of “suzerainty,” would continue to be a contentious thorn in Anglo-
Boer relations, as we will see in Chapter Three.    
In assessing the public’s attitude toward military interventionism in South Africa 
between 1877 and 1881, we find a number of consistencies.  In the first place, as 
evidenced by the widespread approval of the annexation of the Transvaal, the public was 
more likely to endorse coercive diplomacy or military force to advance the British 
position when it was apparent that the action would result in little or no added cost, either 
in blood or capital.  It was only when that action led to further disturbances and failed to 
resolve contentious relationships, such as during the Zulu War and the Transvaal 
rebellion that the public began to rethink the legitimacy of its aggressiveness toward the 
Boers.  Secondly, the press coverage and leading articles regarding the annexation of the 
Transvaal, the Zulu War, and the First Anglo-Boer War showed that the economic 
opportunities associated with imperial expansionism in South Africa factored very little if 
at all into the public debate.  What was a concern to the general public was the 
advancement of British humanitarianism toward the native populations, along with 
continued peace and security both within the Cape and Natal and in surrounding 
territories.  To that end, what the public in Britain desired for the colonials was peace 
through a live-and-let-live imperial philosophy, so long as humanitarianism did not 
conflict with a need for security.  If that type of peace could only be obtained via the 
point of the sword, then so be it, but only if Britain and the colonial administration had 
done nothing to provoke the conflict, and the motivation for the using military force had 
proved to be sufficiently legitimate and virtuous.   
76 
 
 That the opinion of the general public mattered to government officials and colonial 
administrators is borne out by the lengths to which policy-makers went to present the 
appearance of acting in self-defense, even when Britain’s motives and actions were very 
much on the side of the aggressor.  In explaining the action he had taken toward the 
Transvaal, Shepstone insisted that he had the overwhelming support of the Boers 
themselves.  In dealing with the Zulu, Bartle Frere constructed an ultimatum that he knew 
Cetshwayo could not possibly agree to, and thus he could defend the invasion of 
Zululand on the premise that the noncompliant and militant Zulus had made a war 
necessary.  And while public opinion factored less in Britain’s response to the Transvaal 
rebellion in 1881, the public was certainly active in attempting to drive and influence the 
government’s response.  Lastly, taking into account the myriad instances of British 
belligerence throughout the latter nineteenth century, one finds that policymakers, such as 
Carnarvon and Frere, were much more likely to take—and the public to support—an 
aggressive stance and to use either military force or diplomatic coercion to settle a 
dispute when the country faced an adversary that was considered to be an inferior power 
and the circumstances of immediate importance to British interests. 
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Figure 1-1: Illustrated London News, 10 May 1879, 429.  Caption reads: “The Zulu War: 
Attack on an escort of the 80th Regiment at the Intombi River – See p. 434.  From a 
sketch by Lieutenant Beverley W. R. Ussher, 80th Regiment.” 
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Figure 1-2: “British Officers Engaged in the Zulu and Afghan War,” Graphic, 1 March 
1879, 212.  From left to right: Col. C. H. Palliser,  Maj. Gen. E. F. Maude, Lt. Francis 
Pender Porteous, Lt. Herbert Valiant Willis, Lt. Henry Julian Dyer, Lt. Col. Pulleine, Col. 
A. W. Durnford, Capt. John Cook, Lt. Chard, and Lt. Gonville Bromhead. 
79 
 
 
 
 
Im
ag
e 
1
-3
: 
“T
h
e 
R
eb
el
li
o
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
T
ra
n
sv
aa
l 
- 
T
h
e 
A
tt
ac
k
 o
n
 L
ai
n
g
’s
 N
ek
 U
n
d
er
 t
h
e 
L
at
e 
S
ir
 G
. 
P
. 
C
o
ll
ey
, 
Ja
n
u
ar
y
 2
8
 1
8
8
1
,”
 G
ra
p
h
ic
, 
1
9
 M
ar
ch
 1
8
8
1
, 
2
9
0
. 
 E
n
g
ra
v
in
g
 i
s 
fu
rt
h
er
 l
ab
el
ed
 d
es
ig
n
at
in
g
 t
ro
o
p
 l
o
ca
ti
o
n
s.
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-4: “The Transvaal War: Major General Sir George Colley at the Battle of 
Majuba Mountain just before he was killed,” Illustrated London News, 14 May 1881, 
409. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
BRITISH INTRIGUE AND INTERVENTION 
 IN EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, 1882-1898 
 In December 1881, Gladstone wrote to his son relishing the success he had had 
thus far in dismantling the imperial politics associated with Beaconsfieldism and 
contemplating his own retirement from public life.
1
  But, given the expanse of Britain’s 
imperial reach, it was all but certain that the retreats from Afghanistan and the Transvaal 
would not remove the empire from public attention.  Indeed Irish Home Rule remained 
an ever-present issue, and while the Indian, Chinese, Afghan, and South African theatres 
had been the focus of public attention throughout much of the nineteenth century, a new 
theater had opened since mid-century, Egypt.  Within months of the resolution of the 
South African War, affairs in Egypt and the Sudan would come to transfix the attention 
of the country and vault one man’s reputation to that of national hero. Aside perhaps from 
the Second Anglo-Boer War, no greater example of the intersection of public interest and 
imperial policy exists than that which involved Major General Sir Charles “Chinese” 
Gordon’s mission to the Sudan and the subsequent debate over relieving the besieged 
general at Khartoum.  
  THE SUEZ CRISIS, 1882-1883 
Since the late-eighteenth century, Britain had had an interest in preserving the 
power of the Ottoman Empire in order to protect British India.  This interest had led to 
British intervention on behalf of the Turks in 1854 in the Crimean War.  In the resulting 
peace negotiations the Palmerston administration had worked to ensure that the European 
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powers would respect the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and prior to the 1870s neither 
Conservative nor Liberal administrations had any real interest in expanding British 
influence over the Turks.   
The completion of the Suez Canal by the French in 1869 caused Britain to begin 
readdressing its strategic interests and priorities in the Near East as they pertained to 
India.  Consequently, when the Egyptian khedivate offered to sell its shares in the canal 
in 1875 in order to resolve its financial difficulties, Disraeli took the opportunity to 
cement Britain’s position in the region.  Thereafter, the khedive’s continued financial 
problems led to the establishment of joint Anglo-French oversight of Egyptian finances in 
1879.  Even so, the Disraeli government had no real desire to bring the Egyptian 
government directly into the Empire.  Instead, the British and French governments 
intervened for the purpose of liberalizing the Egyptian government and strengthening the 
khedive’s fiscal position.2 
The Anglo-French presence in Egypt, however, actually served to undermine the 
tenuous authority of the khedivate by rallying rival nationalist elements against foreign 
direction.  These elements included Egyptian liberals, who opposed the nominal 
overlordship of the Turks and favored western constitutionalism, as well as Muslim 
conservatives, who condemned the encroachment of Christianity.  Landlords also rallied 
in order to preserve their traditional privileges against the fiscal reforms of the khedivate, 
while the peasantry bore the brunt of funding the government’s industrial schemes and 
paying off its debt.  More importantly, Western intervention drove a wedge between the 
khedive and the Egyptian military upon which much of his authority rested.  In April 
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1879, the Khedive Ismail attempted to resist Western reforms, but the European powers 
were able to pressure the Turkish sultan into replacing Ismail with his eldest son Tewfik.  
Simmering beneath the surface throughout 1880, nationalist sentiments boiled over in 
1881.  On 1 February Colonel Ahmed Arabi and a number of fellow officers forced the 
khedive to replace the minister of war.  Eight months later, on 9 September the army 
surrounded the palace and demanded to be restored to its former status and compelled the 
khedive to replace his entire ministry.
3
    
Due its financial investments with the khedive and its strategic interests in the 
canal, Britain’s position in Egypt was severely complicated by these developments.  
Prime Minister Gladstone was philosophically opposed to the imperial interventionism 
promoted by his predecessors Palmerston and Disraeli.  Nevertheless, British interests 
demanded that some action be taken, if for no other reason than to prevent France from 
acting unilaterally and gaining sole control over the canal.  To that end, throughout much 
of 1881, at the same time that he was heavily involved in calming down tensions in 
Ireland, Gladstone was also engaged in complex negotiations with the French 
government to carve out an Egyptian policy that would be mutually acceptable.
4
     
The result of the complicated Anglo-French diplomatic wrangling was the 
issuance of a Joint Note in early January 1882, which declared the powers’ intent to 
defend the khedivate and threatened a future military expedition to restore order.     
                                                 
3
 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 84-87. 
4
 In those negotiations Gladstone and his Foreign Minister Granville preferred that any action in Egypt be 
done in accordance with the Concert of Europe, in order to prevent Chancellor Bismarck of Germany from 
using the situation to drive a diplomatic wedge between Britain and France.   Moreover, Gladstone desired 
that any military operations be handled by the Ottoman Empire, since it was the suzerain power over Egypt.  
On the other hand, the French Government feared that Turkish intervention in Egypt would encourage the 
Turks to interfere with France’s imperial interests in North Africa. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the 
Victorians, 89-97.     
84 
 
 
 
The Joint Note, however, did little to quell the situation.  Instead it emboldened the 
nationalists to be more assertive in throwing off foreign oversight and it served to 
galvanize support around Arabi who was named minister of war in early February 1882.  
With the Joint Note failing to have any effect on its own and fearing that the Egyptian 
developments would increasingly threaten Anglo-French dual control, British and French 
officials once again struggled to carve out a mutually agreeable course of action.  In the 
middle of May, the two powers agreed to send an Anglo-French squadron, commanded 
by British and French officers, which would precede a Turkish military expedition.  
Those forces would then restore order in Egypt under a European mandate.  That plan fell 
through after the Germans and the French legislature raised objections.  As a result, the 
Anglo-French force arrived off Alexandria without a clear mission and without the 
prospect of relief from a Turkish force.  The squadron’s mere presence, however, 
emboldened the khedive, and he summarily dismissed his Arabist ministers.  This action 
set off a powder keg of Egyptian nationalistic fervor, and on 11 and 12 June rioting 
erupted in Alexandria, which left fifty foreign residents dead.
5
  Faced with the outbreak 
of such violence, the British and French governments renewed their efforts to work out a 
viable solution to the unrest in Egypt.
6
   
By early July, a group of key cabinet officers had become convinced that Britain 
needed to act with or without France and without the approval of the Concert of Europe.  
Although these officials presented a united front, the specific motivations which brought 
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them together varied.  Whereas Joseph Chamberlain, president of the Board of Trade, and 
Charles Dilke, president of the Local Government Board, were primarily concerned with 
the broader strategic importance of the Suez Canal, Lord Hartington as secretary of state 
for India and Lord Northbrook in the Admiralty were attuned to the financial implications 
of the canal.
7
  Meanwhile, Admiral Seymour, who commanded the Alexandria squadron, 
worried about its long-term security, and indeed Arabi anticipated a naval action and he 
began strengthening the coastal forts at Alexandria in the aftermath of the 11 June riots.  
If completed, those fortifications would have posed a significant threat to the anchorage 
of the British warships and to their ability to support any future land operations.  
Seymour, therefore, called for authorization to issue an ultimatum to the khedivate to halt 
those efforts.  This activist group of officials pressured Gladstone to issue an ultimatum 
to Arabi, recognizing that such an action might well escalate the crisis, and that British 
troops would be needed to ensure the security of the canal.
8
     
Although Gladstone remained reluctant to intervene, he recognized that he would 
need to authorize the ultimatum in order to keep the cabinet together.  He again sought 
French support and invited them to join in presenting the ultimatum.  The French 
government, however, did not believe the situation was serious enough to warrant a 
military option.  Rather, it was inclined to negotiate a settlement with Arabi, and thus 
rejected the British offer.  With little option but to proceed alone, Gladstone authorized 
the ultimatum, and when it expired, he authorized Seymour to fire on Alexandria’s 
defenses.
9
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The British bombardment of Alexandria on 11 July did little to resolve the 
situation on the ground in Egypt.  Outraged that Britain had proceeded to act alone, the 
French government immediately withdrew its warships in remonstration.
10
   In Egypt, the 
bombardment incited further nationalist riots and forced the khedive to flee to Alexandria 
and seek the protection of the British fleet.  Assuming power, the Arabist regime declared 
war against Britain and the Western powers, and warned that it would destroy the canal.  
Such developments left little doubt in the minds of Gladstone’s cabinet that a military 
expedition would have to be sent immediately to Egypt to secure the canal and the 
Egyptian interior as well.  John Bright, the chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and a 
Quaker with a lifelong aversion to the use of military force, was the lone exception to this 
decision, and he resigned from the cabinet in protest.
11
    
With the rest of the cabinet behind him, Gladstone pushed Parliament to authorize 
the expedition.
12
   Having abstained from participating in the naval action, the French 
promised through Charles Freycinet, the foreign minister, to support this operation, but 
the French legislature again refused to authorize the necessary credit, and the ministry fell 
from office.  Italy also decided not to answer Britain’s request for a joint action. 13  With 
the other powers not willing to offer assistance, therefore, Gladstone insisted to 
Parliament that Britain had no choice but to act alone.   
Parliament authorized the expenditure of £2.3 million on 27 July, and on 2 August 
Major General Garnet Wolseley left for Egypt to take command of an expeditionary force 
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of over 30,000 men.
14
  Arriving in Egypt later that month, Wolseley’s force defeated 
Arabi’s decisively at Tel El-Kebir on 13 September.  Two days later, the British 
commander entered Cairo, declared the war over, and helped to reinstate Tewfik as 
khedive.  With its unilateral action effectively abolishing Anglo-French dual control, the 
British government assumed sole responsibility for rebuilding the Egyptian government.  
By the end of October, the bulk of the expeditionary force withdrew, and under the 
direction of Sir Evelyn Wood, who had been appointed sirdar (or commander), the 
process of rebuilding the Egyptian army under British officers commenced in December 
1882.  As that force took shape, the gradual drawing down of the British garrison 
continued throughout 1883.
15
  
Still, questions lingered concerning Britain’s longstanding presence in Egypt.  
Having reluctantly led Britain into Egypt, Gladstone and the bulk of his cabinet preferred 
to leave a token military force there in order to maintain the khedivate as a British 
protectorate.
16
  Outspoken supporters of withdrawal in the cabinet included Granville, 
Hartington, Home Secretary Sir William Harcourt, Chamberlain, Dilke, and Northbrook 
in the Admiralty.   For his part, Hartington believed that the primary necessity for British 
dominance was political rather than military, and consequently he encouraged the 
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drawdown of British forces during 1883.
17
  However, as circumstances on the ground in 
Egypt changed and Britain’s colonial relations with Germany shifted in 1884, Hartington, 
Chamberlain and Dilke reversed their position and began insisting upon maintaining a 
permanent British military presence not only in Egypt but elsewhere throughout the 
Empire to present a strong front against German imperial designs.
18
 
Outside the cabinet, Lord Randolph Churchill also strongly favored a British 
withdrawal, but he argued that the administration had falsely represented the necessary 
importance of the canal to India and the need to place Egypt under sole British protection.  
He instead favored establishing Egypt as a protectorate under all of the European 
powers.
19
  Wolseley was sympathetic to the cause of “Egypt for Egyptians” and had 
opposed British intervention before being sent to quell the Arabist revolt.  With that 
mission accomplished, he urged that all British troops be withdrawn as soon as possible 
and warned Hartington in February 1883 that “these small detached forces are … always 
a source of danger to a nation like ours whose army is so small.”20 On the other hand, Sir 
Evelyn Baring (later the earl of Cromer), who had served as the British controller-general 
in Egypt from 1878-1879 and who was familiar with Egyptian affairs, insisted that the 
reconstruction of Egypt would be impossible without a strong continued British military 
presence.
21
   
To Gladstone’s chagrin the strongest proponent of maintaining a strong military 
presence in Egypt was Queen Victoria.  Writing to her private secretary Sir Henry 
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Ponsonby on 17 September about the recent military and diplomatic developments in 
Egypt, the queen included a note to be sent to Granville: 
Think you should be very cautious in speaking of early withdrawal of troops.  We 
must bind ourselves to nothing.  We have not fought and shed precious blood and 
gone to great expense for nothing.  Short of annexation we must obtain a firm 
hold and power in Egypt for the future.  A large force will have to be left there for 
some time; and some troops, doubtless, indefinitely.  If you bind yourselves 
beforehand you will be hampered as you were by the conference and convention.  
We shall be laughed at and despised by all Europe if we do not hold a high tone.
22
 
 
Five days later in a letter to Harcourt, she insisted that Britain had to secure a position in 
Egypt “short of annexation” to protect “our Indian dominions and to maintain our 
superiority in the East, which is the greatest importance to ourselves as much for 
civilization in general.”23 On 26 October Lord Salisbury, the leader of the Conservatives, 
made similar remarks in the House of Lords, insisting that Britain could not withdraw 
and leave Egypt in a state of absolute anarchy: 
To do so would be utterly to condemn the whole of the policy of the war. It would 
be to say that all this valuable blood has been spilt, that these terrible risks have 
been run, that this mighty force has been dispersed, and that heavy burdens have 
been eased upon the English taxpayer, in vain.…[It is] an historical fact that Her 
Majesty's government preferred to postpone the period of their intervention till the 
khedive was absolutely overthrown by his rebellious soldiers; that they 
deliberately preferred to do that rather than interfere at a time when his soldiery 
were submissive and his authority intact. The result of this fact is that the position 
of the khedive when he comes back is as far removed as possible from his 
position when he went away. He comes back on foreign bayonets…I do not say 
that after a sufficient lapse of time, if his government is strong, and firm, and 
equitable, he may not acquire sources of power and support which are 
independent of any foreign aid; but…unless we are prepared to do the business 
over again, and to leave Egypt to an anarchy which is inconsistent with all our 
professions, and fatal to our interests, he must be sustained by that which is the 
only thing upright in that land—namely, the power of Great Britain.
24
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The practical considerations reflected in these arguments, combined with a petition 
submitted by the 2,600 Europeans residing in Alexandria, which called upon the British 
government to maintain a sizeable military presence, convinced those who favored an 
immediate withdrawal that some British forces would have to remain in Egypt for at least 
the time being.
25
  Communicating the government’s intentions to the Powers on 3 
January 1883 Granville insisted:  
Although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of 
public tranquility, Her Majesty's government are desirous of withdrawing it as 
soon as the state of the country and the organisation of proper means for the 
maintenance of the khedive's authority will admit of it.  In the meanwhile, the 
position in which Her Majesty's government are placed towards His Highness 
imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the 
order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess 
the elements of stability and progress.
26
 
 
Exactly when those goals would be satisfactorily accomplished remained undefined.   
PRESS COVERAGE AND PUBLIC OPINION ON THE SUEZ CRISIS 
 The national and provincial press kept the British public well-informed about the 
developments in Egypt, as well as their financial and strategic implications.   Throughout 
the early months of the crisis, the opinions of the national and provincial press reflected 
the divided opinions that characterized the Parliament and cabinet over the issue of 
intervention.  These divisions in turn reflected both party difference and the shifting 
political opinions within the Liberal Party itself.     
 Immediately following the signing of the Joint Note which formalized Anglo-
French cooperation in handling the Egyptian crisis, many Conservative and independent 
papers responded with stiff criticism.  Responding to the Times’s insistence that Britain 
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had signed the Joint Note with the “utmost great reluctance,” the Aberdeen Journal 
stressed that “there could hardly be a more cutting censure” of the British government’s 
Eastern policy, and charged: 
Why should we be dragged ‘reluctantly’ into any policy whatever, or at the heels 
of any power on the face of the earth?  If it be our duty to contemplate such an 
intervention as that indicated by the Joint Note, why not go to that duty like a 
nation of men; and, if not, why be coerced into it like a nation of children?
27
 
 
Similarly, concerned about maintaining British prestige, Berrow’s Worcester Journal 
feared that the arrangement would compromise Britain’s imperial interests in the region, 
by giving France the power to “use the joint note as a pretext for hindering any 
counteraction on our part.”28  A more moderate piece appeared in the independent 
Morning Advertiser, calling the joint Anglo-French approach regretful but nevertheless 
prudent, and pressing for assurances that “England” would not be blindly led into a 
situation where “the peaceful interests of this country would be subordinated to the 
necessities or ambitions of M. Gambetta.”29  Acknowledging that there was as yet no 
consensus as to how best to resolve the developing crisis in Egypt, the Times likewise 
regretted that the country had abandoned its position of strength in the Near East:  
Before 1879 we were masters of our own action, and were at liberty to maintain in 
whatever way we judged best an influence in a country where our interests are 
beyond all comparison greater than those of all other Powers put together.
30
 
 
In summing up Gladstone’s second administration, the Derby Mercury declared that “two 
years of Liberal government have brought the country to a lower position than it occupied 
when Mr. Gladstone last quitted office; and the public desire to know the reason why.”31   
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After Gladstone sent warships to the region, Conservatives continued to accuse 
him of diminishing British prestige.  Musing at the end of May that Gladstone was not 
being more aggressive to defend Britain’s “highway to India,” the Aberdeen Journal 
contended that the Arabi revolution might not have occurred at all or would have quickly 
collapsed had British diplomatic power been consistently and strongly exerted.
32
   The 
Daily Telegraph similarly grumbled that Gladstone’s “muddled” approach to the crisis 
was causing Britain to “sink back to play a humble part in the European concert, and 
above all places on earth in Egypt, where at one time our word alone was law.”33   
Moreover, Conservative papers wove Gladstone’s handling of the Egyptian crisis 
into a broader narrative which sought to demonstrate a pattern of misguided Liberal 
governance at home and abroad.  In an article that was reprinted by the Derby Mercury, a 
correspondent for the Daily Telegraph eagerly cited an article in the Cologne Gazette to 
refute the “bombastic and unfounded assertions” by A. J. Mundella that there was not a 
“single newspaper paragraph in any civilized country, or any legislature, decrying the 
magnanimity and justice of England”:  
Abroad and at home alike, Great Britain’s experiences during the past year were 
of an uniformly disagreeable character.  It seemed as though the good genius of 
the realm had vanished with Lord Beaconsfield and closed his eyes forever on 
April 19.  The Irish Land Bill certainly did not contribute to raise the Government 
in general esteem… The leaders of the rebellion [i.e., the Land War] are under 
lock and key, the police force has been strengthened, the last available regiment 
has been transferred to Irish soil.  Nevertheless, outrages are perpetrated daily 
with impunity…It cannot reckon the restoration of the Transvaal to the plucky 
Boers as a particularly meritorious achievement; by giving up Afghanistan it has 
simply proved its lack of perspicacity and has conjured up terrible 
embarrassments for India.  
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The correspondent accordingly concluded that “Mr. Gladstone’s statesmanship has 
obviously run to the very end of its tether.”34  Querying whether Gladstone’s Egyptian 
policy amounted to something more substantive than merely “not to quarrel with France,” 
the Standard cautioned that, if British interests were sacrificed too cheaply in order to 
maintain that cooperation with France, Britain’s position in Egypt might well “soon be as 
embarrassing as our position in Ireland.”35  Taking issue with Harcourt for what it 
considered his obfuscating the truth at a Liberal political rally in Burton-on-Trent, 
Yorkshire, the Derby Mercury reminded its readers of the “total failure of the Irish policy 
of the government, of their rupture of the European Concert, of the dangerous state of 
affairs in Egypt, and of the Russian advance in Central Asia.”36  In the aftermath of the 
bombardment of Alexandria, Berrow’s Worcester Journal passionately reminded its 
readers of what it considered to be Gladstone’s failings in Ireland, South Africa, 
Afghanistan, and Egypt, and lamented that the pattern of imperial retreat would not likely 
end so long as Gladstone remained in office:   
If John Bull hates anything, it is to be made ridiculous in the eyes of others.  He 
has an exalted idea of his own importance, and rarely forgives those who lower 
his prestige before Europe…Since the present government came into office we 
have not had a single example of that British spirit and pluck which of old has 
carried us through all difficulties, or spirited them away even before they were 
fairly developed…The Boers rule the Transvaal, the Land League rules Ireland, 
and Arabi Pasha rules Egypt...The Government have gone on a principle of 
turning each cheek to the smiter, of sacrificing any interest rather than defending 
it with the sword.
37
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The paper thus cautioned that, with Britain’s prestige so diminished, that it would take 
“greater deeds than would have sufficed to retain it where it was three or four years ago” 
and urged the Conservative Party to be vigilant in safeguarding British honor.
38
  
Despite insisting that the Government address the Egyptian crisis to avoid eroding 
British prestige, many Conservative papers were hardly cavalier about using military 
force to restore order.  Questioning the administration’s demand in January that troops 
would only be landed in order to secure the status quo and not to advance Britain’s 
footprint, the Aberdeen Journal asked whether such action would in the end only further 
the destruction of the status quo.
39
  The Morning Post similarly cautioned that, while a 
joint Anglo-Turkish military action might be possible, a unilateral British action invited 
significant risks: 
England and Turkey in alliance could hold Egypt and the Suez Canal against a 
world in arms.  But it is a very different thing for England herself to assail the 
united forces of the Ottoman Empire…[it] would be no child’s play, but by 
tremendous exertions, by the most costly sacrifices, that such adventure could be 
crowned with success.  But even when we had occupied Egypt at the cost of 
thousands of lives and with the aid of a hundred thousand French ‘helpmates,’ 
what then?
40
 
 
Conservatives, nevertheless, generally favored using a show of military strength 
as a tool of diplomacy, but, they argued, the application of that force would ultimately 
prove unnecessary.  At the end of May and again in the aftermath of the bombardment of 
Alexandria on 11 July, the Aberdeen Journal criticized Gladstone’s “muddled” 
diplomacy and the “certainly avoidable violence” by reminding its readers of how, 
“without firing a shot or risking a life,” Disraeli had effectively used British military 
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power to defend British interests and prestige in the Near East.
41
  To that point, the 
Aberdeen Journal along with Berrow’s Worcester Journal maintained that had Gladstone 
offered consistent and vigorous support for the khedive from the start rather than backing 
the nationalist “Egypt for Egyptians” movement, such pressure would have diffused the 
crisis and might even have prevented the revolution outright.
42
   By sending warships into 
Alexandrian waters, where Britain “had no natural right,” the papers maintained that the 
government had only invited a response by Alexandrian shore batteries and incurred an 
unnecessary loss of life.  It would have been better, the Aberdeen Journal maintained, to 
station the vessels in the vicinity of the Suez Canal which was Britain’s chief priority and 
interest.
43
   
Concurring with that point, the Standard charged that “the Allied Fleets are not 
the protectors of order, but the instigators of disorder:  
Had it not been for the presence of the English and French squadrons in the Port 
of Alexandria—a feeble demonstration that has served only to irritate the 
Egyptian fanatics—the massacre of Sunday might never have taken place. 
 
To that end, the Standard further held that the fleets would retain that “mischievous 
character” until a land force arrived to drive Arabi out of Egypt and to convey Tewfik 
back to Cairo.
44
   
Speaking before a Conservative demonstration in Charlton, the Conservative MP 
for Exeter, Sir Stafford Northcote, told the crowd that he feared that the Government “by 
their vacillation and tardy recognition of the preponderance of British interests in the 
East, have imperiled those interests, and are mainly responsible for the present state of 
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affairs in Egypt, which may involve this country in a disastrous and costly war.”45  
Editorializing on Northcote’s speech, Berrow’s Worcester Journal contrasted Tory 
attitudes with those of the Liberals:  
However much we may lament or condemn the course of diplomacy which has 
led up to the crisis, if England has to put forth her strength, Sir Stafford Northcote 
promises that her Conservative sons will be ready to support her.  The 
Conservatives of England will not impede or embarrass the exertion of that 
strength, but will show, and not for the first time, an example of loyalty to our 
country and our country’s interests which rarely marks a Liberal Opposition.46 
 
Likewise, in the aftermath of the bombardment, the Derby Mercury decried that little 
attention had been given to the consequences of sending the fleet to Alexandria without 
the ability to follow up the action with land forces, maintaining that the “catastrophic” 
incident profoundly demonstrated the administration’s naïve belief that a moderate show 
of force would coerce Arabi to desist his activities.
47
   
Confident that a strong display of military force had been needed from the start, 
Conservative newspapers were less certain about who should supply it.   The Daily 
Telegraph had allowed in January, at a time when Gladstone was intent on cooperating 
with France, that such collaboration was regrettable, but that “it is, at any rate, better to 
have a single partner whom we may one day buy out than to admit four or five with rival 
claims.”  Even so, the paper further maintained, “we will never consent to any restoration 
of direct Turkish rule, to any removal of the exactions of Ismail’s time, or to any 
intervention by the four European Powers whose interests lie outside.”48  Later, in the 
aftermath of the attack on Alexandria, as Gladstone worked to prompt the Turks to 
intervene, the Standard opined that if the Sultanate offered to send in troops, “however 
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much we may dislike it, or suspect the motives that prompt it, we fail to see what answer 
can be given, save an affirmative one.”49   
Not surprisingly, when Gladstone decided to act unilaterally and called for a tax 
increase to fund a full military expedition to put down the Arabi insurrection, 
Conservative papers gleefully pointed out the irony that Gladstone’s request validated 
their own longstanding position.   
The Conservatives are not factious when they see the policy of their late lamented 
Chief adopted by his opponents and successors…The very policy [the Whigs] 
condemned they have adopted.  They raised an outcry against the bringing of 
native troops from India, and now they are following that wise example.  There 
are few who will deny that whilst we hold India we must preserve our highway 
thither and our communications intact.  We have therefore to uphold the khedive 
and his authority against what Mr. Gladstone calls a military faction opposed to 
the lawful rulers in Egypt.
50
 
For the Lancaster Gazette, Bright’s resignation from the cabinet made the Liberal 
hypocrisy all the more evident:  
It would seem, however, that the principles of the Peace-at-any-price Party enable 
its supporters to join in threats of war, and show of force, indeed all preliminaries 
which lead up to actual warfare; but they must [retire] ignominiously with the first 
shot…If he wished to have been a consistent member of the Peace-at-any-Price 
party, he should have withdrawn some time ago; if he wished to be a consistent 
member of the cabinet, the present is certainly not the time to leave it.
51
 
 
From the start, Liberal papers throughout the country did not let Conservative 
accusations go unanswered.  Questioning how it was that Conservatives could honestly 
criticize Gladstone and his ministers for “persevering in a course that had been set by 
Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury,” the Scotsman insisted that such attacks would 
“not likely influence public opinion” against the premier.  Additionally, the paper refuted 
the idea that France or other Western powers had a “desire to enlarge their scope of 
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control,” arguing that Anglo-French cooperation in Egypt did not endanger British 
supremacy in the region.
52
  The Daily News, meanwhile, championed the notion that the 
two political parties and the country were more unified than not regarding British 
cooperation with France in Egypt.  Further it maintained that “the interests of Britain are 
paramount even over that of her partner in control to a certain well-defined extent.”53  A 
week later the Daily News sounded surprisingly interventionist when it emphasized that 
Gladstone fully appreciated the “delicacy and difficulty” of the Egyptian crisis and would 
not hesitate to defend the canal and oppose misrule:   
To guard her own rights…this country would be ready and willing to act, even, if 
that were necessary without allies...While it is most important to keep up a good 
understanding with France, we cannot afford either to neglect our own position, or 
to violate sound principle by standing in the way of a genuine movement toward 
independence among the Egyptian people.
54
   
 
The Bristol Mercury speculated that any direct intervention would take place only if the 
hoped-for nationalist movement became dictatorial, and it reassured readers that any such 
action would not be taken unilaterally, but would occur within the European concert:  
While [the government] was prepared to protect interests in Egypt which are 
exclusively English, they refuse to take up a dog-in-the-manger attitude toward 
the Powers who claim a voice in Egypt.  Mr. Gladstone stated distinctly that the 
Government were prepared to welcome the cooperation of Germany, Russia, 
Austria, and Italy in dealing with the Egyptian question.  This prevents jealousy, 
and restores the European concert at Cairo.
55
  
 
By early summer the opinions of the national and provincial Liberal press 
increasingly sounded more like their Conservative counterparts as they leaned toward 
direct intervention.  For example, in late May the Daily Chronicle, a paper which 
supported the left-wing of the Liberal Party, strongly criticized Radically-minded MPs, 
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such as Sir Wilfred Lawson, for opposing any display of force to stabilize the situation. 
“The real strength of the foreign policy of the Liberal Party,” it wrote,   
lies in the fact that…it can speak clearly and distinctly when occasion arises.  
There are times when it is as much the absolute duty of England to be ready to 
intervene abroad as it is for the London police to be ready to intervene in our 
streets.  Officious meddling in either case is to be deprecated but absolute apathy 
would be absurd.
56
 
A few days later the paper maintained that “the first duty of our government is to remove 
obstacles and reassert our influence; and this to be done effectually must be done 
promptly.”57  The Daily News likewise doubted that the general public approved of using 
Turkish troops to maintain order in Egypt and maintained that not only was it imperative 
for Britain to protect the khedive, but that the nation had “a moral duty to promote the 
welfare of Egyptian people.”58   
 At the same time, other papers resisted making such a shift in their political 
opinion.  Regretting that unfortunate circumstances had caused Britain to take direct 
action by sending a naval squadron to Egypt, the Scotsman remained confident that the 
Government could be trusted to end the crisis with the “least possible friction and least 
danger to further complications.”  It then cautioned: 
The cry for more vigorous action in asserting British interests is a survival of 
Jingoism.  It means a repudiation of the right of anyone but ourselves to interfere 
in Egypt, and the curious circumstance is that it is advocated by the partisans of 
the Ministry to whom we are indebted for the copartnership [sic] with France.
59
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The Times joined in opposing direct British intervention.  Throwing its influence behind 
Gladstone by maintaining that he had “accurately estimated the situation from the 
outset,” the Times shared his optimism that no force by Britain would be needed and that 
Turkish intervention was “the least objectionable expedient for restoring tranquility.”60   
 As the situation became more serious, more papers began pointing to the need for 
Britain to intervene directly.  As the Bristol Mercury contended, the unwillingness or 
inability of the Turkish government to stabilize the situation had moved matters to the 
point where the major powers needed to act more assertively.   
The conference of the powers cannot prudently maintain its present indefinite 
form, which leaves the Khedive open at moment to conspiracies organized in 
Constantinople.  The mere repugnance of the Sultan to the deliberations of the 
Great Powers proves the absolute necessity of devising better guarantees for the 
existing control, for the safety of the European population, and for the 
constitutional system which the Turkish agents have outraged.
61
 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the massacre in Alexandria on 11 June, the Liverpool Post 
submitted:  
We heartily regret the legacy of a French partnership in Egypt left us by the late 
Government…If England were alone in this adventure she would know what to 
do better than she does.  European Concert if you please; but not partnership with 
one unpopular State, with all the rest looking on with ill-disguised suspicion.
62
   
 
At the end of June, the Pall Mall Gazette asserted in its front page editorial that its 
“business [was] to point out with the light of recent published official despatches how 
unfortunately the influence of France has operated in the development of the present 
crisis in Egypt.”63  Over the next month, that aggressive shift in tone became even more 
pronounced after Arabi usurped control of the Egyptian government and the British 
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government authorized the H.M.S. Seymour to bombard Alexandria.  It was at this point 
that the Times declared that “we cannot afford to allow Egypt to fall further into anarchy, 
as it will certainly do if the action of the fleet is not immediately followed up.”64   
While Liberal newspapers had consistently attacked Conservatives for imperial 
interventionism, they now found themselves advocating similar intervention in Egypt.  
Increasingly, as summer 1881 progressed, they rationalized such action on the grounds 
that it was necessary to secure British interests, that it was not inconsistent with 
fundamental Liberal principles, and that it furthered the cause of western civilization in 
the region.  Assessing reaction to the bombardment of Alexandria on 11 July, the London 
correspondent for the Leeds Mercury, a paper which in January had emphasized 
Gladstone’s commitment to direct intervention if necessary, held that the recent events 
had widely convinced Liberals that to uphold a “policy of absolute non-intervention 
would be perilous to British commerce.”  The correspondent further claimed that there 
was “no great sympathy even among the Radical Members, most of whom are capable of 
distinguishing between the policy of mere aggression and a policy of legitimate defence” 
for the positions held by peace Radicals such as Sir Wilfred Lawson and Mr. Henry 
Richard. “There are not ten Members on the Liberal side of the House,” he claimed, “who 
sympathise with the views of Mr. Lawson.”65  The Times insisted if Britain delayed any 
longer Arabi would be able to greatly strengthen his position and pose a “standing 
menace to European life and property, and even to the existence of Cairo itself.”66  
Lauding Bright’s long stance against the use of military force, the Bristol Mercury 
asserted that the “popularity of the veteran statesman will not be lessened by his 
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resignation, however little the public may share in the sentiments by which he has been 
actuated.”67  The Mercury also asserted that the “country at large, in common with the 
Government, may admit the principle whilst reasonably demurring to the application.”  
Still, “in view of the extreme exigencies and almost unprecedented calamities of the 
moment,” the paper concluded: 
We are surely entitled to avert further exigencies and perhaps more deplorable 
calamities, by defending—not merely the vast interests of England but imperiled 
civilization.  One can hardly imagine any object for which a Power like Great 
Britain could more beneficently exercise its material resources than in preserving 
Egypt from the horde of savages which a military adventurer has let loose upon 
it.
68
 
 
The Pall Mall Gazette, meanwhile, offered reassurance to its readers regarding 
the government’s altruistic intentions for bombarding Alexandria.  According to the 
Gazette,  
This then is the programme of the day:—England preparing to do the work for 
Europe and possibly at the request of Europe, which the Sultan refuses to do; that 
work, the suppression of the army; this done, the Egyptian minister and popular 
delegates to have wider opportunity of doing their own business.  That the 
programme may be hindered by Turkey on the one hand and by France on the 
other is only too true, and there is plenty to be said on both of these hands.  But 
the above, at any rate, describes the general drift of a policy that is not unworthy 
of the government of Great Britain, and to which the powers will be more likely 
to ascent, whether expressly or implicitly, than any other.
69
 
 
Conveying the speeches of William Woodall and Henry Broadhurst at the Liberal Club at 
Hanley on 15 July, the Bristol Mercury reported that they insisted, “the government had 
done all that was possible to avoid interferences by force,…[and that] England was acting 
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in full command with the other powers, and the relations had not been shaken by the 
bombardment of Alexandria.”70     
The widespread approval for British intervention across the spectrum and the 
thorough coverage of Wolseley’s campaign and victory at Tel-el-Kebir were also 
accompanied by continued concerns about the government’s long-term strategy for 
Egypt.  Agreeing with Gladstone that “anarchy must be put down in Egypt and that 
English interests must be protected against attack,” the Times forcefully maintained that 
“the restoration of the khedive, if it is to lead to any permanent settlement of affairs in 
Egypt, must be supported by something more stable and lasting that the shadowy 
authority of the sultan or the futile approval of the Concert of Europe.”71  The paper 
asserted that, having taken sole responsibility for restoring order in Egypt, Britain had an 
undisputed right to control the future arrangements for the government of the Egyptian 
territory.  With the vote to authorize a military expedition pending, the Liberal 
Birmingham Daily Post insisted that “it is now of much more importance that we 
should…ascertain definitely the objects for which we are fighting, and the conditions 
under which we are to lay down our arms.”72  Exhaustively engaging the dynamics of 
restoring order to Egypt while protecting British and European interests, the paper 
recognized the implication of defeating the Egyptian army: 
This leads to one of the most important points of all.  Without such an army as 
would be sufficient to protect the internal order and the external independence of 
Egypt, how is the khedive to be able to perform those international duties, and 
protect those foreign interests, in which England is of all countries the most 
immediately concerned?  It is not enough, then, to say that we desire to restore 
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self-government to Egypt, we must be prepared to replace the military forces 
which we shall have destroyed, and to define the English and the European 
interests which have to be recognized and preserved.  It is essential that on these 
subjects we should be moderate and unselfish. 
 
The Post, therefore, definitively held that “we shall scarcely have closed our mission in 
Egypt until there is established a government there able and willing to secure that 
object.
73
  While the Liberal Liverpool Post approved of British intervention, it 
nevertheless appealed to the government and the nation: 
We have retired ere now without enriching ourselves from territories which we 
have seized and controlled in the interests of civilization.  Let us determine to 
retire at the earliest possible moment from Egypt, even though under the peculiar 
circumstances of the case the earliest possible moment may be considerably 
postponed.
74
 
 
The editors of the Conservative Spectator magazine, meanwhile, called upon the country 
to stay the course and finish what it had started in Egypt no matter the difficulty.
75
   
Over the following months, as the government struggled to work out its policy 
concerning Egypt, the provincial presses also found it difficult to articulate a stance 
toward Anglo-Egyptian relations.  For instance, on 7 December 1882, the Liberal 
Manchester Examiner weighed in on the queen’s avowed commitment to “promote the 
happiness of the people and the prudent development of [Egypt’s] institutions.” While it 
gauged that nobody in Britain expected to annex Egypt formally, the paper firmly 
believed that the government, having “learned how to abandon the semblance of power 
and yet grasp the substance of power,” was almost certainly “bent upon pursuing in 
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Egypt one of those subtle and complex policies which, as developed in India, the world 
has come to admire as models of ingenious statecraft.”76 
Beyond the ranks of editorial writers, the public remained engaged with 
developments in Egypt.  According to the London correspondent for the Leeds Mercury, 
“there was no part of the country where the policy of the government finds stronger 
approval than among the Liberals of the north of England...and if the government had 
shown itself indifferent to English interests, the outcry in the north of England would 
have been very great.”77  In addition to inferences from national and provincial papers 
which alluded to public sentiment, the public’s active engagement in the Egyptian crisis 
was manifestly expressed in a number of different ways, such as the frequent publishing 
of letters to the editor, including those submitted by former and active government 
officials such as former Liberal MPs Julian Goldsmid and William H. Gregory, as well as 
the standing Liberal MP for Waterford, Henry Villiers-Stuart.
78
  Also included were 
letters from individuals such as the traveler and explorer Samuel W. Baker, Charles H. 
Allen, Alfred J. Butler, and Robert W. Felkin.
79
     
Popular opinion was dramatically evident at numerous public demonstrations.  
Provincial papers reported on and advertised for these events.  For instance, in 
association with the 12 July Orange celebrations commemorating the Battle of the Boyne, 
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between 5,000 and 10,000 members of the Liberal Orange Institution of England turned 
out at Hooton Park in Liverpool to celebrate the principles of Beaconsfieldism.  
Occurring just one day after the bombardment of Alexandria, the demonstrators 
denounced “the total and disastrous failure” of Gladstone’s government at home and 
abroad, specifically in the cases of Ireland and Egypt.  The meeting consequently moved 
that “Gladstone’s government is unworthy of the nation’s confidence, and should be put 
an end to at the earliest possible moment.”80  At another demonstration held in 
Blackburn, the keynote speaker warned: 
The dishonor through which England has had to go in Zululand, in Egypt, and in 
other places should be a caution to the leaders in England, and should excite in the 
breast of every man and woman who cares for his and her country a determination 
to get ready for the coming conflict which might be close upon us, closer than we 
think.
81
 
At a similar rally in Brookhill near Lisburn, spectators welcomed the criticisms of the 
administration’s handling of Egyptian and Irish affairs with supportive cries of “Shame 
and put them out.”82   
Similar events continued to occur into the autumn months.  For instance, on 21 
July Conservatives from West Kent and the Borough of Greenwich demonstrated at 
Charlton Park in Wiltshire.
83
  Significantly the Charlton event occurred in a district 
formerly represented by Gladstone.  Driving home this point, identical editorials which 
appeared in Berrow’s Worcester Journal and the Isle of Wight Observer pressed that 
events such as the one in Charlton, as well as in Oxford and South Lancaster, 
demonstrated how deeply the general public objected to the premier’s handling of Egypt 
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and other policy matters.  They further speculated that, while the premier still carried the 
support of his present home district of Midlothian, his backing would likely soon 
diminish there as well.
84
  Claiming that Conservatives were resurgent and reporting that 
more than 30,000 individuals had attended the event in Charlton, the Essex Standard 
similarly took note of “the remarkable fact that, even where Liberalism was strongest a 
few years ago, there the most hostile demonstrations are made against the government.”85  
On 7 August 5,000 demonstrators attended a nationally advertised event at Stoke Edith 
Park in Ledbury, Herefordshire, and enthusiastically approved an equally critical 
resolution.
86
  Subsequently, on 7 October, “a great demonstration” of Conservatives 
turned out in Manchester to “consider the Irish and Egyptian policies of the government.” 
The attendees unanimously resolved:   
That this meeting strongly disapproves of much of the government policy in 
Ireland; and while, cordially recognising the gallant conduct of Her Majesty’s 
forces during the late campaign in Egypt, condemns the action of the 
administration, believing that, by judgment, firmness, and foresight, the cabinet 
might have secured British interests, averted the war, saved many valuable lives, 
and prevented much unnecessary pressure upon the national resources...This 
meeting is convinced that the proceedings of the government in Afghanistan and 
South Africa, as well at home, are calculated to bring discredit upon the country; 
and pledges itself to use every means consistent with law to reinstate a 
Conservative administration which will have an enlightened and consist[ent] 
regard for the honour and true welfare of the empire.
87
 
Conservatives were not the only ones to demonstrate, however.  If Tories 
capitalized on Bright’s resignation to ridicule what they called the hypocritical shift in 
Gladstone’s foreign policy, the Birmingham Reform League met to celebrate politicians 
such as Bright, Sir Wilfred Lawson, and Joseph Cowen, who had denounced “the cruel 
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and unnecessary bombardment of Alexandria.”88  On 15 July at Bowood Park near 
Chippenham and on 16 August in Brownhills in the West Midlands, other Liberals 
gathered amidst marching bands, in order to dismiss Conservative critics and reinforce 
public confidence in the government.  With the bombardment of Alexandria having 
occurred only days earlier, the chairman of the Bowood rally insisted that there was “not 
the slightest discredit attached to our government under the circumstances,” an 
assessment met with applause and cheers of “here here.”89  A month later at the 
Brownhills demonstration, Mr. Henry Wiggin, MP, emphatically denied that the Liberals 
were the “Peace-at-any-Price” party, and professed that “recent events had shown clearly 
that when the honour and dignity of England were about to be attacked, Liberals were 
willing to strain every nerve in defence.”90   
The public’s engagement with Britain’s presence in Egypt did not cease once the 
Arabi revolt had been suppressed.  Over the next year provincial presses continued to 
engage questions about the nation’s commitment to remain there, and that interest was 
elevated still further as complications arose in the Egyptian protectorate of the Sudan.   
BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN, 1883-JANUARY 1884 
Having assumed responsibility for Egypt—however reluctantly—Gladstone’s 
administration was additionally burdened with overseeing the Sudan.  Annexed by Egypt 
in 1821, the Sudan had been in open rebellion since 1881.  That revolt was led by 
Muhammad Ahmad, the son of a Sudanese boat builder, who proclaimed himself the 
Mahdi (the Expected One), who called for a jihad against Turkish rule.  Over the next 
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two years, the movement gained strength.  Defeating sizeable Egyptian armies that were 
sent against it, the Mahdi’s forces contributed to and benefited from the instability caused 
by the Arabi revolt.
91
  With his government propped up by the British military, Tewfik 
sought to reassert control over the Sudan and eliminate the Mahdi threat to Upper Egypt.  
In early 1883, therefore, he dispatched an Egyptian army of 10,000 men, many of whom 
were survivors of Arabi’s army at Tel-el-Kebir.  The army was officered by British 
soldiers and commanded by Colonel William Hicks, who was a veteran of the Indian 
Army and, in being hired by the khedive, was elevated to the rank of general.  After 
drilling and training his army for several months in Omdurman, Hicks had succeeded in 
clearing Mahdists from the region between the White and Blue Niles by the end of May 
1883.  Encouraged by these results Tewfik and his ministers sought to reassert Egyptian 
control over Kordofan, a region that lay southwest of the capital at Khartoum.  Gladstone, 
Baring and other British officials opposed such a move, because they feared the financial 
strain a Sudanese dependency might put on the weakened Egyptian state.  However, 
because the British were preparing to turn over full control of Egypt to the khedive, 
including drawing down their military presence there, and because they wanted no part in 
the Sudan question, they chose to refrain as much as possible from interfering in the 
matter.  Leaving Omdurman on 8 September with a force numbering close to 10,000 
men, Hicks’s expedition into Kordofan met with disaster on 5 November.  Abushed at El 
Obeid, Hicks’s force was almost completely annihilated.92    
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This defeat left 32,000 Egyptian soldiers cut off in garrisons in Khartoum, Sennar, 
and other places.  When news of the disaster reached London about two weeks later, it 
immediately raised questions about Egypt’s long-term presence in the Sudan and forced 
the cabinet to reconsider Britain’s Egyptian policy.  Prompted by General Wolseley, 
Hartington as war secretary argued that Britain was bound to support Egypt in retaining 
control over Khartoum and its surrounding regions for the sake of preserving British 
prestige and protecting the route to India,. At the same time, he believed that it was 
reasonable that Egypt be persuaded to evacuate from the provinces of Kordofan, Darfur, 
and Fashoda, which lacked strategic importance.
93
  Gladstone concurred with Baring, 
who had recently been named British consul-general, that it would be impossible for 
Egypt to hold on to even those limited sectors of the Sudan without British assistance.
94
  
Lord Northbrook soon agreed that it would be impossible for Egypt to retain control over 
its southern neighbor on its own and that the operation was too costly for the Turks or 
Britain to pursue.
95
  But when Baring advised the khedive in early December to abandon 
the territory south of Aswan, Tewfik’s ministers summarily resigned rather than take 
responsibility for relinquishing Egyptian territory.  Bankrupt and with his army 
destroyed, the khedive was powerless to defend his own borders let alone to withdraw 
from the Sudan without assistance.  Recognizing the situation, the cabinet was obliged to 
assume responsibility for the protection of Egypt proper and the Red Sea coast.
96
  The 
political effect of this decision was that instead of advancing the process of granting 
Egypt its independence, British oversight was all the more formalized.  The khedive was 
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relegated, for all intents and purposes, to the status of a puppet ruler, with the real 
decision-making power residing in Baring’s hands.97    
The task of evacuating more than 33,000 Egyptian troops and civilians out of the 
Sudan fell to Major General Charles “Chinese” Gordon.98  A fervent Christian who 
avidly supported charitable and humanitarian causes, Gordon had previously served as 
governor general of Equatoria and the Sudan under Khedive Ismail in the 1870s, and he 
had used his position to suppress the slave trade.
99
   
There were initially significant reservations about sending Gordon, both in 
London and in Cairo. At the time he agreed to accept the cabinet’s offer to go to the 
Sudan in mid-January 1884, Gordon had already resigned his commission in the British 
army to accept a contract with King Leopold of Belgium to eradicate the Afro-Arab slave 
trade in the Congo.
100
  Aware of Gordon’s tendency to interpret his orders to serve his 
own convictions, Gladstone was wary about giving him the power to act on his own and 
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preferred that he be given only advisory responsibilities.
101
  In fact, Sir Edward Walter 
Hamilton, Gladstone’s personal secretary, recorded that “[Gordon] seems to be a half-
cracked fatalist; and what can one expect from such a man?”102  Meanwhile, Baring had 
initially opposed the appointment of Gordon or any other British officer for that matter, 
but he also believed that the Egyptians were incapable of administering the situation, 
which called for both an advisory and an executive functionary.  At the urging of his 
military advisors--some of whom had served previously with Gordon--Baring became 
convinced that Gordon was the only officer suitable to effect the evacuation of the 
Sudan.
103
   
 Gordon met with a select cabinet committee comprised of Hartington, Granville, 
Dilke, and Northbrook to finalize his commission on 18 January.  The committee offered 
potentially conflicting instructions to him.  The members told Gordon to proceed to the 
Sudan in an advisory capacity and to “report on the best way of withdrawing garrisons, 
settling the country, and to perform other duties as may be entrusted to him by the 
khedive’s government” through Baring.104  Gladstone was notably absent from that final 
meeting, as he was resting at his home in Hawarden, and his absence may well have 
contributed to his subsequent befuddlement over Gordon’s actions and his persistent 
                                                 
101
 Cautioning Granville about the appointment, Gladstone wrote: “While his opinion on the Sudan may be 
of great value, must we not be very careful in any instruction we give, that he does not shift the center of 
gravity as to political and military responsibility for that country?  In brief, if he reports what should be 
done, he should not be the judge who should do it, nor ought he to commit us on that point by advice 
officially given.  It would be extremely difficult after sending him to reject such advice, and it should 
therefore, I think, be made clear he is not our agent for advising on that point.  Gladstone to Granville, 16 
January 1884, in John Morley, Life of Gladstone, volume 2 (London: Macmillan, 1907), 390. 
102
 D. W. R. Bahlman, ed. The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton 1880-1885, volume 2, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1972), 545. 
103
 Roger Owen, Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 191-93; Bernard Allen, Gordon and the Sudan (London: Macmillan, 1931), 226. 
104
 Holland, Life of Spencer Compton, 1: 418.  Dilke, who arrived late to the meeting, was under the 
impression that Gordon was being sent merely to “collect information and report on the situation in the 
Sudan.” Gwynn, Life of Sir Charles Dilke, 2:29-30. 
113 
 
 
 
belief that Gordon had only been given at most advisory responsibilities.  “We sent 
Gordon on a mission of peace and liberation,” he later wrote. “I never understood how it 
was that Gordon’s mission of peace became one of war.”105  As Elton notes in his 
account of Gordon’s commissioning, Hartington’s report to Gladstone made no mention 
of the reference to Gordon being authorized to perform “other duties.”  Consequently, 
Gladstone, who intended from the onset that Gordon only be sent in an advisory capacity, 
remained convinced that Gordon embarked on nothing more than a fact-finding and 
advisory mission.
106
   
Gordon, however, understood his orders to be executive in nature.  Recounting his 
meeting with the ministers to his sister Augusta the following day, he wrote:  
Wolseley came for me, I went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke, and 
Northbrook; they said had I seen W. and did I understand their ideas.  I said yes, 
and repeated what W. had said to me as to their ideas, which was ‘they would 
evacuate Sudan.’  They were pleased and said, that was their idea.  Would I go?  I 
said ‘yes.’   
They said ‘when?’  I said, ‘To-night.’ And it was over.107  
 
Immediately following his meeting with the cabinet ministers, Gordon, accompanied by 
Lt. Col. J. D. H. Stewart as his staff officer, departed for Egypt by way of the evening 
boat-train to Calais.  They arrived in Port Said on 24 January.  
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THE POWER OF THE BRITISH PRESS AND GORDON’S MISSION TO SUDAN, 
 NOVEMBER 1883-JANUARY 1884
108
 
Throughout 1883, the provincial presses remained attentive to questions regarding 
Britain’s future interest in Egypt and the Sudan.  That interest only heightened after 
Hicks’s army was massacred by Mahdist forces on 5 November 1883.  In the course of 
printing detailed articles on the disaster, the newspapers of the country quickly reacted by 
calling for a withdrawal from the Sudan.  The Conservative Bury Post asserted on 27 
November that “it is no concern of ours to conquer the Sudan, and we should be stupid to 
attempt it.”109  The independent Dundee Courier cautioned against sending troops into 
the Sudan, insisting “we have no interest there and no right to be fighting where our 
interests are not threatened.”110  Declaring Khartoum to be the “extreme outpost of 
Egypt,” the Economist firmly declared “[we] not only refuse to assist in any expedition, 
but refuse consent to it while the army is being commanded by British officers.”111  
Likewise the Liberal Daily News insisted, “it is absurd to suppose that the policy of 
England can be affected by the deplorable catastrophe in the Sudan.  Even if the Mahdi 
should be defeated in the end, there ought to be no further thought of conquering the 
Sudan.”112  Despite the widespread bipartisan call in the press for the British government 
to dispense with any responsibility for the Sudan, at least a few papers disagreed.  The 
independent Glasgow Herald did not rule out the possibility of a British expedition 
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against the Mahdi and contested the notion that Britain had no compelling interest in the 
Sudan:  
Although a serious enterprise…such an effort as this would probably not be 
wasted as insurance against total anarchy in Egypt and still more against loss of 
our continuing influence there.  But it must be expected to fail—and indeed it 
ought not to be made—unless a clear understanding is come to the Nile Valley, 
and still more in Downing Street, as to the real meaning and extent of that 
influence.
113
 
 
Characterizing the news as “a mene tekel to the government scheme of withdrawal,” the 
Saturday Review maintained that it would be impossible “for us to disregard an 
overthrow of Colonel Hicks and an advance of the insurgents on Khartoum…If Egypt 
under English influence, or Egypt under some influence, does not attempt the opening of 
the Sudan, it will be done somehow.”114 
In spite of the press’s widespread call for a British retreat from the Sudan, they 
did not advocate a complete withdrawal from the region in the aftermath of the Hicks 
disaster.  Rather they suggested that Britain should retain and even increase its presence 
in Egypt.  The Times immediately urged that:  
We cannot believe that, in the presence of facts the significance of which only 
wilful blindness can refuse to see, the Ministry will persist in the project of 
weakening the small British force in Egypt.  The policy, in which the evacuation 
of Cairo, recently announced, but, happily, not yet accomplished, is a step, has 
been adopted in defiance of the advice of every person of authority and 
experience in Egyptian affairs from Lord Dufferin downwards.
115
 
 
It further held that “a sudden turn of affairs…has made the country ask whether, instead 
of weakening the British garrison in Egypt we shall now be compelled to face the 
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necessity of reinforcing it.”116  The independent Dundee Courier, likewise, contended 
that Britain’s great interest in Egypt must be preserved.117  And the Conservative 
Lancaster Gazette warned:  
Radical non-interventionists are prompt with the assertion that British interests are 
confined to the Nile delta so the Mahdi leader should be permitted to freely work 
his will in the Sudan.  But what if the False Prophet advances to Cairo?...The first 
result of this startling disaster is a countermand of the order for withdrawing 
British troops…The only method of securing order is the maintenance of the 
British forces.”118   
 
In thus engaging the mounting questions pertaining to Britain’s presence in the 
Sudan, the press was not only highly responsive to imperial activity, but proved to be 
highly influential in determining British policy.  Indeed, Gladstone’s decision to send 
Gordon and his subsequent decision to dispatch a relief expedition to Khartoum was so 
fundamentally connected to the activities of the press, that one must account for those 
shifting opinions in order to understand fully the government’s actions.   
To be sure, while the press was not the only party interested in seeing Gordon sent 
to the Sudan, it would be their efforts that would prove vital to Gordon’s eventual 
appointment.  At the end of November in the aftermath of the Hicks disaster, Colonel 
Brevan Edwards, an officer in the Royal Engineers, and Sir Andrew Clarke, the 
superintendent of fortifications, recommended that Gordon be sent to Sudan to Hugh 
Childers, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. According to Edwards, “there was no one 
more qualified to deal with the question [of the Sudan] than Charlie Gordon…His name 
alone would do wonders, but no time should be lost.”  And Clarke insisted that, “if the 
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Mahdi is a prophet, Gordon in the Sudan is greater.” 119  Childers then forwarded the 
proposal on to Foreign Secretary Granville, who asked Gladstone: 
Do you see any objection to using Gordon in some way?  He has an immense 
name in Egypt.  He is popular at home.  He is a strong but sensible opponent to 
slavery.  He has a bee in his bonnet.
120
 
 
On 1 December the proposition was then sent on to Baring in Cairo for his consideration.  
But Baring, after conferencing with the Khedive, flatly rejected the offer because he felt 
that appointing a Christian to deal with a Muslim uprising would be grossly 
counterproductive.
121
  Consequently, as matters stood in early December, little was done 
officially to impede Gordon’s intention to resign his commission and serve Leopold in 
the Congo.  There is also every indication that the public at large was unaware of these 
exchanges, as no mention of the possibility that Gordon might be sent to the Sudan 
appeared in the press in November and December.  In fact on 4 and 6 December the 
Times reported that Zubehr Pasha, a former slaver who carried considerable influence in 
the region, was likely to be named the commander of the forthcoming expedition into the 
Sudan.
122
   
That changed briefly on New Year’s Day.  Sir Samuel Baker, an esteemed 
explorer and authority on the Middle East, wrote a letter to the Times in which he asked, 
“Why should not General Gordon Pasha be invited to assist the government.  [sic]  There 
is no man living who would be more capable or so well fitted to represent the justice 
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which Great Britain should establish in the Sudan.” 123  Privately, he also wrote on the 
subject to Gordon, with whom he was friends, but Gordon replied that he was intent on 
serving in the Congo.
 124
  Five days later the paper congratulated Gordon on his future 
post in central Africa and reported with disappointment that the government had not 
followed up on Baker’s suggestion.125   
The cabinet at that juncture remained intent that the khedive’s ministers take 
responsibility for evacuating the Sudan.
126
  Indeed, Baker’s plea seemed to have fallen 
almost completely on deaf ears.  Almost all other references to Gordon in the press 
between November and 8 January involved passing remarks concerning his upcoming 
assignment to the Congo, or his past work in China and the Sudan.
127
  Aside from these 
glancing remarks, the only notable mention of Gordon and the Sudan came from a 
correspondent stationed in Cairo that first appeared in the Standard on 5 January: 
“Chinese” Gordon has left Syria in order to succeed to the functions and position 
of Mr. Stanley on the Congo, under the King of the Belgians.  I hear, however, 
that proposals have been made to him by the Foreign Office which may induce 
him to turn his steps to Egypt. Such an appointment would be generally approved 
should Gordon accept it.
128
  
 
Two days later the editors of the Glasgow Herald may have been hinting at this when 
they vaguely asked in passing, “why, by the way, was the general not bespoke for a still 
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darker region of the Dark Continent.”129  The lack of attention to Gordon, especially in 
the wake of Baker’s proposal, supports Gordon biographer John Pollock’s observation, 
that at the time “Gordon’s name had been almost completely forgotten.”130 
The tenor and direction of the public’s interest and the cabinet’s intentions 
dramatically shifted thanks to efforts of W. T. Stead of the Pall Mall Gazette.
131
   On the 
eve of Gordon’s departure for the Congo, Stead having learned that Gordon had arrived 
in Britain, showed up unexpectedly at the home of the general’s sister in Southampton on 
8 January, and pressed him for an interview regarding the Sudan.
132
  Gordon was at first 
reluctant to speak and insisted that he “did not want to press [his] opinions on the public.”  
Stead reassured him that the public was genuinely interested in his authoritative views, 
and Gordon obliged Stead’s request. In the course of that discussion, Gordon strongly 
questioned the wisdom of a full British withdrawal:  
So you would abandon the Sudan?  But the eastern Sudan is indispensible to 
Egypt.  It will cost you far more to retain your hold upon Egypt proper if you 
abandon your hold on the eastern Sudan to the Mahdi or even to the Turk than 
what it would to retain your hold upon the eastern Sudan by the aid of such 
material as exists in the provinces.  Darfur and Kordofan must be abandoned.  
That I admit; but the provinces lying to the east of the White Nile should be 
retained, and north of Senaar.  The danger is altogether of a different nature.  It 
arises from the influence which the spectacle of a conquering Mahommedan 
power, established close to your frontiers, will exercise upon the populations you 
govern.
133
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He also maintained that “the great evil is not at Khartoum, but at Cairo.  It is the 
weakness of Cairo which produces disaster in the Sudan.” 134  Whether Egypt abandoned 
the Sudan or not, Gordon asserted that financial costs would accrue regardless, but in 
either case he believed such costs would only be temporary.  On a more pragmatic note, 
he insisted that it was logistically impossible to withdraw the troops garrisoned in Sudan 
safely, and thus concluded that “the only course which ought to be entertained” was to 
“defend Khartoum at all hazards.”135  Introducing Stead’s interview the following day, 9 
January, with a forceful leader that read “Chinese Gordon for the Sudan,” the Pall Mall 
Gazette urged that Gordon’s expertise made him indispensable and that he should be 
dispatched to Sudan immediately “to do what can be done.”136   
Intrigued with the Sudan as early as 22 November following the news on Hicks, it 
is not known if Stead was influenced by Baker’s appeal in the Times.  Years later Wilfred 
Scawen Blunt accused Reginald Brett (later Lord Esher), a personal friend of Gordon’s 
and Hartington’s private secretary, of purposefully orchestrating Stead and the other 
newspapers to push for Gordon’s appointment.137  When he reviewed Blunt’s work in 
November 1911, Stead boldly claimed full credit for Gordon’s appointment, including a 
section entitled, “My Reason for Sending Gordon to Khartoum,” and declared: “I not 
only said so, but I was obeyed.”138  Whether or not the call for Gordon was solely Stead’s 
own idea or was devised by others, it is nonetheless impossible to deny the impact of 
Stead’s piece. 
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The day after the interview appeared papers around the country reprinted portions 
of the scoop and discussed Gordon’s assessment of the strategic situation in the Sudan.139  
In Maryport on 10 January, at a crowded Liberal meeting that was meant to affirm 
confidence in the leadership of the party and return Liberal MPs to parliament, Sir 
Wilfred Lawson utilized Gordon’s critique to heap condemnation on the premier for 
entering Egypt in the first place and for disgracefully “enslaving” the Sudan., He pledged 
“to do everything in his power to get the troops out of Egypt.”140  While it paid tribute to 
Gordon’s expertise by insisting that “everyone ought to pay the fullest attention to any 
opinion expressed with regard to the Egyptian crisis by General Gordon,” the Daily News 
stood firmly behind Gladstone’s decision to withdraw from Sudan and dismissed the 
persistent accusations that the government’s decisions were continuing to lead to a “loss 
of prestige.”  To that end, the papers stressed to their readers that Gordon’s statements 
were a warning against abandoning the Sudan rashly, but that they were not, per se, 
directed against an orderly withdrawal.
141
  Concurring with the government’s decision to 
make Wadi Halfa the southern boundary of Egypt, the Bristol Mercury rejected Gordon’s 
contention that an abrupt extraction was unadvisable when it maintained that the garrison 
at Khartoum “at present could be withdrawn without danger.”142  Such responses were 
not limited to the Liberal papers. Taking issue with a Sheffield politician who advocated 
sending 30,000 British troops into the Sudan to crush the Mahdi and then marching on to 
Madagascar to flush out the French, the Sheffield and Rotherham Independent declared: 
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“This…is what Tory journalism means when it insists upon the government protecting 
British interests and the prestige and honour of England in Egypt and the Sudan.”  The 
only sound course of action, the paper determined, was that which the government had 
already resolved to do, the withdrawal from the South and Western Sudan to Wadi 
Halfa.
143
  
From the perspective of the Conservative and independent presses, which 
seemingly took Gordon’s warnings more seriously, a military expedition to extract the 
garrisons or to defend Britain’s position in the Sudan, was simply the responsible and 
necessary course of action.  Claiming that the European papers widely perceived 
Gladstone’s withdrawal from Sudan to be a sign of weakness, the Hampshire Advertiser 
exhaustively argued that it was impossible to conclude otherwise since their suppositions 
were supported by experts such as Baker and Gordon.  The Advertiser went on to observe 
regretfully that in the long run the cabinet’s “humiliating policy would hardly settle the 
crisis.”144   
Although many Conservative papers did not mention Gordon directly, their 
arguments were consistent with what he had advocated in his interview with Stead.  
Insisting that the entire country was amazed by the government’s “resolution to leave 
Khartoum, Sinkat, and Tokar to their fate with humiliation and anxiety,” the Standard 
hoped that the government would not “tarnish the English name by withholding 
assistance from the beleaguered garrisons who, with the exercise of a little spirit and the 
expenditure of a little money, might be—or would have been—rescued from a terrible 
fate.”  The Standard further contended that, if Britain gave the Sudan to the Mahdi, 
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“there would be no hope of a strong and beneficial administration at Cairo.” The paper 
claimed that with proper governance, “there was no reason why his southern domains 
should not add strength and dignity to the throne of the khedive.”145  The Daily Telegraph 
similarly charged:  
It is necessary to urge that the British government shall spare no effort to rescue 
the victims of its tardy resolution. There are British soldiers enough in Egypt to-
day to drive the Mahdi over the equator if they could only get at him; and yet, in 
fear as we are of hearing of frightful disasters, they are helpless at Cairo.
146
   
 
The Morning Post counseled that “if the six thousand Egyptian troops at Khartoum, with 
the Europeans in that town…are massacred in attempting to retreat across the desert, the 
responsibility of the British government for such a catastrophe cannot be disavowed.”147  
It therefore recommended that a force of some four to six thousand Indians and Nubians 
could affect the safe withdrawal of the Khartoum garrison.
148
  The Morning Advertiser 
echoed those remarks stating:  
It seems to us that no effort that Her Majesty’s government could make would be 
too great for securing the safety of the defenders of Khartoum and the remnant of 
the European population under its protection.  If disaster, and possibly massacre, 
should overtake the column of fugitives from Khartoum there would be an 
outburst of indignation from the civilized world.
149
 
 
The Liverpool Courier posited that “the abandonment of the Sudan may or may not be 
wise as a political step, [but] the abandonment of the imperiled garrison and the Christian 
people who imagined that England was ruling Egypt is a crime that will cover the British 
name with indelible infamy.”150   
                                                 
145
 Standard, 11 January 1884, 5. 
146
 Daily Telegraph, January 1884, reprinted in Pall Mall Gazette, 12 January 1884, 11. 
147
 Morning Post (London), 11 January 1884, 4 
148
 Morning Post (London), 15 January 1884, 4-5. 
149
 Morning Advertiser (London), January 1884, reprinted in Pall Mall Gazette, 11 January 1884, 11. 
150
 Liverpool Courier, January 1884, reprinted in Pall Mall Gazette, 14 January 1884, 11. 
124 
 
 
 
That Gordon’s statements had an impact on public opinion and policy decisions 
did not go unnoticed by a London correspondent for the Hampshire Advertiser who 
observed just a few days after Stead’s interview appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette:   
The publication of General Gordon’s opinions has done a great deal to strengthen 
the hands of those who have all along urged the fatality of the abandonment, 
while the sensitiveness, even of the government itself, to the criticism on its own 
project, is shown by its contradiction of the suggested abandonment of Souakim 
[sic].  “Nothing of the kind,” we are told by the semi-official journalists.  Perhaps 
we shall be told by and bye [sic] that it is not intended to abandon Khartoum, and 
then that Berber is to be held, while as to Wady Halfa [sic] that is to be a mere 
basis of alterations.
151
 
 
Moreover, in contrast to Baker’s earlier plea in the Times for Gordon’s services, the Pall 
Mall Gazette’s demand that Gordon be sent to the Sudan provoked a great deal of 
positive response by the presses.  For instance, the London correspondent for the 
Sheffield and Rotherham Independent reported, that  
“Chinese” Gordon and his opinions on the Sudan are on the lips of all active 
politicians here to-night, and the possibility of the government intercepting his 
projected voyage to the Congo, and sending him to Egypt with extensive powers, 
is being eagerly discussed.
152
  
 
And while it noted that “some fancy the mere whisper of his name throughout the Sudan 
would dispel all danger,” the correspondent cautioned that “a little less hysterical 
enthusiasm would be likelier to secure the approval of the general public to any such step 
being taken.”153  Dismayed by the situation in Egypt, the Morning Advertiser likewise 
wrote, “it is not too much to ask that all England has been looking for the employment of 
General Gordon in the present crisis in Egypt.”154  The Morning Post insisted that “surely 
it is not too late for the government to admit to their councils a man whose advice and co-
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operation in such a crisis as the present would be of incalculable value.”155  The Times 
suggested that it was good that Gordon’s resignation had not yet been formally accepted 
by the War Office, as it was proof that the government recognized “his eminent services 
and [were] unwilling to lose them.” It optimistically offered that those services might not 
only be utilized to secure the defense of Egypt but also to effect “the restoration of the 
khedive’s authority over a part of the Sudan.”156   
 Still apparently intent upon going to the Congo, Gordon’s reaction to the flurry of 
such articles and demands for his services was to press for Baker’s appointment to the 
Sudan in a letter to the Times.
157
  That suggestion, however, was completely ignored by 
the presses; they wanted Gordon.  So too did Hartington, the war secretary, who having 
favored sending Gordon to the Sudan for some time, redoubled his efforts.
158
  With 
journalistic and political pressure quickly mounting, Gladstone and Granville acquiesced 
and offered the Sudan mission to Gordon.
159
  The aforementioned process by which 
Gordon was sent to the Sudan rapidly went into motion.  Only nine days after Stead’s 
article appeared in print, Gordon was on his way to the Sudan.   
The significance of Stead’s accomplishment in effecting the appointment of 
Gordon did not go unnoticed by the general public.  As one observer expressed to the 
Times: 
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The people who first obtained and forced on the attention of ministers the 
general’s opinions were the press, and it is to them that the country owes a tardy 
recognition of this great man’s power, and it is they who must be thanked if 
England and Egypt are rescued from their difficulties by his courage and 
gallantry.
160
 
 
Raymond Schults has contended that Stead’s efforts marked a truly significant point in 
the history of journalism.  To be sure, this was certainly not the first time the press had 
influenced a government into take a certain course of action.  What made it especially 
notable, as R. H. Gretton pointed out, was that this “was probably the first occasion on 
which a newspaper set itself, by acting as the organiser of opinion on a particular detail of 
policy, to change a government’s mind at high speed.  However strongly newspapers had 
spoken before this on political subjects, they had not adopted the method of hammering, 
day in, day out, at a single detail, and turning policy into a catchword.”161  That the press 
was so successful may have been due, as Gretton suggested, to the government being 
encouraged that they had been right all along to consider sending Gordon to the Sudan 
back in December.
162
  
THE SWAY OF PUBLIC OPINION AND GORDON AT KHARTOUM,  
FEBRUARY 1884-AUGUST 1885 
Any ambiguity concerning Gordon’s orders evaporated when he arrived in Cairo 
on 24 January.  The Egyptian government bestowed upon him the title of governor-
general of the Sudan, and he was expressly charged by Baring to 
arrange for the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons etc. as rapidly as is 
consistent with (1) the saving of life and so far as possible, property; (2) the 
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establishment of some form of government which will prevent, so far as possible, 
anarchy and confusion arising out of the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops.
163
 
  
To effect the second part of that commission, Gordon elicited the support of Zubehr 
Pasha, whom the government had considered as a possible leader prior to Gordon’s 
appointment.  He was also the only person, Gordon believed, who had any chance of 
establishing a responsible temperate government in the wake of an Egyptian exodus.  On 
that basis, Gordon requested that the cabinet approve Zubehr’s appointment.164   
From the moment Gordon left Britain, hardly a day went by without leading 
articles in the British papers that reported or offered comments on his position.
165
  
Already successful in effecting Gordon’s appointment to the Sudan, the press continued 
to exert influence.  For example, the British government ultimately rejected Gordon’s 
request to install Zubehr because, in the words of Granville, “the public would not 
tolerate the appointment of Zubehr Pasha.”166  Ostensibly this was because the public 
opposed the idea of an ex-slaver being named governor-general of the Sudan.
167
  Leading 
the charge against Zubehr was the highly influential British and Foreign Anti-Slavery 
Society.  In December, when it was reported that he might be named the commander of 
an Egyptian army in the Sudan, the Anti-Slavery Society along with the Times strongly 
protested that move on the grounds that, given Zubehr’s history of slaving and resisting 
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the authority of the khedive, the appointment would be “improper and dangerous in the 
highest degree.”168  Three months later, although the Times recognized that Gordon ought 
not leave Khartoum without first establishing a responsible government, it declared that 
“it is very much open to doubt whether any Government with a notorious slave-driver at 
its head can be fitly entrusted to take the place he vacates.”169  Reiterating its opposition 
to the rumored appointment, the Anti-Slavery Society firmly urged that the government 
not “stultify that anti-slavery policy which has so long been the high distinction of 
England.”170  That the public was so adamantly against Zubehr, Elton asserted, was not 
so much a result of a campaign by the press, as it was because the government had not 
done enough to “enlighten public opinion” about the necessity of the appointment.171  
Queen Victoria, meanwhile, complained to Gladstone at the end of February that “the 
decisive factor should be ‘the good and permanent tranquility of Egypt…and not public 
opinion HERE which is fickle and changeable.’”172   
Even while they opposed the appointment of Zubehr, the press and the public 
were still highly eager to see that Gordon was adequately supported in his mission.  As 
early as 23 January the Huddersfield Daily Chronicle had contended that “General 
Gordon may have great influence among the natives, and he may know more about the 
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Sudan than any other officer, but unless he is well backed up by a strong force of English 
troops he might as well stay at home as seek to turn by his single arm the blow which 
threatens the chief town of the Sudan.”173  In emphasizing the humanitarian aspects of 
Gordon’s mission in the Sudan and Gordon’s future ambition to stamp out the slave trade 
in the Congo, one clergyman wrote to the Essex Standard at the beginning of February 
that “under these circumstances is it not a national, nay a world-wide duty that we should 
give him all that we can give him—all that he asks for—our prayers.”174  On 11 February, 
meanwhile, the Times demanded that the government support Gordon adequately:  
It is incredible that the strength of the British Empire should not be adequate for 
such an effort, and, if it be, the obligation upon us to use it for the purpose is 
dictated alike for humanity and policy…At home, practically all classes and 
sections are agreed in calling upon the government to recognize and give effect to 
that responsibility, and ministers will commit an astounding and 
incomprehensible error if they delude themselves with the notion that a movement 
of public opinion so powerful and unanimous can be defied even by this phalanx 
of a parliamentary majority.
175
   
 
Gladstone’s administration was extremely reluctant to offer military support 
directly to Gordon in the weeks following his departure, a position that left the prime 
minister and his colleagues open to criticism.  To be sure, the Egyptian and British 
governments did send forces into the Sudan in 1884.  At the very time that Gordon and 
Stewart were making their way to Khartoum, for example, General Valentine Baker led a 
failed attempt to relieve a garrison at Tokar.  Immediately after, at the insistence of 
Wolseley and the Duke of Cambridge, the commander-in-chief of the army, a second 
expedition under Major General Sir Gerald Graham set out to relieve Suakin, a location 
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believed vital for effecting a retreat from Khartoum.
 176
  This latter effort received 
considerable public support, as evidenced by a meeting held at the Guildhall in London 
and chaired by the lord mayor on 15 February.
 177
  Nevertheless, the Gladstone 
administration faced a Vote of No Confidence in the Commons four days later, and 
during the debate on that motion, Hartington spelled out the government’s position vis-à-
vis Sudan. “We are not responsible,” he said, “for the relief or rescue of garrisons in 
either the western or the southern or the eastern Sudan.” 178  He further claimed—
disingenuously—that Gordon was not acting on behalf of the British government but 
rather for the Egyptian government, which had occupied Sudan.
 179
  
The day before this debate at Westminster, Gordon and Stewart arrived at 
Khartoum, where Gordon was received as “‘father’ by an adoring and enthusiastic 
crowd,” and he immediately set about the slow process of evacuating the 11,000 
Egyptian troops and civilians who resided in Khartoum down the Nile by means of 
government steamers.
180
  When word reached him in early March of London’s decision 
not to approve the appointment of Zubehr, Gordon informed Baring that, while he would 
proceed in evacuating Khartoum, he could not guarantee the completion of his 
instructions to leave behind a responsible government without the assistance of Zubehr.  
By that time he had come to understand that the Mahdi’s movement was not just a 
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response to ineffective and corrupt governance, but that it was a religiously inspired 
movement, and that as such the Mahdi could not be negotiated into allowing the 
establishment of an effective government other than one of his own making in the Sudan.  
Gordon consequently warned Baring that “if Egypt is to be quiet, the Mahdi must be 
smashed up.”181  Conveying to Baring a week later the paramount need for additional 
support from “the government,” and specifically referencing the necessity of Zubehr’s 
confirmation, Gordon maintained: “I will do my best to carry out my instructions, but I 
feel a conviction that I will be caught in Khartoum.”182    
On 12 March the Mahdists closed the siege around Khartoum—a situation that 
would last some 320 days.  Telegraph communication between Khartoum and Cairo were 
severed and the only means for Khartoum to communicate with the outside world was by 
messenger across the desert.  The plans for evacuating the city thus came to a halt.  Even 
without the relief of Berber, there remained a window of opportunity for Gordon and a 
great portion of the Egyptian and Foreign contingent to escape in the early summer while 
the Nile remained high.  Such an expedition, though, was beset with considerable danger 
and had no certainty of success.  Weighing the risks and refusing to leave the Sudan in 
crisis, Gordon opted to stay in Khartoum, doing his best to secure the city militarily, 
attempting to ease the ever increasing fiscal and food shortages, and holding up 
morale.
183
  All the while, he awaited the arrival of military relief—that relief, which 
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messages from London during the spring and summer insisted would not be 
forthcoming—ultimately did come, but it came too late.184 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1884, the cabinet continued not to 
appreciate fully Gordon’s assessment of the impending Mahdi threat to Khartoum 
specifically or to the Sudan more generally.  Upon receiving his warnings and pleas for 
military resources with which to “smash the Mahdi,” the cabinet believed that Gordon 
was not only advising British military intervention but was announcing his intention to 
pursue his own course of action and willfully to disobey his orders to withdraw.  To be 
sure, earlier transmissions from Gordon to Baring, which had been forwarded to the 
government in London, suggested that he was launching military attacks against the 
Mahdi.  In truth, however, such actions were little more than intelligence gathering 
missions, and Gordon’s warning to Baring was nothing more than a predictive 
assessment of the situation.  In addition, messages from Gordon, such as the one that 
arrived on 30 March, offered reassurance that as of two weeks prior Khartoum was “quite 
safe.”185  The overall effect was that miscommunication greatly affected the cabinet’s, 
and especially, the prime minister’s understanding of Gordon’s situation.  Thus, holding 
firm to the belief that Gordon could come out of Khartoum if he wanted, and 
apprehensive about being seen giving ground to the “jingoes,” Gladstone resisted sending 
a military expedition into the Sudan.
186
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That resolve came in the face of stiff pressure to act.  On 25 March, the queen 
appealed to Hartington through her private secretary that “Gordon must be trusted and 
supported…if not for humanity’s sake, for the honour of the government and the nation 
he must not be abandoned.”187  In fact, Hartington had by then been hearing from 
Wolseley for nearly seven weeks that a large expedition should be sent to support 
Gordon, and by early April a narrow majority of the cabinet, including Dilke and 
Chamberlain, had become convinced that action was required.  They could not, however, 
agree on the size or scope of the relief expedition, and Gladstone and Granville took 
advantage of these divisions to postpone any decision into the summer months.
188
 
As new information from Khartoum became scarce, the press and the general 
public once again set the pace for government action.  Having earlier anticipated that the 
government would act to relieve Gordon, newspapers increasingly exerted pressure for 
the government to follow through when that support was not forthcoming.  A Cairo 
correspondent for the Standard reported in early April: “Lord Hartington’s declaration 
that General Gordon would receive assistance, should he claim it, has caused some 
amusement here.  It is well known that General Gordon has already distinctly asked…for 
English troops, which request has been ignored.”189   On 8 April, in noting the questions 
posed by Lords Napier and Hardwicke in the House of Lords about preparations for a 
relief mission of Gordon, the Dundee Courier insisted that “it would be well that the 
government could show that they are prepared for such a contingency as the relief of 
Gordon and those for whose fate we have made ourselves responsible.”190   Four days 
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later, a leading column in the same paper claimed that as Egyptian troops were inherently 
unreliable, any relief of Gordon would have to be effected by British troops.  With that in 
mind, it maintained that Gordon’s reports, which emphasized the security of his position, 
were likely not completely accurate because Gordon, as an “enthusiast” to the work he 
was undertaking, was likely to “face dangers lightly.”  Arguing that the reports from the 
Times’s correspondent in Khartorum, Frank Power, were accurately conveying the 
seriousness of the situation, it insisted that “the optimist views which have been 
continuously pressed…do not accurately outline the situation of Gordon at Khartoum.”  
The paper urged that “if we have any responsibility for Gordon’s present position…a 
more solicitous and anxious view of the situation by our Government would be justified 
than that which they appear yet to have entertained, or than General Gordon has himself 
seemed to hold.”191  The Liverpool Mercury, meanwhile, took a more sanguinary tone, 
assuring that “the government has done the best that could be done under the 
circumstances,” and arguing that “Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues may be confidently 
trusted to take all necessary measures for the rescue of General Gordon.”192 
Not every paper, however, was convinced that a British relief expedition should 
be sent to Khartoum.  For instance, Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper acknowledged reports 
that the situation in Khartoum had become desperate and that Gordon was attempting to 
solicit Turkish support for the garrison by raising funds from English and American 
millionaires.  Yet it maintained that “even if the English government resolved upon the 
relief of Berber and Khartoum, the sending of a British force is next to impossible.”193  
To be sure, Reynolds’s Weekly, like many Liberal presses, was averse to decisions which 
                                                 
191
 Dundee Courier, 12 April 1884, 2. 
192
 Liverpool Mercury, 6 May 1884, 5. 
193
 Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper, 27 April 1884, 5.  Emphasis is mine. 
135 
 
 
 
they saw as furthering a jingoistic fever and imperialistic encroachment.  But that had not 
stopped other Liberal papers, such as the aforementioned Liverpool Mercury, from 
demanding that the government not abandon Gordon.   Given that commentators in other 
papers explained that the hostile climate precluded any immediate relief, it may well have 
been that Reynolds’s Weekly was assessing the prospect of an expedition 
pragmatically.
194
  Further, the paper excused Gladstone for not responding to the 
opposition’s demands for a full explanation of his intentions in Egypt on the grounds that 
circumstances on the ground there were changing on a daily basis.
195
  Having already 
argued that a relief expedition was impossible, Reynolds’s subsequently argued that any 
military expedition into the Sudan to relieve Gordon meant the reconquest of the Sudan, 
which would be an “utterly worthless” expenditure of blood and treasure.196  
By the end of April, meanwhile, concerned journalists and members of the public 
translated their worry into civic action.  Promoters eagerly sought to put together a 
volunteer expedition to relieve Gordon, and private citizens who were interested in 
volunteering wrote to the press inquiring after the qualifications for service.
197
  One 
concerned citizen suggested to the lord mayor of London, P. N. Fowler, that he should 
form a “Mansion House Fund for the Relief of General Gordon.”  Publicizing his 
response in the Standard, Fowler insisted that as a member of Parliament, he thought that 
“ministers ought to undertake the rescue, and both Houses would support them in doing 
so.”  However, as the lord mayor of London, he said that he could not agree to the 
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request, as it would bring him into “a collision with the government.”198  In a letter to the 
Times on 6 May a self-identified member of the Caledonian United Service Club offered 
that argued that the government was “paralyzed” to send any relief to Gordon for 
upwards of five months given the weather conditions in the Sudan.  As such, the 
Government should make it clear to the “warlike tribes” that if harm should come to 
Gordon or the inhabitants of Khartoum that was “not warranted by the usages of war, no 
mercy will be shown to the leaders and instigators of such usage when the time arrives 
for the British army to advance, which it assuredly will, unless submission be made in the 
interval.”199   
Following Commons’ Easter recess, Conservatives in the body brought additional 
pressure to bear by submitting a resolution of censure against Gladstone’s administration: 
That this House regrets that the course pursued by Her Majesty’s government has 
not tended to promote the success of General Gordon’s mission, and that even 
such steps as are necessary to promote his personal safety are still delayed.
200
 
 
With the debate over censure advertised well in advance and scheduled to begin on 12 
May, the motion encouraged a wellspring of anticipatory public activity.  On 8 May a 
well-attended meeting was held at St. James Hall in London, under the auspices of the 
Patriotic Association, to protest the “abandonment of Gordon.”  Denouncing the 
government’s conduct for being “devoid of principle, moral courage, and statesmanship,” 
Lord Cadogan insisted that “he mistook the character of the English people if it did not 
bring down the reprobation and indignation of the whole country.”  Condemning 
Gladstone’s actions for being “dishonourable to the government and discreditable to the 
country,” Henry Chaplin, the Conservative MP for Mid-Lincolnshire, expressed his hope 
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that a “feeling would be rapidly evoked which would compel the cowardly and caitiff 
crew who guided the helm of state to-day to take immediate action.”201  Two days later, 
on 10 May, a group of 3,000 people—a small number of whom were Liberals—gathered 
in Manchester, and the organizers of the meeting accused the government of making 
“Gordon responsible for his own safety.”202  Appealing to the people to “vindicate the 
national honour and the national traditions,” and insisting that the government would be 
held accountable for the “liberty, the safety, and the life of General Gordon,” the Hon. 
Edward Gibson, member of Parliament for Trinity College, Dublin, advanced a resolution 
that a “big expedition would have to be sent to the Sudan,” and it was overwhelmingly 
cheered and approved by those in attendance.
203
  That same day, other public 
demonstrations held in Hanley, Darwen, Folkestone, and Shrewsbury produced similar 
resolutions that called on the government to relieve Gordon.
204
 
Meanwhile, on 13 May, the House of Commons debated a motion to censure the 
Government.  In spite of their holding a majority of almost 120 seats, the Liberals 
survived narrowly on a vote of 303 to 275.
 205
  Only days later, the St. James Gazette 
reported that the cabinet had resolved to prepare an expedition to Khartoum immediately, 
and that it was likely to embark by the end of July.  The story was subsequently picked 
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up by provincial presses, including the Dundee Courier on 19 May.
 206
  As we have seen, 
Gladstone believed into the early summer that no relief expedition was warranted, a 
conclusion that was bolstered by reports sent from Gordon in mid-June (and appearing in 
the press in mid- and late-July) indicating that Khartoum remained safe.
 207
  Indeed, in 
early July, the prime minister reassured Sir Henry Gordon that his brother was not in any 
immediate danger, and that “whenever and if ever, General Gordon is in danger, the 
whole resources of the government will be employed in his cause.”208  Confident that if 
messages could get out of Khartoum, then so too could Gordon, Gladstone continuously 
maintained that there was no need to extract him.
209
   
At that very time, however, key members of the cabinet forced the premier’s 
hand.  On 31 July Hartington and the Home Secretary Lord Selborne threatened to resign 
if Gladstone did not agree to send out a relief expedition.  Appreciating that those 
resignations would likely bring down his government, Gladstone presented the Commons 
with an appropriations bill on 2 August to fund a relief expedition.  Three days later 
Parliament overwhelmingly approved the measure.  Only a small cadre of members 
opposed the bill, and they were led by Henry Labouchere, who insisted that “General 
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Gordon had disobeyed his instructions in not quitting Khartoum, and had forfeited all 
claims to sympathy and help by his insane desire to ‘smash the Mahdi’.”210 
But even while the press welcomed the news that Gladstone had finally decided to 
act and eagerly anticipated the rescue of Gordon, they remained deeply concerned.  The 
Huddersfield Daily Chronicle wrote: “The nation demands that General Gordon shall be 
relieved from danger which has for so long threatened him, and much will depend upon 
the manner in which the government set to work to effect the desired result…But 
although the sum applied for by the government has been willingly granted, it is by no 
means clear what course will be adopted for carrying out the end in view.”211  If that 
effort should fail to bring Gordon back safely, the Chronicle insisted that the government 
would have much to answer for.
212
  The enormity of the effort to relieve Gordon did not 
escape the Morning Post, which anticipated that “it will be necessary to employ a very 
numerous force, much greater than could without risk be spared from the present Egypt, 
and we may, therefore, expect Mr. Gladstone to prepare the House for the dispatch of 
further drafts from either England or India.”213  Indeed, despite Gladstone’s willingness 
to move an expedition to save Gordon, the press remained skeptical.  Noting that nearly 
everyone ridiculed Gladstone’s unwavering insistence that Gordon could withdraw from 
Khartoum any time he wished, and recognizing that his position was not likely to change, 
the Huddersfield Daily Chronicle offered that perhaps Gordon could set Gladstone 
straight upon his return to Britain.
214
  As it was, Gladstone remained in no hurry to move, 
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as a further three weeks passed before Wolseley was officially named the expedition’s 
commander on 26 August.
215
   
 “AGAINST NATURE AND AGAINST TIME” :  
THE GORDON RELIEF EXPEDITION AND THE MAKING OF A MARTYR
216
 
 Wolseley was never one to rush into a campaign, and thinking that he still had 
plenty of time, he meticulously planned out the expedition to relieve Gordon and to 
complete the British withdrawal from the Sudan.
217
  The strategic problem was how to 
get to Khartoum, which lay 1,200 miles from Cairo as the crow flies, but over 2,300 
miles as the Nile flows.  Even from Wadi Halfa, the most feasible point from which to 
launch a relief expedition, Khartoum was still 1,600 miles upriver.  The most direct 
approach was to strike out across the desert from Suakin to Berber and then proceed up 
the Nile to Khartoum, a distance of roughly 830 miles.
218
  This route had been the one 
favored by Major General Sir Evelyn Wood, the first British sirdar (commander in chief 
of the Egyptian Army), and General Sir Frederick Stephenson, the commander in chief of 
the British occupation forces, who had been strategizing a relief expedition since March 
when they became concerned that Gordon might be trapped.  To facilitate that endeavor 
and to service Britain’s strategic interests in the region, they envisioned building a 
railway along the Suakin-Berber route.
219
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Wolseley, however, preferred to move up the Nile from Wadi Halfa to 
Khartoum.
220
  Wood and Stephenson had previously ruled out this approach because it 
was longer and because the Nile’s cataracts would make it impossible to move up river 
by steamer.  Wolseley countered that the Nile route, while longer, would be easier and 
cheaper.  To get around the difficulty of navigating up the Nile, Wolseley planned to use 
a fleet of 800 modified whalers that could be rowed upstream and then portaged around 
the cataracts by experienced Canadian voyageurs, a method he had used with 
considerable success in his 1870 Red River campaign in Canada against the Métis revolt 
of Louis Riel.  In the end, Wolseley’s powerful sway within the War Office in London as 
adjutant general overrode the arguments of Stephenson and others on the ground in 
Egypt.
221
  Wolseley further sought to augment the expedition with a camel corps.  
Comprised of men selected from the Guards and Royal Marine Light Infantry, this desert 
column would take the more direct overland route and serve as an advanced guard to hold 
Khartoum until the rest of the forces arrived.
 222
     
The Nile expedition proved to be costly and, arguably, a failure.  It was also to be 
Wolseley’s last field command, and to carry out his mission, he relied upon members of 
his so-called “ring” and several highly competent junior officers, who would rise later in 
their careers to the rank of general officer.  Still, the planning and implementation of the 
complex operations resulted in a delay of three months before the forces began to move.
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223
  Moreover, even after the expedition pulled out from Wadi Halfa on 6 November, 
logistical and environmental complications, professional disagreements among the 
officers, and the inferior quality of the voyageurs, meant that the camel corps had only 
reached Korti in early December, while the bulk of the expedition lay scattered along the 
Nile all the way back to Wadi Halfa.
224
    
A frustrated Wolseley ordered the desert column to strike out towards Metemmeh 
on 30 December, in what he confessed in his war journal was “a great leap in the dark.” 
225
  Supply shortages and two clashes with the Mahdi’s forces slowed their progress and 
resulted in the deaths of the column’s commanding officer, Brigadier General Herbert 
Stewart, and the second in command, Colonel Frederick Burnaby.
226
  The column, now 
led by its brilliant yet cautious intelligence officer, Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, finally 
reached Metemmeh on 21 January, where they met four steamers Gordon had dispatched 
from Khartoum to assist in their passage.  Instead of proceeding on to Khartoum directly, 
however, Wilson chose to regroup and to reconnoiter the surrounding area for three days 
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before making his final push.  Leaving Metemmeh on 24 January, the column reached 
Khartoum on 28 January, thirty-six hours after the city had fallen to the dervishes.
227
   
Wolseley received word of Gordon’s fate on 4 February.  Having been 
commissioned with the task of extracting Gordon and being expressly ordered not to 
extend a campaign against the Mahdi, he now had to wait for word from London about 
how to proceed.  Gladstone granted him a free hand, and although Wolseley desired to 
avenge Gordon, he acknowledged after a couple of weeks that the expedition was in no 
condition to wage a full-out campaign against the Mahdi.  He therefore ordered the 
columns to withdraw on 24 February.
228
  For several more months the last Egyptian 
garrison in the Sudan at Kassala continued to hold out against a Dervish siege, but was 
forced to capitulate on 30 July after a twenty month siege.
229
  With that, Egypt and 
Britain had been forced temporarily from the Sudan.  
ASSIGNING BLAME AND THE MAKING OF A MARTYR: 
THE PUBLIC’S EVALUATION OF THE RELIEF EXPEDITION AND GENERAL GORDON 
The appointment of Wolseley had been well received by the press and the general 
public, and it instilled a strong sense of confidence that Gordon would be relieved in 
time.  As the Morning Post reported on 6 August, “Mr. Gladstone has…become alive to 
the fact that several months ago certain pledges were given by the government that they 
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would consider themselves bound to take exceptional measures, if necessary, for the 
safety of Gordon.”230  Well-documented by the London and provincial presses, the delays 
and set-backs that beset the two columns were well known to the British public.  Fears 
that Wolseley’s columns would not reach Khartoum in time to save Gordon were 
temporarily assuaged, when, in the first week of February, papers such as the Times, the 
Cornishman, and the Derby Telegraph erroneously speculated that Colonel Wilson had 
been in Khartoum for a number of days.
231
  These were of course ultimately proven to be 
unsubstantiated rumors.
232
  In the case of Punch, on 7 February the paper grandly but 
mistakenly portrayed Wolseley greeting Gordon in Khartoum with the caption “At Last!”  
It then corrected its most unseemly error with a depiction of a grieving Britannia outside 
the walls of Khartoum with the caption “Too Late!”233   
The country descended into mourning with the news that Khartoum had fallen.  
The Huddersfield Daily Chronicle observed that “since the arrival of the news of the fall 
of Khartoum, but little else has been talked about.”234  Weeks later, on 13 March, crowds 
attended memorial services for Gordon in London, Manchester, and Durham.
235
  Public 
dismay at the fall of Khartoum led to speculation about who was accountable for the 
disaster.  The two names which immediately rose to the surface were Gladstone and 
Wolseley.  In his defense, Gladstone and his supporters in and outside of Parliament 
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attempted to deflect responsibility from the government by blaming the military and 
specifically Wolseley.  They emphasized that nearly two months passed between the time 
of Wolseley’s commission and the point at which the expedition finally began heading up 
the Nile.  In addition, those who deflected blame from the prime minister also focused on 
Wolseley’s insistence to move up the Nile instead of taking the overland approach.  For 
example, in his contemporary history of the Egyptian campaigns, Royle argued that even 
though Wolseley’s force might well have had to fight along the Suakin to Berber to 
Khartoum route, that passage would still have been shorter and taken less time than the 
longer river route.
236
  Wolseley and his supporters refuted the charges, and directed the 
blame back on Gladstone.  If Gladstone had acted promptly, Wolseley argued, the delays 
incurred in preparation and in executing the relief notwithstanding, he would have arrived 
in Khartoum in plenty of time to save the besieged officer.
237
   
In general, those who had favored sending a relief expedition long before it was 
authorized tended to side with Wolseley.  In letters to the independent-minded 
Huddersfield Daily Chronicle, two troubled citizens eulogized the fallen soldier thusly: 
ON HEARING OF GORDON’S DEATH 
 
Brave Gordon—gone— 
The Arab spear hath pierced his breast, 
And freed his soul; while ever and anon 
England asked why her foremost son should rest 
Forsaken—pitilessly left to shift as best he might, 
What days of toil, what nights of troubled rest 
Were his.  Khartoum his prison, treachery lurking there, 
A multitude to feed.  Sustained by prayer 
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And faith in God, he need his mighty skill; 
Mounting each crested billow as it rose,  
Almost like Him who uttered, “Peace be still.” 
And twice six months he kept at bay his foes, 
With soldiers who had nothing save the name; 
Intent to his duty, and the fame 
Of his dear country to uphold.  Oh shame! 
Thrice shame! on those who let him die. 
Britannis, blush and weep.  That craven policy, 
Whispering expense, delay, and peace hypocricy,[sic] 
Should sacrifice thy noblest, bravest son. 
Go write his epitaph.  Say here lies one 
Of matchless valour, infinite resource; 
A lion’s heart, yet gentle as the wind 
Which play’s on summer’s eve; his force 
Of mind, sustained by Him, whom well he loved. 
And I—you, I!—forsook him, left him e’en to die. 
Amid a scene of savage butchery. 
W. H. G.
238
   
   
GORDON 
Is this the land of Nelson, 
     The land of Pitt and Clive, 
The land of Cromwell, Raleigh, 
     Or Palmerston’s Old Hive?... 
  
Praying that they would send him [Gordon] 
     Only three thousand men, 
To unbeleaguered Berber, 
     To smash the tiger’s den. 
   
But their good faces lengthened, 
     And their small hearts stood still, 
They blankly gazed and blankly said, 
     “Twill spoil our Budget Bill.”… 
  
When school boys read the story, 
      The indelible shame 
Will fill their souls with loathing, 
     Their little hearts with flame... 
 
Some glow of pride will mingle 
     With shams upon each cheek, 
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And their little hearts will open, 
     And their little tongues shall speak. 
 
And with their wreaths they’ll crown him, 
     The hero of Khartoum, 
And will throw the names of those men 
     Into history’s lumber-room. 
     J. M. R.
239
 
 
Noting that the continental presses overwhelmingly condemned Gladstone for failing to 
act, the Standard argued that the government had had no case against the censure motion 
the previous spring.
240
  On 26 February the Huddersfield Daily Chronicle reminded its 
readers of those who had “abandoned Gordon” by listing the local MPs who had sided 
with Gladstone during that vote.
241
  Deriding Gladstone’s failure to act, the public 
reversed the acronym of his nickname “Grand Old Man” G.O.M. to read M.O.G. 
“Murderer of Gordon.” 242  With criticism against Gladstone mounting, in early June the 
Tory opposition moved against the prime minister in opposing his Customs and Inland 
Revenue Bill.  Although the measure was not a formal vote of censure, as Sir Michael 
Hicks-Beach noted, the vote “carried with it the life or death of the government” and had 
thus had the effect of a vote of no confidence.  On that occasion, Gladstone was 
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unexpectedly and narrowly defeated, by a vote of 264 to 252.
243
  Gladstone duly resigned 
on 9 June and Lord Salisbury began the first and shortest of his three governments.
244
   
The public’s fixation with Gordon since Stead’s piece in the Pall Mall Gazette 
vaulted the general in death to martyr status.  The Leeds Mercury eulogized him thusly, 
“that he should have closed his noble life of heroic effort by the martyr’s death will strike 
all among us with a sense of fitness.”245  Middlesbrough’s Daily Gazette predicted that 
“his country will cherish his memory.  His name will live in history; his laurels will not 
fade.”246  And the Suffolk Mirror insisted that “Gordon still lives in the hearts of men 
throughout the civilised world, and whilst time lasts, he will stand.”247  Likewise, at a 
well-attended meeting of the Christian Mission Society in late March, the Earl of Cairns 
paid homage to Gordon’s career as a humanitarian and concluded his remarks: “if these 
things constituted the true type of a Christian missionary, and if a violent death cheerfully 
met and welcomed in the midst of life constituted a martyr’s death, then it was beyond all 
doubt that that great and noble hero whose loss England and the world were now 
deploring…was both missionary and martyr.”248   
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In keeping with a long tradition of recognizing military and imperial heroes, the 
country intended to memorialize Gordon.  Within weeks of the general’s death, the lord 
mayor of London formed a committee of influential persons, including members of the 
royal family and government officials.
249
  After deliberating on the matter for several 
weeks, the committee determined to open a school for orphaned boys and raised almost 
£16,000 in two months.  On 1 May 1886, the Gordon Boys’ Home held its opening 
festival.
250
  Meanwhile, Gordon memorials were placed both in St. Paul’s Cathedral and 
at Westminster Abbey.  Adorning the cenotaph at St. Paul’s were lines composed 
specially by Alfred Lord Tennyson:  
 Warrior of God, man’s friend, not here below, 
      But somewhere dead, far in the waste Soudan; 
 Thou livest in all hearts, for all men know 
      This earth hath borne no simpler, nobler man.
251
 
 
In mid-March the citizens of Southampton urged the commissioning of a statue to their 
fallen son.
252
  In April, at the initiation of the Marquis of Huntly, family and members of 
clan Gordon eagerly proposed that a Scottish memorial to Gordon be erected in 
Aberdeen.
253
  That same month, the citizens of Liverpool established the Liverpool 
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Gordon’s Working Lads Institute.254  In 1888 a contemplative statue of Gordon, was 
erected in Trafalgar Square, in the company of two of the country’s other great martyrs, 
Admiral Lord Nelson and General Sir Henry Havelock.
255
  Two years later a statue 
depicting Gordon sitting astride a camel was erected outside the regimental headquarters 
of the Corps of Royal Engineers in Chatham.
256
  
For several years 26 January did not pass without a newspaper noting that it was 
the day on which Gordon had died in Khartoum.  In 1888, for instance, the Times claimed 
that he was still very much in the hearts and minds of the British public, and the paper 
drew a biting contrast between the general sentiment and political actors:  
Yesterday many thousands of Englishmen, and those especially who place 
patriotism above party, were saddened by the memory of an event scarcely, we 
believe, to be paralleled in the annals of the nation…History will judge between 
him and those who, for the purpose of an ignoble ambition, gambled with that 
noble life.  It is rather significant, however, of the levity of modern politics to find 
that among all the orators who are deafening the public ear with their speeches 
scarcely one was mindful of this solemn anniversary…It would be well, to be 
sure, for the Gladstonian party if that oblivion were complete, but notwithstanding 
the silence of politicians on both sides, the nation is not wholly forgetful of 
Gordon’s devotion and Gordon’s fate.257  
On 26 January 1891, a short “in memorium” notice dedicated to Gordon appeared in the 
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Times for the last time.
258
  Even so, Gordon was hardly forgotten.  In 1899, in the 
aftermath of Kitchener’s victory at Omdurman and in the course of delivering a sermon 
on Matthew 20, the Bishop of Peterborough resurrected the memory of Gordon stating: 
“Thank God for the Presence in His Church has touched our nation’s life and worked for 
righteousness—only the last few years have given us proof of it.  The hero of the 
people’s hearts has been the man, Charles Gordon, whose heroic death and Christian life 
won men’s esteem.  It was to honour him that in the very flush of victory our soldiers 
bared their heads to join their intercessions—Anglicans, Romans, Presbyterians—and 
gave this tribute of their honour to a righteous man.”259  And, in 1933, on the centenary of 
Gordon’s birth, memorial services were held at St. Paul’s Cathedral and in Trafalgar 
Square.
260
  
Even while the press ceased printing memorial notices, a long-term recognition 
and interest in Gordon persisted.
261
  The degree to which imperialism was a fixture of 
Victorian society is evidenced through Victorian popular literature.  While that issue will 
be examined more substantially in chapter 5, it is nevertheless fitting at this point to 
comment briefly on as to how the treatment of Gordon illustrated that wider narrative.  
Whereas George Birkbeck Hill’s work on Gordon’s early career in the Sudan failed to 
generate or receive much interest before he was reassigned to the Sudan in January 1884, 
in the aftermath of Gordon’s death, the work subsequently underwent several editions.262  
In addition to the numerous contemporary works about Gordon cited earlier, Colonel 
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(later Major General) Sir William F. Butler published a Gordon biography in February 
1889 that became a bestseller.  It was subsequently reprinted in March 1889, 1891, 1892, 
and 1893.  After public interest in the Sudan was reinvigorated by Britain’s reentry into 
the Sudan in 1896, the work went through additional printings in 1897, 1898, 1899, and 
thereafter in 1901, 1903, 1904, 1907, 1913, 1920, and 1921.
263
  Speaking to the general 
proliferation of such works, the Leeds Mercury observed in 1896 that “of the making of 
books concerning General Gordon there seems to be no end.”264   
Extending beyond works that were solely dedicated to Gordon, other writings 
included noticeable references to the imperial martyr.  For instance, Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle subtly rounded out the Victorian attributes of his famed detective, Sherlock 
Holmes, by mentioning that an engraving of the late general hung on the wall of his 
apartments at 221b Baker Street.
265
  Later when Conan Doyle was forced by popular 
demand to resurrect Holmes from an untimely death at Reichenbach Falls and fill in the 
missing years, the author wove into the detective’s hiatus a fact-finding mission to 
Khartoum on behalf of the Foreign Office.
266
  Furthermore, the Sudan, Khartoum, and 
Gordon also found a place in K. and Hesketh Pritchard’s 1903 serial “By Tammers’ 
Camp Fire” which appeared in Strand Magazine from June 1903 to November 1904.267  
To those ends, the public’s longstanding interest in Gordon and his elevation to martyr 
status was certainly cemented by the circumstances of his death and had much to do with 
the fact that the public’s connection with Gordon had been established and encouraged by 
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the press during the year-long siege.  In this way, as John Wolfe demonstrated, Gordon 
had much in common with the famed explorer David Livingston, whose exploits, thanks 
to the efforts of Sir Henry Morton Stanley, were also fresh in the public’s mind at the 
time of his death.
268
   
EPILOGUE: BACK TO SUDAN AND FASHODA 
Having expelled Egypt from the Sudan, the Mahdi and his successor the Khalifa 
Abdullah ibn Muhammad established and maintained an empire which for thirteen years 
dominated the Sudan and its neighbors.  From 1885-89 it fought a war against Abyssinia 
from which it emerged victorious but severely weakened.  At the same time, a dervish 
army under Osman Digna advanced into Egyptian territory in an effort to carry out the 
Mahdi’s vision of ridding the Nile Delta of Turkish rule.269  Since taking responsibility 
for the Egyptian state in 1883, Britain had done much to stabilize and strengthen the 
Egyptian army.  In one of that force’s first tests, on 17 January 1888 at Handub, a well-
seasoned Dervish army overwhelmed the outnumbered force of 500 Sudanese irregulars 
led by the governor of Suakin, Colonel Herbert Kitchener.  Though his attack was 
thwarted, Kitchener’s bravery and example of leadership under fire earned him a great 
deal of recognition by the Egyptian government.  Twelve months later the Egyptian 
army, led by Sirdar Sir Francis Grenfell and Kitchener, who had been recently promoted 
to adjutant-general, routed Osman Digna’s besieging army at Suakin.  The incident 
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further elevated Kitchener’s standing with his superiors, and in 1892 upon Grenfell’s 
retirement, Kitchener became the third British officer to hold the title of sirdar.
270
 
At the same time, even as Britain had withdrawn from the Sudan, other European 
imperial-minded powers, namely Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, began expressing 
interests in extending their control over the region.  Italy’s colonial presence in Africa 
was dwarfed by its rivals, but its actions proved pivotal in compelling Britain to reenter 
the Sudan.  The catalyst came in 1896 when Italy, seeking to expand its footprint in the 
horn of Africa, invaded Abyssinia.  The event proved disastrous for Italy as its army was 
destroyed in the Battle of Adowa on 1 March.
271
   
The Tories (led by Lord Salisbury) had returned to power in 1895, with the long-
held belief that Egyptian suzerainty over the Sudan had merely been suspended and not 
completely relinquished.  Concerned that France would make inroads into the Sudan and 
thereby threaten Britain’s position in Egypt, the Salisbury government encouraged Egypt 
to reenter the Sudan and take back the territories that had been lost in 1885.  Now 
concerned that Abdullah’s forces would capitalize on Italy’s evident weakness and 
expand further into the horn of Africa as well as into Egypt, the British government also 
feared that Italy’s defeat in Africa might have dire effects on the power balance in 
Europe.  Thus armed with geopolitical considerations and a desire to avenge the death of 
Gordon, it took little time for Salisbury to respond in the affirmative to Italy’s request for 
assistance.  Acting through Lord Cromer, the British government pressured the Egyptian 
government to send Kitchener and the Egyptian army back into the Sudan.
272
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What followed was a methodically executed three-year campaign of conquest up 
the Nile River.  Kitchener followed the same course that Wolseley had taken thirteen 
years earlier, but he did so without relying on boats, following the river’s course on foot.  
Heading south out of Wadi Halfa on 15 March 1896, Kitchener’s Anglo-Egyptian army 
spent the next two years retaking ground.  Then, on 2 September 1898, the subjugation of 
the Sudan was all but accomplished when the Sirdar’s force of 25,000 men annihilated 
the Khalifa’s army of 52,000 at Omdurman.  The following day Kitchener marched into 
Khartoum and raised the British flag over the palace once occupied by Gordon.
273
   
With the re-conquest of the Sudan effectively completed, the dervish power 
destroyed, and the death of Gordon avenged, Britain had little time to relish its victory.  
On 10 July a small French expeditionary force commanded by Colonel Jean-Baptiste 
Marchand, having marched across the desert from Gabon, claimed the fort at Fashoda for 
France.  After his victory at Omdurman, Kitchener headed south to confront Marchand 
and arrived at Fashoda on 10 September.  For the next six weeks the two great imperial 
powers of Britain and France stood on the brink of war as both powers asserted their 
claim to Fashoda.  For Britain, the position at Fashoda was absolutely critical.  If Fashoda 
fell into French hands, Britain feared that France would dam up the Nile River and cutoff 
the life blood of Egypt.  For France, the issue was much more an issue of national pride 
and not backing down to British demands.  Marchand had marched across the Sudan 
                                                                                                                                                 
Britain had also keenly focused on expanding its understanding of the land and their intelligence gathering 
capabilities.  These factors proved strategically invaluable as Kitchener prepared and launched his invasion 
into the Sudan in 1896, and politically important as the country was conditioned for the invasion. Churchill, 
The River War, 97-99. 
273
 In what turned out to be one of the most lopsided victories of Britain’s imperial experiences, at 
Omdurman Kitchener’s losses amounted to 47 dead and 382 wounded, while the Anglo-Egyptian Army 
inflicted more than 28,000 total casualties (killed, wounded, captured) on the Khalifa’s forces.  For a 
detailed accounts of Kitchener’s campaign see Churchill, The River War, 107-311; Asher, Khartoum, 298-
407.   
156 
 
 
 
without orders to do so, and in the event of a conflict, his small force would have been no 
match for Kitchener’s army.  Moreover, France was internally in turmoil over the 
Dreyfus Affair, and it had few reliable European allies that could offer assistance in a war 
with Britain.   Consequently the French government realized it had no choice but to back 
down.
274
 
 Throughout the late-1890s, echoing their earlier disputes about blame over the fall 
of Khartoum and the proper role of empire, Conservative and Liberal presses consistently 
engaged the questions of empire and diplomacy.  Largely favoring reentering the Sudan 
in 1896, Conservative papers such as the Aberdeen Journal emphasized that the dervish 
threats to Egypt required Britain to promptly respond militarily, and that there could be 
“none of the disastrous delay which took place in the dispatch of the expedition for the 
relief of Gordon.”  To that end the paper found the views of those opposed to be “narrow, 
unpatriotic, and contemptible.
275
  Moreover the Derby Mercury reminded its readers that 
it was the Liberals who were responsible for Gordon’s death and allowing the dervish 
power to thrive in the first place.  As such, they charged, the opposition was “by no 
means fitted…to set up as critics worthy of respect.”276  Noting that the public was 
fatigued by war alarms over the past months, the Ipswich Journal nevertheless asserted 
that “security for Egypt is a dominant and imperious want, and the English Government 
would be well justified to secure it.”277  Ever resistant to imperial interventionism Liberal 
papers, such as the Leeds Mercury and North Eastern Gazette remained skeptical and 
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were concerned that the “Tory recklessness” had larger ambitions in marching 300 miles 
into the Sudan besides merely “warding off attack,” and worried not only about the 
operation’s financial cost but the political impact if it provoked French hostility.278   
Those concerns and objections notwithstanding, there was universal rejoicing in 
the presses over the victory at Omdurman and the final avenging of Gordon.  That 
celebration was quickly followed by universal concern over the presence of the French at 
Fashoda in the autumn of 1898.   In addressing that crisis over the following months, the 
press and the public, via letters to the editorial pages, consistently maintained that the 
French had no claim whatsoever to the region and were thus obligated to withdraw.  They 
widely insisted that Britain had no interest in going to war, but maintained that if war 
came it would be the French who were responsible for initiating hostilities.
279
   As we 
shall see, the press would express a very similar attitude toward the Transvaal crisis the 
following summer. 
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Figure 2-1 – “At Last,” Punch 7 February 1885, 66. 
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Figure 2-2 – “Too Late,” Punch 14 February 1885, 78 
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CHAPTER 3:  
RENEWED INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 1895-1900:  
THE JAMESON RAID AND THE SECOND ANGLO-BOER WAR  
A great deal has been written about what led to the outbreak of war in southern 
Africa in 1899.  For the purposes here, there is little need to reexamine exhaustively the 
long-term progression towards war.  Among the causes cited by British actors were 
Uitlander grievances (i.e., that foreigners, mostly of British descent, who resided within 
the Boer republics were denied civil rights) and growing fears of German interference in 
the region.  On the Boer side, the road to war lay in their consistent defense of Boer 
independence against what they perceived as untoward advances and interferences by the 
British into their internal affairs.
1
  Moreover, they perceived that these broad underlying 
circumstances were abetted by Cecil Rhodes’s naked desire for further wealth and power 
and supplemented by a façade of demands for equality.  These elements coalesced in 
1895 and inaugurated what F.W. Reitz, the president of the Orange Free State, later 
denounced as the first of two phases of “capitalistic jingoism” that sought to dismantle 
the sovereignty of the Transvaal.  The first phase consisted of direct military force.  The 
second phase entailed the use of strong-arm diplomacy.
2
   
THE JAMESON RAID, 1895-96 
That first phase was profoundly marked by the plot of Cecil Rhodes, the prime 
minister of the Cape Colony, to eliminate his economic competitors, impede the 
expansion of Britain’s imperial rivals, and profit from the rich gold and diamond deposits 
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that lay to the north of the Cape.
3
  Intending to capitalize on the discontent of the 
Uitlanders, Rhodes arranged for Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, a long-time friend and 
business associate, to invade the Transvaal with a small body of men.  They then were to 
lead a larger uprising of disgruntled Uitlanders against the Transvaal government.  Under 
the guise of restoring peace after the chaos of the invasion, Rhodes expected that the high 
commissioner of the Cape, Sir Hercules Robinson, would quickly announce the re-
annexation of the Transvaal.  A bold and blatantly illegal venture, this was not the first 
time that Rhodes had taken similar risks.
4
  The Jameson raid (29 December 1895 – 2 
January 1896), however, was a complete and utter failure.  The Uitlanders failed to rise 
up in support, and the Transvaal government was able to crush Jameson’s force quickly.5   
 In stark contrast to the way in which it reacted to the annexation of the Transvaal 
in 1877, the British government and certain elements of the press responded to the 
Jameson raid with a firestorm of criticism.  For its part, Parliament launched an intense 
investigation into the suspected culpability of the Colonial Office and its secretary, 
Joseph Chamberlain, in particular.
6
  The inquiry found that while Chamberlain had 
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certainly been active in fomenting a racial war in South Africa, he had deliberately 
sequestered himself from any specific knowledge of the raid, so that he could assert 
plausible deniability about the affair.
7
  The investigation, led by Sir William Harcourt, 
also directed criticism at Rhodes for “[bringing] race hatred and distrust into colonial 
politics, and lasting discredit abroad on English faith.”8   
As formal investigations proceeded, the public asked hard questions about events 
in southern Africa in the days immediately following the raid. The Huddersfield Daily 
Chronicle printed an article from the Law Journal which insisted that the imperial 
government had to bear some responsibility for its subordinate officials, even to the point 
of making some compensation in the event that international rights had been violated.
9
  
That Jameson had apparently and brazenly violated the Foreign Enlistments Act—by 
committing an act of war upon the peaceful Transvaal—led many national and provincial 
papers, Conservative and Liberal alike, to speak out against him. The Bristol Mercury 
expressed its sympathy for the Uitlanders, but charged that Jameson’s action was further 
evidence of “the dangers of putting the power of government into the hands of a dividend 
earning company.”  By dragging Great Britain into “what might have remained a purely 
local dispute between the Boers and the Uitlanders,” the Mercury argued that the raid had 
turned the issue into an international dispute, which only added to the difficulties of the 
Foreign Office.
10
  The paper subsequently insisted that the country had nothing “but 
regret that the march should ever have been undertaken, and, perhaps, still more that it 
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should have issued in fatal conflict.”11  The Daily News, meanwhile, denounced the 
action for transgressing upon the sovereignty afforded to the South African Republic by 
the Convention of 1884: 
There is no right whatsoever to interfere with the internal affairs of the Transvaal, 
and no jurisdiction within its borders.  Dr. Jameson would have had no 
international right to enter the South African Republic with an armed force, even 
if he had received the express authority of the Crown.  So far from having any 
such authority he disobeyed the direct orders of Her Majesty’s representative, Sir 
Hercules Robinson.  He made a private raid and he came to speedy grief.
12
  
 
The Standard insisted that, while the country had the deepest sympathy for the plight of 
its countrymen residing abroad, it was as “unpalatable a task” for Englishmen to admit 
they were in the wrong and that the raid was “plainly a gross violation of the rights of the 
Transvaal republic,” regardless of what prompted Jameson to act.  “To condone it—much 
less to encourage it,” the paper continued, “would be to make a precedent utterly 
inconsistent with the whole course of conduct by which our empire has grown to its 
present bulk.”13 Thus, as one military officer feared, “the defeat of Jameson would result 
in a loss of British prestige in South Africa.”14   
Believing that Jameson’s actions had caused considerable damage to British 
prestige and that they offered an opportunity for the Boers to illustrate their magnanimity, 
the papers consequently expressed few misgivings about his forthcoming trial .  In light 
of the serious violations committed by Jameson against the Transvaal, the Dublin-based 
Freeman’s Journal complimented the Boers for their actions in releasing him into the 
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custody of the British.
15
  In the mind of concurring papers, such as the Glasgow Herald 
and the Standard, there was little doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.16  On the eve of the 
trial, the Bristol Mercury insisted that the “facts of the matter were mostly beyond 
dispute,” and that the only question that remained for the grand jury to decide was 
whether “there was a primâ facie proof that the defendants either ‘engaged, assisted, or 
were employed’” in the expedition.17   
More importantly, the circumstances of the raid raised questions about the 
appropriateness of Britain’s imperial policy.  While the Daily News offered that “it was a 
fine thing to engage the world in arms,” it maintained that the affair provided “food for 
thought to the silly and reckless advocates of war with the Boers at any price.” The paper 
concluded that Britain needed to be quite sure that a quarrel was just before it entered into 
it.
18
  Troubled by the inconsistency of Chamberlain’s policies, H. Seton-Karr, a 
Conservative MP, as well as a former explorer and army officer, wrote to the Times and 
called for a clearer explanation of Britain’s official policy toward the Transvaal.  He 
noted that on the one hand, Chamberlain’s denunciation of Jameson was a sign that the 
British government rejected any interference in the internal affairs of the Transvaal.  Yet 
if the Boer state was incapable of effective governance, then “abstract justice [demanded] 
that the British government should see the matter through.”19  
Britons were also quite aware of the broader geo-political ramifications that 
emerged in the wake of Jameson’s raid.  Indeed this was one reason why the 
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aforementioned correspondent did not favor a military policy.  A localized war against 
the Boers could quickly become a much broader war involving black Africans.
20
  Beyond 
the regional questions, the congratulatory telegram sent by Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II 
to the Boers for their successful repulsion of Jameson’s invasion also raised considerable 
concerns in Britain.
21
  The Daily News hoped that the kaiser’s telegram would give those 
who favored a war with the Boers some pause:  
There is nothing hostile to this country in the emperor’s words.  But they must 
impress upon some minds which sorely need the impression that the 
encouragement of filibusters is playing with edged tools.
22
   
 
There were also some who believed that Chamberlain would be justified to intervene on 
behalf of the Uitlanders because they assumed that German support of the Boers was a 
certainty.  For instance, “The Man on the Street” insisted in a letter to the Times that the 
question of such interference transcended the Transvaal and involved the whole of South 
Africa: 
The six years of this ministry will see South Africa either completely British-
Independent or German-protected  Dutch, and the action of the next six weeks 
will decide which.
23
 
  
At the same time, the Bristol Mercury reminded its readers that although “Dr. Jameson 
had undoubtedly compromised the British name” and had thus raised the jingo spirit of 
rival powers, such hostility and jealousy “must not be taken as the deliberate expression 
of the German public sentiment toward this country when the excitement is over.”  The 
Mercury continued: 
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We must remember that our success as a colonising power is highly exasperating 
both to Germany and France, and this last exploit must look to them like a daring 
and unscrupulous attempt to add to our empire.  Foreign powers must act through 
diplomatic channels, and by that time all that is to be known will be known, while 
France will not aid the self-glorification of Kaiser Wilhelm even to stab perfidious 
Albion.
24
   
 
Public opinion shapers were not, however, unified in their condemnation of 
Jameson, as many Conservative and Liberal papers rose to his defense.  Decrying the 
attacks on Jameson, the Aberdeen Weekly Journal, the Dundee Courier, and the Morning 
Post expressed their dismay at the failure of his “gallant” action and their expectation 
that, when the facts became fully known, he would be exonerated of any wrongdoing.
25
  
Reprinting the comments of E. P. Mathers, an individual the papers identified as an 
authority on South African affairs, the Aberdeen Weekly Journal and the Morning Post 
seemingly concurred with his assessment that Jameson’s actions were no more an act of 
war than the invitation of the Uitlanders had been.
26
  Similarly, the Pall Mall Gazette 
initially characterized the raid as an “intolerable remedy” for the Boers’ intolerable 
treatment of the Uitlanders and as a “hopeless act of audacity.”  The paper also insisted 
that the criminal case against Jameson was far from settled.
27
   
Further, Jameson’s defenders elevated a number of other potential scapegoats.  
Noting how Chamberlain had effectively distanced himself from the “ill-fated 
expedition,” the Dundee Courier criticized him for not doing more to fulfill his obligation 
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to defend the interests of the Uitlanders.
28
  A similar argument was issued by E. B. Iwan-
Mueller, a Unionist journalist, who criticized those who favored conciliating the Boers.
29
  
He wrote that the Uitlanders had exercised every legal means of appealing their unequal 
and unconstitutional position in the Transvaal and had been all but abandoned by their 
suzerain power, the British government.  Outnumbering the Boers as they did, but with 
no political recourse of their own, the Uitlanders had no choice but to seek extra-
constitutional means to ensure the equality promised to them by the Pretoria and London 
conventions.
30
   Equally, the Aberdeen Mercury and Dundee Courier claimed that 
Jameson had not acted rashly, but humanely and patriotically.  As such, they attributed 
the incursion to the tyrannical rule of the Transvaal government and its president, Paul 
Kruger, for refusing to treat the Uitlanders justly.
31
   
Emphasizing Jameson’s heroism, the Aberdeen Journal drew upon the provincial 
sentimentalities of its readership.  It argued that Jameson was guilty of nothing save 
“having acted on the generous impulse of a brave and patriotic Scotchman,” and it 
regretted the “almost unanimous chorus of condemnation of his action.” The Journal 
noted that “some English papers [were] so unpatriotic as to suggest vindictively that the 
Boers would be doing a just act of retribution if they hung [Jameson] from the nearest 
tree.”32  Casting a favorable light upon Jameson’s “quasi-triumphant” traversal of 
Mediterranean ports on his way back to Britain, the Pall Mall Gazette compared his 
reception and burgeoning celebrity to that of the tragic “Bonnie Prince Charlie.”  The 
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paper congratulated the “dashing Scotchman” for embodying British bravery at a time 
when “everybody seemed to go for us, and the British public were dying to get hold of 
someone whom they might back against the world.”33  These efforts to shape public 
opinion notwithstanding, the vast majority of public discourse opposed Jameson’s 
unilateral violation of the Transvaal’s sovereignty.  In contrast to the quiet acquiescence 
to the annexation of the Transvaal—preceded as it was by the implied threat of 
intervention at the time of Shepstone’s mission—many papers condemned Jameson’s 
actions in 1896.  To be sure, in the years since 1877, a sizeable pro-Boer contingent had 
built up in Britain.
34
  But even papers such as the Daily Post and the Standard, which 
disagreed on Britain’s responsibility to the Uitlanders and the franchise question, equally 
condemned Jameson’s raid into the Transvaal.35   
To a degree, the early expectations of papers such as the Pall Mall Gazette that 
Jameson’s actions would prove justified carried over into his trial.  Formally charged in 
July 1896 for having violated the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 by engaging “in the 
preparation of a military expedition to proceed against the dominions of a friendly state,” 
Jameson and five of his officers were acquitted by a jury that clearly sympathized with 
their motives.
36
  In the end, Sir John Willoughby, the military commander of the raid, and 
Jameson were sentenced to fifteen months of imprisonment.   Jameson himself, however, 
only served four months of that sentence due to ill health, and he was thus available to 
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testify before the Parliament’s select committee on the raid.  The other key participants 
were given sentences of five to seven months.
37
  
Following the trial, Parliamentary conducted its own inquiry into the matter.  
Established on 27 January 1897 and lasting until July, the Select Committee on British 
South Africa was chaired by William Jackson (MP for Leeds North) and included several 
prominent current, former, and future government officials, such as Joseph Chamberlain, 
Sir William Harcourt, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, as 
well as imperial critics such as Henry Labouchère.
38
  Witness testimonies before the 
committee provide some insight into what they had assumed British sensibilities to be 
regarding the use of overt military force to advance political interests.  Testifying before 
the committee, Jameson asserted that “had [he] been successful he should have been 
forgiven.”39  A few months later, Samuel Pope, QC, who represented Rhodes before that 
same committee, likewise maintained that a successful outcome would have vindicated 
Jameson’s rash and foolish actions.  He claimed that Britain would have taken full 
advantage of the enterprise and would not have condemned it or his client.
40
   
The circumstances and issues surrounding the raid remained before the public, 
thanks in part to reports and leading articles about the committee hearings.  While the 
gallery was mainly filled by members of Parliament and not the general public, the 
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Hampshire Telegraph insisted that there nevertheless was “great public interest” in the 
proceedings.”41  And the testimonies of notable witnesses, such as Rhodes and Jameson, 
drew attention to Uitlander grievances.  For instance, in covering Rhodes’s testimony, the 
Hampshire Telegraph mentioned the rising discontent regarding the “restrictions upon 
the people, the corrupt administration of the government, and the denial of civil rights to 
the population.”42 Later, when William P. Schreiner testified on 26 March, the Aberdeen 
Journal keyed in on his statements regarding English parents being prohibited by 
Transvaal law from educating their children in the English language.
43
 
The select committee issued its findings on 13 July.  They included a strong 
censure of Rhodes for using his various positions in South Africa to advance revolution 
in the Transvaal and for deceiving the high commissioner of South Africa as to those 
intentions.  At the same time it exonerated the Colonial Office of being complicit in the 
raid.  Meanwhile, Labouchere issued a minority report, which insisted that an insufficient 
amount of information was available to warrant such an indictment against Rhodes.
44
  
These reports were duly summarized and released in the nation’s press both on the 
national and local levels.  
The committee’s conclusions inspired commentary on their key points.  Lord 
George Hamilton, for instance, expressed satisfaction that Chamberlain and the Colonial 
Office had been absolved “from the base and unfounded charges of complicity…which 
his [Chamberlain’s] enemies had so industriously flung at him.” 45  Others, including a 
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commentator to the Dundee Courier and the editors of the Leicester Chronicle, decried 
that the committee refusal to punish Rhodes for his culpability in what had been a “vulgar 
conspiracy, an outrage upon international comity, engendered, subsidised, and stimulated 
by men who ought to have known better, and did know better…who, in excess of ill-
begotten zeal, so far forgot themselves as to countenance a scheme which might have 
dragged the nation into a disastrous war, for which there would not have been a shadow 
of an excuse on our part.”46  Another commentator insisted in a letter to the Times that for 
the sake of British honor and the dignity of Parliament, it was imperative for the people 
to “absolutely dissociate ourselves from anything like approval or condonation [sic] of 
Mr. Rhodes’s actions in connexion [sic] with the Jameson Raid.”47  To that end, he 
completely rejected Chamberlain’s insistence that Rhodes’s honor remained intact:  
To justify the means by the end seems to me ridiculous jesuitry unworthy of the 
House of Commons.  I yield to no man in my approval of the end which Mr. 
Rhodes had in view if I am correct in assuming that the end was the creation of a 
United South Africa under a British flag, and I yield to no man in my 
condemnation of the means employed if I am justified in accepting the decision of 
the committee as to those means.  
     Grave breaches of duty, deceiving an official chief, hoodwinking colleagues, 
leading astray subordinates, and inducing men in a position of trust to become 
guilty of “grave derelictions of duty”—are these findings which in no way affect 
the personal honour of an English gentleman?  If so, we must have either changed 
our language or our character.
48
   
 
As was the case in the aftermath of Gordon’s death, a multitude of pamphlets and 
books hit the market in the wake of the raid and the committee of enquiry.
49
  Among 
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those was Iwan-Mueller’s 1902 work, Lord Milner and South Africa, which addressed 
wider Anglo-Boer relations, including the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War, and 
explored the relationship between extra-constitutional actions and British public opinion.  
The author drew upon instances in which the course of history had previously excused 
belligerent action.  These included Lord Byron’s participation in the Greek war of 
independence in 1824, Garibaldi’s invasion of Sicily in 1860, and, more distantly but 
nevertheless poignantly, Parliament’s assistance of William of Orange in deposing James 
II.  For Iwan-Mueller, the critical difference between such examples and Jameson’s 
actions lay in the fact that, whereas those instances were ultimately successful, the raid 
had failed.  Ignoring the illegality of the action, Iwan-Mueller thus insisted that “it was 
the folly of the raid and not its immorality which ought to have been bemoaned,” and that 
“the vital mistake made by the majority of Englishmen was the confusion of folly with 
wrong-doing.”50   
Iwan-Mueller’s conclusion seems off-base for several reasons.  In the first place, 
the success or failure of the raid made no apparent difference to the Colonial Office 
because it ordered Jameson to withdraw before the matter had been militarily decided, 
and the British public had almost no time to react to the raid without being aware that the 
effort had failed.  Thus, instead of being guided by the success of military action, it is 
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more likely that British animosity toward Jameson was influenced by deep-seeded 
concerns for British prestige and the irreproachableness of Britain’s national character.   
As things stood in the mid-1890s, the British public, though perhaps sympathetic toward 
the Uitlanders, was not yet convinced that the franchise question warranted extreme 
military measures.  They were also made aware that Rhodes had ordered Jameson not to 
invade in the first place, and that Chamberlain had likewise ordered Jameson to withdraw 
after he had breached the border.  All of this worked against Jameson in the eyes of the 
public, whose full attention was directed towards the blatant illegality of the raid.   
Concurrent with the sitting of the select committee, South African correspondents 
for British papers kept the Uitlander issue before the public, making it more likely that 
the franchise question eventually would take on greater importance.  For instance, writing 
more than a year after the raid, a Times reporter submitted that the English settlers were 
convinced that the “only hope for the settlement of differences and for a restoration of 
confidence was for the British government to ‘have it out’ with the Transvaal, to insist by 
force that the British subjects should be treated as liberally in the Transvaal as the Dutch 
are treated in the Cape Colony.”51  The correspondent went on to insist that there was no 
doubt that Britain had the “power” to force the Transvaal to comply.  British territory 
surrounded the Transvaal.  Britain had greater wealth and larger numbers of men for the 
prosecution of a war.  In weighing the question of whether Britain should use the power it 
had at its disposal, the correspondent concluded that a complete hands-off policy was 
impossible, asserting that the inability for the Boers to govern the territory called for a 
response.  It would only encourage them to reject further British paramountcy in South 
Africa and further destabilize the region not to intercede.  At the same time, he argued 
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that Britain had a moral obligation to look after the political and social well-being of the 
Transvaal.  Instead of war and the subjugation of the Boers, the correspondent insisted 
that the better policy was to sway Boer opinion toward accepting British principles 
concerning the development of South Africa.  Only then, with the full weight of “Dutch 
opinion” against them, he argued, would those Boers who stood in the way of progress 
give way.
52
  Although such sentiments had no demonstrable impact on policy in the 
immediate aftermath of Jameson’s failed raid, they would gain greater currency in the 
run-up to the Second Anglo-Boer War. 
“TRICKY DIPLOMACY,” “TURNING THE SCREW,” AND PUBLIC OPINION:  
THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND ANGLO-BOER WAR IN 1899
53
 
 
For Boers such as Jan Smuts, state attorney general of the Transvaal (1898-1899), 
the Jameson Raid was “the real beginning of the [Second Anglo-Boer] war” because it 
revealed Britain’s intent to completely absorb the Transvaal.54  In the face of such a 
threat, Boer nationalist sentiments heightened to the point that many in the Transvaal 
believed that any attempt by the British to ameliorate the conditions for the Uitlanders 
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was a direct assault on the sovereignty they had been granted by the Pretoria and London 
conventions.
55
   
Although the raid raised questions about the means by which Britain pursued its 
imperial aims, the long-term goal of British expansionists to severely reduce if not 
completely eliminate the independence of the Transvaal remained unchanged.  As Henry 
Labouchère reflected later, the only adjustment in policy was the means to achieve the 
government’s designs: military force was exchanged for “tricky diplomacy.”56  That 
effort was immediately preceded by the issuance of the so-called Second Uitlander 
Petition in early May 1899, a document that was signed by upwards of 21,000 British 
residents and demanded that non-Boer residents of the Transvaal immediately be granted 
the same franchise rights and representation in the Volksraad as the burghers enjoyed.
57
   
Over the course of the summer of 1899 Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner 
(governor of the Cape Colony and high commissioner of South Africa) outwardly 
demonstrated a sincere interest in compromise, but in truth they had no such intentions.  
In what Milner called “the great game for the mastery in South Africa,” they believed that 
the Transvaal could not be allowed to continue to suppress English subjects, even if 
preventing that suppression meant war.
58
  In many of his communications with officials 
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in London and at the Cape, Milner insisted that he did not want to aggravate the situation 
unduly, and that if war came, it would “not come from any spirit of jingoism in me.”59  
At the same time, he believed that the Transvaal would back down when faced with the 
prospect of war.  But, even if the crisis resulted in war, Milner maintained that it would 
be better to fight the Transvaal in 1899 than to wait five or ten years, when the Boers 
would certainly be “stronger and more hostile than ever.60   
Indeed, Milner had sought to shape opinion against the Boers since his arrival at 
the Cape.  As early as February 1898, he had actively worked to turn Britain toward what 
he called the “right views.”  He encouraged the printing of inflammatory articles in South 
African papers, such as the Cape Argus, the Cape Times, the Star (Johannesburg), and the 
Transvaal Leader (Johannesburg), knowing that they would be reprinted by the national 
and provincial papers back in Britain.  Consequently, by the summer of 1899 the public 
had become more aware of the plight of the Uitlanders and more committed to upholding 
Britain’s prestige as the paramount power in South Africa.61   
Pakenham has made a strong circumstantial case that the governor intended to 
annex the Transvaal and to have himself installed as the overlord of a new crown colony, 
knowing full well that it would require a war to achieve this end.
62
  Chamberlain, on the 
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other hand, would have been satisfied just to see the Transvaal government accede to 
British demands for an extension of franchise rights.  But while their personal goals 
differed, the tactics by which they worked remained largely the same: a progressive 
tightening of diplomatic pressure that would force Kruger to comply or to react with war.  
Either way, Britain would effectively dominate the Transvaal’s internal affairs through 
external influence or through reabsorption and direct governance.
63
   
The result was that, as negotiations over Uitlander rights progressed throughout 
1899, Kruger’s government increasingly found itself backed into a corner with few 
options.  Each time Kruger made a small concession, Milner and Chamberlain added new 
demands that would extend Britain’s suzerain rights and powers even further.64  If it 
accepted Chamberlain’s demands, the Transvaal effectively would have to concede the 
nation’s sovereignty.  But to reject Britain’s demands outright in all likelihood meant 
war.
65
  Faced with this predicament in mid-August, the Boers made a final bid to disarm 
the situation when they offered to expand the Uitlander franchise and Volksraad 
representation on the condition that Britain agreed: 
a) Not to interfere in the internal affairs of the republic 
b) Not to further insist on the assertion of suzerainty 
c) To arbitration (excluding a foreign presence other than the Orange Free 
State).
66
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Milner and Chamberlain considered these conditions to be direct challenges to Britain’s 
position as the paramount power in South Africa and to the empire’s right to interfere in 
the internal affairs of the Transvaal.
67
  
Meanwhile, as early as June Milner and Wolseley (who had been the governor of 
Natal in 1877 and who was serving in the War Office as commander in chief of the forces 
in 1899) began pressing the cabinet to send 35,000 troops to South Africa.  Wolseley 
maintained that such a move would cause the Transvaal to think twice about a war and 
quell a war scare.
68
  While Milner concurred with Wolseley that such a move was 
necessary for security and that the threat of military force would further compel the 
Transvaal to capitulate, he did not shirk from the prospect of war.  In the event that such 
pressures provoked the Transvaal into an act of aggression against Natal or the Cape, 
Britain could easily claim that the Boers had instigated the war.
69
  Seeing that the 
Transvaal had given ground, Milner communicated to Chamberlain on 16 August that the 
whole matter rested on “staying power” and Britain’s determination not “to weaken,” but 
to “go on steadily turning the screw.”70  To that end, sensing that diplomatic pressure had 
pushed the Transvaal as far as it could without the British army on its border, Milner 
called for military reinforcements.   
The position at present seems to me a threatening one, as we are face to face with 
the question of our right to put things straight in the T.V.—our virtual nominal 
suzerainty—and, on this, agreement is, I believe, impossible without war; or at 
least the verge of war; —an army in S.A.71 
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Chamberlain, who had been concerned in early August that indefinite negotiations would 
cause Britain’s casus belli to slip away, likewise came to believe by the end of August 
that the British position was now considerably strengthened.
72
   This did not necessarily 
mean a war was inevitable, since he believed that the Boers still might yield.  
Nevertheless, he communicated to Milner on 23 August that he was going to initiate 
plans to send an initial 10,000 troops to South Africa, a force he believed would be 
sufficient until a full army corps could be deployed to the region for the purpose of 
achieving a “complete solution.”73  Two weeks later, the cabinet authorized 
Chamberlain’s request for troops.   
Milner and Wolseley were certainly not alone in their inclination toward a 
tangible threat of war to force Kruger’s hand.74  As early as 25 June, Lord Selborne, the 
under-secretary to the colonies, wrote to Milner:  
The idea of war with the S.A.R. is very distasteful to most people.  Consequently, 
the cabinet have undoubtedly had to modify the pace that they contemplated 
moving at immediately after the Bloemfontein Conference … [Kruger] will never 
yield until he feels the muzzle of the pistol on his forehead, or that the surest way 
to avoid war is to prepare openly for war … We have entered a lane, you have 
entered a lane, the Cabinet has entered a lane, the country has entered a lane, 
where no turning back is possible without humiliation or disaster.  We must 
eventually force the door at the other end, by peaceful pressure if possible, but if 
necessary by war.
75
 
 
Likewise, Sir Edward Hamilton, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, noted in his 
diary on 30 July that, while nobody in Britain wanted war, he believed that some 
“military demonstration” might prove necessary “before Kruger comes to terms.”76  
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Even so, other well-positioned officials took a far less belligerent stance.  While 
ultimately in agreement that Britain could not back down in the face of Boer rejection of 
British suzerainty, Hicks-Beach, then chancellor of the exchequer, argued for caution as 
war clouds darkened at the end of August.  Eluding cabinet responsibility for stoking the 
prospects of war, he hoped that “Milner and the Uitlanders [would] not be allowed to 
drag [Britain] into war.”77  Prime Minister Salisbury, concerned about Milner’s 
purposeful intent to “turn the screw,” feared that the Boers would go to war instead of 
capitulating and that such a war would be highly unpopular in Britain.
78
  Although Arthur 
Balfour, the first lord of the Treasury and leader of the House of Commons, personally 
considered the Transvaal to be a sovereign foreign state, he consented to sending 
reinforcements to the Cape after becoming convinced that a mobilization of troops would 
not necessarily lead to war.
79
  Similarly, Sir William Harcourt, the leader of the 
opposition, was convinced that “the real policy of the government [was] to bluff Kruger,” 
and that the issue would ultimately not come to war.
80
  Throughout the summer, 
Secretary of State for War Lansdowne, and Lt. General William Butler (Commander-in-
Chief of British forces in South Africa) had stood opposed to Milner’s and Wolseley’s 
requests for reinforcements because of the massive costs associated with such a 
mobilization and because they feared that such action might provoke a war rather than 
prevent one.
81
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Indeed Butler’s experiences throughout the spring and summer of 1899 illuminate 
much about the links between South African business interests and those within the 
British government pressing for concessions from the Boers.  Charged with the defense 
of the British colonies in South Africa, Butler criticized officials within the War Office 
who he believed desired to provoke a war at a time when imperial defenses in the region 
were completely unsatisfactory.  Further, Butler worried openly that a war between the 
“white races” would prove disastrous to southern Africa’s social fabric.82  As late as May 
1899, he insisted that the Boers might be cajoled into implementing reforms if they could 
be convinced that Britain had no intention of assaulting the independence of the 
Transvaal.  To Butler, the “real danger lay in the occult influences at work, backed by 
enormous means and quite without conscience, to produce war in South Africa for selfish 
ends.”83  However, his superiors in the War Office and Milner at the Cape admonished 
him for transgressing into political matters that they believed did not concern him.  Public 
opinion also strongly turned against Butler as the summer progressed.  The result was 
that he lost whatever influence he might have had in deterring a war, and he was 
ultimately recalled from South Africa.
84
   
The cabinet as a whole did recognize that any military mobilization had to be 
accompanied by an ultimatum, and that Britons generally would not support a move 
toward war on the basis of the franchise question alone, unless all diplomatic measures 
had presumably been exhausted.
85
  Thus, Chamberlain and Salisbury began crafting an 
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ultimatum to the Transvaal government which, as Kruger’s advisors feared, would have 
gone a long way toward destroying what sovereignty the Transvaal enjoyed under the 
terms of the London Conference of 1884.
86
  However, the promulgation of this message 
was unintentionally preempted by Kruger, who issued his own ultimatum to Britain on 10 
October, with a 48-hour deadline attached.  In that ultimatum Kruger did not specifically 
address the contentious issues of the Uitlander franchise, or the larger question of 
Britain’s suzerainty and its corollary (the right of interference), which had occupied the 
attentions of the two governments.  Rather, it was a direct response to Britain’s decision 
to mobilize.  It demanded that Britain agree to: 
1. arbitration on “all points of difference”; 
2. withdraw British troops from the border; 
3. withdraw all British reinforcements that had arrived in South Africa after 1 
June; 
4. send no further troops, and those presently en route were not to be landed  
anywhere in South Africa.
87
 
 
Foreshadowing the thinking of the kaiser and his generals in 1914, Kruger believed that 
the mobilization of the British army meant war.  The mobilization of 10,000 British 
troops on 8 September had effectively nailed the door shut on diplomacy, if it had not 
previously been closed.
88
  Coming to the conclusion that nothing short of war would stop 
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Britain from imposing on their sovereignty, the Boers realized that to preserve their 
independence they had to seize the initiative.
89
   
At the onset of the dispute the British public had remained generally disinclined 
to go to war with the Transvaal solely over the issue of franchise rights.  Yet, as the 
diplomatic conversation turned to the broader issue of British suzerainty in early 
September, Chamberlain observed that public opinion had turned.
90
  Writing to Milner on 
2 September, Chamberlain expressed his confidence that if it came to war, although a 
sizeable minority of the public would be most unwilling, “we shall be sufficiently 
supported.”91  Toward that end, Chamberlain insisted that the diplomatic game had to be 
played “selon les règles” [according to the rules].  Before Britain could ask more from 
the Transvaal, it had “to first exhaust proposals on the franchise issue.” At the same time, 
he believed that no ultimatum could be issued until at the very least a contingent force 
had been deployed to the Cape, which could hold the position until a full complement of 
troops could be delivered.
92
   
For its part, throughout the spring and early summer the British public was, as 
Chamberlain had recognized, widely opposed to going to war with the Boers solely to 
ensure Uitlander franchise rights.  While it is arguable that most were not well versed in 
the intricacies of the diplomatic positions staked out by the respective governments in the 
late spring and early summer of 1899, the provincial press still provided considerable 
coverage and commentary about the ongoing diplomacy.   As the Conservative-minded 
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Gloucester Standard observed when troops were being deployed in July 1899 to reinforce 
the British position at the Cape:   
Undoubtedly, outside the mining interests and the friends of the comparatively 
few families settled in the Transvaal, there is no disposition on the part of the 
public to wrestle with Kruger's puzzles, to analyse the points of difference 
between his concessions and Sir A. Milner's demands.  Still less is there a war of 
feeling about.  An armed expedition to the Transvaal would not, we fully believe, 
be popular just now.
93
   
 
The paper asserted that it was dangerous to assume that the British public would be 
forever detached from the matter, and maintained that “a single turn in events, an insult to 
the British flag, a reverse of arms, might set the current the other way in a moment.”94  
Clearly aware of the situation itself and the broader implications for British imperial 
prestige, the paper anticipated: 
One morning…they may perceive that which is quite clear to the government, that 
much more is at stake than the conversion of Kruger to the cause of the 
Outlanders.  Are we to admit that the Rand shall be the paramount power in South 
Africa?  If so, then we need not prolong the struggle.  We may just as well haul 
down the British flag.  And in that case, what would Queensland, which has 
offered troops for service in the Transvaal, in the event of hostilities, think, with 
the rest of the empire.
95
 
 
 Only two weeks later, the same paper reported that the negotiations in South 
Africa were followed with interest:  “public opinion [was] in a rather optimistic mood in 
regard to the Transvaal of late, and perhaps that hopeful view was supported by the 
carefully-worded statement of the colonial secretary a few days since when he announced 
the receipt of a telegram showing that the Volksraad of the South African Republic had 
adopted a seven years' retrospective franchise for the Uitlanders.”96   
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That interest became even more apparent when the matter ceased being just about 
the specific rights of the Uitlanders and became focused on the standing and prestige of 
Britain and its empire as a whole.  Commenting on Kruger’s attempt to compromise on 
the franchise issue in July, the Gloucester Standard maintained:  
Either Britain is to govern in South Africa or the Boer.  To do nothing and to 
admit defeat would be to court another Majuba Hill—a moral Majuba, as a special 
correspondent puts it.
97
 
Likewise, the West Briton and Cornwall Advertiser insisted that the Boer promise of 
granting all whites in the Transvaal an equal share in political right and liberties, “should 
at length, if only in a qualified fashion, be fulfilled.”  The Advertiser continued: 
That is the conclusion at which Sir Alfred Milner and the bulk of the people in 
South Africa generally have arrived, and in which they are supported by the 
imperial government.  The issue, let it be once more explained, is not only for the 
procuring of the franchise for a few thousand Englishmen in the Transvaal; but as 
to our future paramountcy in South Africa.  Nothing can be more certain than that 
our yielding now would deal a damaging blow and possibly an irrevocable blow 
to our prestige.
98
  
   
The Liberal-minded Fife Free Press editorialized a month later that while the Boer 
government had indeed already made some concessions concerning the Uitlander 
franchise, still more action was needed from Kruger before the matter could be 
considered closed.  Firmly declaring its desire for peace, the Free Press enthusiastically 
reported that statements by Chamberlain and the queen, along with the deployment of the 
10,000 reinforcements to Natal, were effectively cornering Kruger into a position from 
which he would be forced to comply with British demands.  When faced with the 
prospect that “war [would] mean nothing less for [the Boers] than the removal of the 
republic from the map of South Africa,” the Free Press was firmly convinced that the 
                                                 
97
 Gloucester Standard, 15 July 1899, 4. 
98
 West Britain and Cornwall Advertiser, 27 July 1899, 4. 
186 
 
Boers would come to see the reason of conceding to Britain’s demands instead of losing 
their entire country.
99
  Later still, in mid-September, the Independent Evesham Journal 
similarly emphasized: 
The British terms are just and equitable in themselves, and their being so, and the 
avoidance of any expressions calculated to exasperate the existing feeling, must 
strengthen the government by enlisting the moral support for a large mass of 
responsible and thoughtful men, whose reluctance to countenance war except as 
the last resource and under irresistible pressure earns for them the scorn of the 
raving jingoes who would light-heartedly enter upon a race war without serious 
thought  of the awful and far-reaching consequences.
100
   
 
While doubting whether the Boer reply would in itself relieve the tensions between the 
two countries, the journal nevertheless held out hope that an agreeable resolution would 
soon be forthcoming.
101
   
London and provincial papers had, therefore, noted the deployment of troops that 
took place alongside the diplomatic effort, but they expressed little concern that such 
action might precipitate a conflict.  One commentator wrote to the Times, that in the 
event that Kruger’s proposals proved to be insufficient and unsatisfactory, “strong 
reinforcements of our troops in South Africa should be sent out as an indication that we 
are not resorting to a council of the South African states in order to shelve our 
responsibilities, but merely to make certain that our cause is just and approved by those 
of whose interest we are guardians.”102  Likewise speaking about the need to be ever 
prepared, the Gloucester Standard opined:  
The exodus of the British soldiers for special service in South Africa goes on 
apace, though we are officially assured that nothing more is being done in this 
direction than to make assurance that the military equipment at the Cape and the 
auxiliary stations shall be sufficient to meet any possible emergency.  It is to be 
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hoped that there will be no necessity for active operations in the field; but the War 
Office motto would seem to be, in this direction at any rate, “Ready, aye 
ready.”103 
A month later, the Times asserted that the deployment of additional troops to South 
Africa had already had an effect on Pretoria. 
The threats of the Boers have been open and undisguised, as our correspondent 
tells us, but little more will be heard from them when it is known that the British 
forces in the colony are so strong that a raid would meet with an unpleasantly 
warm reception…Pretoria will, in the end, think twice and thrice before they risk 
their property, their liberty, and their political privileges in a hopeless struggle 
with the paramount power.
104
 
  
Statements such as these strongly suggest that few had reservations about the use of 
coercive military force so long as it aided in eliciting the desired response from the 
Transvaal.  
The tenor of commentary changed, however, when Kruger denied British 
suzerainty in early September.  The Morning Post did not believe war to be imminent; 
rather, it argued that, due to Chamberlain’s steadfastness, the Boer government would be 
compelled to retract his denial not merely with words but with action.
105
  British 
newspapers from across the political spectrum expressed the belief that the Boer 
Government should and eventually would accede to British demands before it came to 
war.   To that end, Conservative and Liberal papers alike, widely argued that should war 
come with the Transvaal, it would be due to the recalcitrance of Kruger and the eagerness 
of his administration for war.
106
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News of the Boer ultimatum elicited a range of responses from the British press 
including “derision, delight, dismay—and indifference.”  London papers used words such 
as “preposterous” and “extravagant farce” to describe the Boer ultimatum.107 For 
instance, the Times expected that the public would receive the news that the “petty 
republic” had taken the “infatuated step of dispatching such a document” with profound 
regret.
108
    More emphatically, the Morning Post noted, Kruger’s open rejection of 
British suzerainty effectively galvanized public opinion:  
When Mr. Kruger made his empty boast about British suzerainty he probably did 
not see that he was at the same time bidding good-bye to his favourite theme of 
arbitration.  By his own foolishness he has given away the situation.  People who 
felt lukewarm on the Uitlander franchise and the dynamite monopoly are up in 
arms the moment it comes to an independent Transvaal.  Even the bondsmen must 
now desert the Kruger cause if they wish this country to believe in their 
protestations, for both Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Schneider have declared in favour of 
British supremacy in South Africa.
109 
 
   
And, as Pakenham has pointed out, most editorials echoed the position of the Daily 
Telegraph:     
 
Of course there can be only one answer for this grotesque challenge…Mr Kruger 
has asked for war, and war he must have.
110
 
 
When the Transvaal was first annexed some Britons defended the Boers’ right to 
domestic sovereignty.  The pro-Boer lobby would gain considerable momentum when, 
after the summer of 1900, the war deteriorated into a guerrilla struggle, and the British 
government used objectionable tactics, such as concentration camps, in an effort to curtail 
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and hinder the Boer forces.
111
  Even before that point, however, key members of 
Parliament and pacifist groups spoke out against the legitimacy of the war.  For instance, 
in late-September Lord Rathmore wrote a lengthy review of Britain’s imperial policy 
toward the Transvaal from 1877 to 1899 and concluded prophetically that a future war 
would devolve from a shooting war into a disastrous guerilla war.  In thus questioning the 
legitimacy of the position which Britain had staked out, he wrote:  
I see many things against us; but, if in addition, the God of battles deems not our 
cause a righteous one, the war that we are entering upon with so light a heart may 
bring sorrow and loss untold to our fair Christian land. 
     The Boers are not a lovable people; somewhat naturally they hate us; but still 
for all that, though their country is rich in mines, and a vineyard to be coveted, it 
is questionable whether our motives are perfectly pure, and our conduct righteous 
in making war upon them.
112
 
In addition, peace societies, some members of the Liberal Party, elements of the labor 
movement and religious nonconformists, such as the Quakers, actively petitioned the 
British government between June and October 1899 both in letter and in public meetings.  
After the war started, anti-war agitation coalesced into a variety of anti-war 
organizations, which included the Transvaal Committee, the South African Conciliation 
Committee, and the Stop-the-War Committee.
113
   
Within the relatively small bloc of pro-Boers, Irish nationalists had long been 
particularly sympathetic with the Boer cause, seeing in the Boers a people who had 
                                                 
111
 Works that specifically delve into the Pro-Boer position prior to and during the Second Boer War 
include Stephen Koss, The Pro-Boers: the Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1973); Arthur Davey, The British Pro-Boers, 1877-1902 (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1978); 
Donal McCracken, The Irish Pro-Boers, 1877-1902 (Johannesburg: Perskor, 1989); Hope H. Hewison, 
Hedge of Wild Almonds: South Africa, the Pro-Boers, and the Quaker Conscience, 1890-1910 (Portsmouth: 
Heinemann, 1989).   
112
 Evesham Journal, 23 September 1899, 3. 
113
 Paul Laity, “The British Peace Movement and the War,” in The Impact of the South African War, ed. 
David Omissi and Andrew Thompson (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 138-156.  For more on the anti-war 
activities of nonconformists see, Greg Cuthbertson, “Pricking the ‘nonconformist conscience’: religion 
against the South African War, in The South African War reappraised, edited by Donal Lowry 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 169-187. 
190 
 
mutual frustrations with the overbearing power of Britain.  Opposition to the Jameson 
raid afforded a rallying point for nationalist Irish MPs, who had been torn apart since the 
Parnell split in the Irish Parliamentary Party in 1890.
114
  As Anglo-Boer relations 
descended into war, Michael Davitt, MP for South Mayo, along with other Irish 
nationalists such as Arthur Griffith, Maud Gonne, and W.B. Yeats, strenuously objected 
and on 1 October convened a sizeable public meeting to contest the war.
115
  On 17 
October John Dillon (MP for East Mayo), offered an amendment to the Commons’s 
response to the queen’s speech in which he moved that the government acknowledge that 
the war was caused by unlawful interference on the part of Britain into the internal affairs 
of the Transvaal, and that the dispute between the two countries be settled through 
arbitration.
116
  Supporting Dillon’s motion, Davitt emphasized the hypocrisy of the 
British government’s defense of Roman Catholic rights in the Transvaal while denying 
Catholics the same rights in Ireland.  Moreover, he declared: 
As I have the honour to represent a constituency which was the first in Ireland to 
condemn the war policy of the colonial secretary, I support the amendment of my 
hon. friend [sic].  Upon the war which that policy has provoked the whole world 
outside of jingo circles and stock-jobbing rings cries “shame,” and I am proud of 
the fact that Ireland’s voice is raised in that indignant chorus of condemnation.  It 
is a war without one single redeeming feature, a war of a giant against a dwarf, a 
war which, no matter what its ending may be, will bring neither credit nor glory 
nor prestige to this great British Empire.
117
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Supported mostly by members of the various Irish nationalist factions and a few Liberals, 
the motion was, nevertheless, overwhelmingly defeated by Unionists and Conservatives 
by a vote of 54 “Ayes” to 322 “Noes”.118  On 26 October, in a further act of protest 
against what he considered to be “the greatest infamy of the nineteenth century,” Davitt 
resigned his seat in the Commons and subsequently worked to generate Continental 
support for the Boer cause.
119
  In the spring of 1900 he proceeded to South Africa, where 
he followed the Boer armies as a correspondent for the New York American Journal and 
the Dublin Freeman’s Journal.  Later that year he returned to London where he wrote a 
history of the war from the Boer perspective.
120
  
Tangible indications of the public’s interest in the run-up to the war, either in 
favor of or against the conflict, can be found in the numerous public meetings that sprang 
up all around Britain.  On 24 September a small pro-Boer rally in Trafalgar Square was 
reportedly overrun by a crowd of 30,000 “jingoes,” who rallied in favor of Chamberlain 
and the government.  Singing patriotic songs such as “Rule Britannia” and “The Soldiers 
of the Queen,” and waving the Union Jack and royal standard, the crowd drowned out the 
keynote speaker, Dr. Gavin Brown Clark (Liberal MP for Caithness), with accusations of 
treason and challenges to his being able to call himself an “Englishman.”121  On 1 
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October, there was the aforementioned rally in Dublin.
122
  Another rally opposing the war 
occurred in Swindon on 8 October and was also disrupted by supporters of the 
government, who then proceeded to hold their own rally.  The following day in Sheffield 
there was a “remarkable patriotic feeling” at a public meeting, at which “a resolution was 
carried heartily supporting the Government in their Transvaal policy.”123  At public 
meetings held on 1 November in Wick and Thurso, towns that lay within Clark’s own 
Caithness constituency, the attendees unanimously passed resolutions to express their 
“great dissatisfaction and strong disapproval of the action of Dr. Clark, MP for the 
county, with reference to the present crisis in the Transvaal.”124  Two weeks later, 
Aberdeen’s Weekly Free Press reported that even Clark’s most enthusiastic supporters 
along the East Coast had turned against him and passed a similar resolution condemning 
his position: 
That no language can adequately express the feelings of contempt with which this 
meeting holds the recent unpatriotic attitude of Dr. Clark, MP, toward the 
government and the nation at a time when the enemies of the country are invading 
our territory, our countrymen ruined and fleeing for refuge from the hands of the 
oppressor, and that we take this opportunity of dissociating ourselves from such 
disloyal conduct.
125
 
 
As often as British newspapers had expressed a desire for a peaceful resolution of 
the imbroglio, they widely held that neither Britain’s honor nor its imperial holdings 
could be sacrificed at any price.  Although the government had effectively forced the 
Boers into a political corner, its spokesmen portrayed—and the papers and public readily 
accepted—that the war was a defensive conflict because the Boer government was the 
first to issue an ultimatum.  It was thus Britain’s duty to prosecute the war to the fullest 
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extent.  The question no longer was simply about the Uitlanders’ franchise.  The Second 
Anglo-Boer War would determine whether the Transvaal would establish itself as a fully 
independent state, or whether Britain would finally establish itself as the sole imperial 
power in South Africa.  If the Transvaal succeeded, Britons widely believed this would 
lead to the decline of the empire – something which could not be allowed to happen.  On 
the other hand, a British victory brought with it great economic and humanitarian 
promise. As Dr. James Stewart, a moderator of the General Assembly of the Free Church 
of Scotland and a resident of Lovedale, South Africa, noted in a letter to the Earl of 
Moray:  
There is a great future for the African continent.  Its mineral and other wealth has, 
as yet, only been guessed at.  What is needed for the opening up of that continent 
is reliable information, just government, and a Christian civilization, or the 
application of the teachings of Jesus Christ.  The present war, which has darkened 
so many homes, is, strange to say, a part of the process and a part of the heavy 
price which has to be paid for that great end.  It is in this light that the present war 
should be regarded, and no one need have any compunction or any doubts as to its 
necessity and justice.  Little or nothing of a permanent kind can be done to 
develop the continent on just lines so long as essentially unjust and obstructive 
forces of government block the way.  It is the same process as began in Egypt 
nineteen years ago, was necessary at Omdurman and Khartoum two years ago, 
and has now travelled south to Ladysmith and elsewhere; and that just because 
none of these three forms of government would act otherwise than for the benefit 
of a few at the expense of the many.
126
  
 
With the stakes thus set, the majority opinion of the public was that there was little room 
for those who held a position short of fully supporting the war effort and the intended 
aims of the government.  Regardless of their abhorrence for another war with in South 
Africa, once the Transvaal issued its ultimatum, the ensuing war became one that the vast 
majority believed Britain must win to uphold its national honor. 
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OPENING SHOTS, BLACK WEEK, AND MAFEKING NIGHT 
 As they had in prior conflicts, war correspondents kept the reading public well 
informed about events in South Africa.  Regimental departures appeared in the presses 
and maps (a staple of British war correspondence) accompanied the reports which 
emerged from the front.  In October and November the news that poured into Britain was 
anything but encouraging, and it was not long before lengthy casualty lists filled the 
columns of the national and provincial papers.  Despite Britons’ belief in their own 
military superiority, the Boers took the initiative as they had in 1880 and had the upper 
hand in the early going of the conflict.  Unlike in the previous war, the Transvaal was 
supported in its struggle by the Orange Free State, which saw that its future survival hung 
in the balance.   
The war officially began on 12 October 1899 when the Boer ultimatum expired.  
Within forty-eight hours Britain began losing contact with its forces on the Transvaal 
border.  On 14 October Boer forces laid siege to the border towns of Kimberley and 
Mafeking, with garrisons of 2,600 and 1,000 men respectively.  The next week saw a 
furious invasion, as the aged Commandant-General Piet Joubert led 21,000 Transvaalers 
and Orange Free Staters south past the old 1881 battlefields of Laing’s Nek, Ingogo, and 
Majuba Hill, and flooded into northern Natal.  Despite temporarily repulsing the Boers at 
Dundee and Elandslaagt, the British fell back toward Ladysmith, where General George 
White’s force of 12,000 likewise became besieged on 29 October.127   
The British public quickly became intensely interested in the war.  George Sturt 
recorded in his journal on 24 October: 
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Behind the boy who brought his bundle of evening papers into Frank’s shop, there 
followed thick, until the shop was crowded, men eager for war news.  For so long 
they had been waiting about, with nothing to do, expectant of the stimulus, and 
desiring something truly stirring.  They would like a bloody battle twice a day, so 
that breakfast and supper might have a relish, and ennui be chased away.
128
 
 
Responding to the clamor for war news, the Conservative Daily Mail, which had been 
founded by Lord Northcliffe in 1896, quickly rose to being the best-selling daily 
newspaper.  Joining the Mail in covering the war, other leading papers, such as the Daily 
Telegraph, and the Morning Post, as well as illustrated weeklies, such as the Graphic and 
the Illustrated London News, sent correspondents and artists to report on events.  Even 
the Manchester Guardian, which was one of the few papers to continue to oppose the war 
openly, sent a correspondent to the scene of the war.  War news, especially when it came 
from a paper’s own correspondent, was good for business.129   
The growth of the Daily Mail at this time was part of the burgeoning of adult, 
educational, and juvenile literature markets that had emerged since the late 1870s.  Much 
of this fare was devoted to imperial messaging.  Arguably motivated by both a keen 
interest to meet public demand for imperial news as well as to drive public opinion, the 
central themes of those media were British self-confidence and the safety of the 
empire.
130
  As Jacqueline Beaumont, a historian of British journalism and the colonial 
wars, points out, the hundreds of war correspondents who found their way to South 
Africa demonstratively reflected the growth of the press and the level of public interest in 
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imperial matters.  Many of those correspondents, such as Lionel James, established their 
careers in covering the war.
131
  To be sure, there was a very good reason why the Boer 
War captivated the public.  More than merely being the latest in a long series of imperial 
crises, the set-backs in the early stages of the conflict warranted deep public concern as 
this war proved to be the greatest challenge to the empire arguably since the Crimean 
War.
132
 
Indeed, by early November the public’s initial haughtiness was already beginning 
to wane.  Describing the scene in London to Milner, Miss Bertha Synge wrote on 3 
November: 
Our days are spent reading our papers—ever clamouring for more, our nights in 
dreaming of all that is and is to be.  In my lifetime, the state of tension is unique.  
The war affects all, rich and poor alike.  All have friends and relations in it and it 
is no exaggeration to say we are all plunged in gloom…I shall never forget last 
Tuesday in London, when the news of the missing battalion arrived around 
midday.  Picture the newsboys at the corners…shouting “Terrible Reverses of 
British Troops—Loss of 2,000.”  Imagine the rush for papers as we all stood 
about the streets—regardless of all appearances, reading the telegrams with 
breathless anxiety.  Carriages stopped at the corners for papers to be bought—bus 
conductors rushed with handfuls of pennies as deputation for their passengers.  
There was a perfect sea of newspapers and anxious faces behind—intense gravity 
prevailed…People walked along speaking in whispers and muttering, while ever 
echoed round the shrill and awful cry of “Terrible Reverses of British Troops.” 
…The War Officer is besieged—no one goes to the theatres—concert rooms are 
empty—new books fall flat—nothing is spoken save the war.133   
 
With the British regaining some of their footing in the third week of the month, Lt. 
General Redvers Buller, the commander of British forces at the Cape, divided his 47,000 
men into three groups and planned a massive three-pronged counter-offensive to break 
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through the Boer defenses and to relieve the beleaguered British garrisons at Kimberley 
and Ladysmith.
134
  He sent 20,000 men west under Lord Methuen to retake Kimberley.  
With a much smaller force, Major Generals William Gatacre and John French were to 
repulse the Boer incursion in the midlands of the Cape Colony.  Retaining 20,000 under 
his personal command, Buller intended to relieve Ladysmith.
 135
  Initially the operation 
went well.  In the west, Lord Methuen’s 1st Division succeeded in driving the Boers back 
to the Modder River.  On 28 November they then successfully maneuvered 
Commandant-General De la Rey and Piet Cronje’s 3,000 commandos out of the 
defensive position they had taken up despite suffering significant losses in the process.
136
  
The strategic success at Modder River notwithstanding, the ratio of the comparative troop 
strengths and the casualty numbers would become characteristic of the early phase of the 
war.  In the east, the arrival of British reinforcements, along with the presence of Buller’s 
own column of approximately 21,000 men, had convinced Joubert to fall back to Colenso 
and focus on the siege of Ladysmith instead of pressing still further south toward 
Durban.
137
   
Then, between 10 and 15 December, in what came to be known throughout 
Britain as “Black Week,” the offensive turned catastrophic.  In the midlands on 10 
December, despite enjoying a two to one numerical superiority, Gatacre’s 3rd Division 
was utterly routed at Stormberg.
138
  The following day, Lord Methuen intended to follow 
up his earlier success at Modder River, and, with the aid of reinforcements from the 3
rd
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Highland Brigade, he struck with 13,000 men at De la Rey’s new position at 
Magersfontein Hill, which was held by fewer than 5,000 commandos.  The Boer forces 
easily repulsed Methuen’s attack, inflicting almost nine hundred casualties while 
sustaining fewer than two hundred and fifty.
139
  The most grievous blow came four days 
later in the east when Buller’s own column, which had swelled to 23,000 men, attempted 
to break through General Louis Botha’s force of 5,000 at Colenso.140  Here, as at 
Stormberg and Magersfontein previously, though severely outnumbered, the Boers 
enjoyed a decisive advantage in position and made full use of it.
141
   When the fighting 
subsided, the British had sustained as many as 1,500 casualties and lost ten pieces of 
artillery, while the Boers had at most thirty-three casualties.
142
  Among the British who 
fell was Field-Marshal Lord Roberts’s only son, Lieutenant Freddy Roberts, who was 
mortally wounded in an attempt to save several British guns from being captured.
143
    
Being used to the relatively short wars which had generally produced favorable 
outcomes with comparatively few casualties, the British government and public were 
completely stunned by the news of this string of British defeats.  In the first place, the 
casualties sustained in those fights were uncharacteristic for the British army.  While they 
did not rise to the level seen during the Napoleonic or Crimean wars, they were a stark 
contrast to the greater pattern of battles fought against native opponents during Victoria’s 
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colonial wars.  In those encounters the British were frequently outnumbered but almost 
routinely had suffered casualties of only a few dozen.
144
   
Despite Britain’s previous difficulty fighting the Boers, the public entered the war 
with utter contempt for their opponents’ capabilities.  H. Spenser Wilkinson recalled later 
that the public almost universally had believed that “a war with the Transvaal would be a 
small affair, resembling the autumn manoeuvres [sic] and lasting a few weeks.”145  To be 
sure, the British military had suffered other ignominious disasters at places such as 
Isandhlwana (Zulu War) and Maiwand (Second Afghan War).  While tragic, those 
instances could be rationalized by the public on the grounds that their forces had been 
vastly outnumbered by the enemy.   That the British enjoyed sizeable numerical 
superiorities at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso only made the defeats coming 
within days of each other all the more shocking and humiliating.  Chamberlain, in 
speaking before a concerned student body at Dublin’s Trinity College, referred to the 
events of Black Week as “the darkest hour.”146  Sir Arthur Conan Doyle called the week 
“the blackest one known during our generation and the most disastrous for British arms 
which has occurred during this century.”147  The effect of Black Week was such that J. L. 
Garvin maintained some thirty-five years later that “our national life and thought never 
fully recovered” from the shock of Black Week.148   
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  Finding it difficult to fathom how they could have been so easily repulsed, 
British officers and war correspondents frequently over-approximated the size of the 
Boer forces and the number of casualties the British forces had inflicted.  For instance, 
the Hampshire Telegraph reported that at Magersfontein the Boers likely had 12,000 men 
and that there were “heavy casualties on both sides.”149  According to a Press Association 
report of the same battle which was carried in the Bristol Mercury, “the entire 
Scandinavian contingent had been destroyed,” and the Boers had lost more than 700 men.  
Wounded Boers told the reporter that “the destruction wrought by the naval gun was 
enormous…All confess they suffered the greatest loss they have yet had during the 
war.”150  A reporter for the Times insisted “the loss of the enemy in mounted infantry was 
heavy.”151  Calling Magersfontein the “most desperate” battle fought thus far, the 
editorial staff of the Derby Mercury drew some comfort from the knowledge that the 
British artillery, though not destroying the “fine nerve” of the Boers, had “inflicted havoc 
amongst the enemy” as it “killed and wounded hundreds of them.”152  A correspondent 
for the Central News, whose reports appeared in the Mercury, recorded that “all [were] 
agreed that the total number of Boer losses [at Magersfontein] were over two thousand 
killed and wounded,” thus over-estimating by a factor of ten.153 As news trickled in from 
Colenso, rumors abounded in Bristol that Buller had succeeded in capturing 10,000 
Boers.
154
  In issuing their official reports two months later, British commanders continued 
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to assert that they had been confronted with much larger forces than they had anticipated.  
Indeed, the estimated size of the Boer forces had actually grown since the initial reports.  
Methuen’s report on Magersfontein, published in the London Gazette and carried by 
many provincial papers, maintained that there “must have been at least 16,000 Boers in 
front of him.”155  Buller reported after Colenso, that he thought “the force opposed to us 
must altogether have equaled our own!”156   
Amid reports of overall losses, British newspapers featured biographical sketches 
of prominent casualties.  The Daily News called the loss of Wauchope “irreparable” and 
gave a lengthy biographical account of his military service in the Ashanti Wars in 1874 
and his role in the expedition to save Gordon in 1885.
157
     In Scotland news of his death 
was met with “deep regret.”  In Edinburgh, for instance, the news “caused a feeling of 
distress and almost consternation,” to the point that the South Edinburgh Liberal 
Association adjourned after adopting a resolution of “deep and heartfelt sympathy with 
Mrs. Wauchope.”158 
Black Week also caused Britons to re-evaluate their impression of the Boers.  
Noting the public’s tendency to exaggerate the relative magnitude of the British losses, 
the Glasgow Herald offered a Social Darwinist rationalization when it asserted that the 
public could not compare this enemy to other recent foes.  The Herald maintained that 
the Boers were “not barbarians like the Ashantis or Zulus, nor half-civilised and half-
armed tribes like the Pathans of our North-West Indian frontier, or the dervish[e]s of the 
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Sudan…They possess all the intelligence of Europeans, and, what is more important, they 
have the advice of skilled strategists to aid them, and a full supply of the newest and most 
perfect missile-weapon.”159  Insisting that it was more appropriate to compare the 
engagements to those fought with European opponents, the Herald thus assured its 
readers that there was no reason to be pessimistic.  Likewise, dispensing with the notion 
that the Boers were anything but capable adversaries, the Manchester Times maintained 
that “truly they have nothing to learn from either German or French tutors.”160  
In his history of the war, Conan Doyle insisted that Black Week inflicted “an 
incalculable” blow to British prestige, and this conclusion is borne out through a review 
of the contemporary press.
161
  For example, the Daily News claimed that Methuen’s 
defeat at Magersfontein, coming as it did on the heels of Gatacre’s repulse from 
Stormberg, had led to great anxiety about the British position in South Africa.
162
  
Similarly, the Press Association observed that “an air of gloom deeper than any since the 
opening of the war…pervaded the War Office,” and the Aberdeen Journal maintained 
that the reverse of Methurn at Magersfontein, “following so closely after General 
Gatacre’s reverse, at Stormberg, produced a more dispiriting effect than the casualty of 
any engagement.”163 After calling Gatacre’s defeat at Stormberg “humiliating” in a 14 
December editorial, the Liverpool Mercury subsequently noted that the “serious reverse” 
suffered by Buller at Colenso “differed only in coming upon the public as an absolute 
surprise.”  Whereas Methuen and Gatacre had only divisions at their disposal and “were 
operating against enemies who were probably as strong numerically as themselves,” the 
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paper insisted that everyone had expected that Buller, “at the head of the main army,” 
would “produce decisive results.”164   
  Even though the Christmas season of 1899 was understandably gloomy, the 
papers emphasized that the situation was not completely hopeless.  Britons emerged from 
Black Week more unified and determined than ever in favor of the war.  Conan Doyle 
observed that after Black Week the Boers were no longer the piteous underdogs upon 
whom Britain had forced a war, and that peace meetings risked incurring a public riot in 
opposition.
165
  The Glasgow Herald was amazed that partisans would continue to refute 
the necessity of the war:    
Can any sane man regret that we have fallen upon a time so opportune in the 
politics of the world for a trial of strength with this great military power which we 
have discovered to be capable of disputing our hold of South Africa?  Every 
Krupp or Creusot that has rolled out of the Pretoria armoury has dinned into our 
ears the lesson that we should be thankful for the failure of our diplomacy, and for 
the international situation which has permitted us to throw our full military 
strength against a foe who has proved to us that he must be annihilated as a 
military power if the British flag is to wave over any spot from Cape Town to the 
Zambesi.
166
 
 
The Daily News anticipated that “this fresh check to the British arms will only increase 
the determination of the British people to see the thing through,” and that with the “very 
existence of the British Empire at stake,” the war had to be pressed “until the British flag 
flies from Johannesburg and Pretoria—places which will be reached via 
Bloemfontein.”167  Detailing the reverse of Methuen at Magersfontein, the Liverpool 
Mercury called upon the British public to persevere: 
All the fortitude on which the people of this country pride themselves will be 
required to enable us to face the situation with patience and with a fair allowance 
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for the difficulties that have led to the present crisis in the campaign against the 
Transvaal…For the soldiers no praise can be too high.  It is evident from their 
whole demeanor under trying and dispiriting circumstances that they remain 
undaunted and eager for the fight.  They have had to suffer a repulse.  The bravest 
troops are open to a temporary rebuff.  But their morale is, obviously, 
unshaken.
168
 
 
Public support had so shifted in favor of the war that Conan Doyle recorded that even 
“the only London daily which had opposed the war, though very ably edited, was 
overborne by the general sentiment and compelled to change its line.”169   
Notwithstanding support for the troops, newspaper editorial staffs had few qualms 
about attacking the government for its handling of the war effort.
170
   Thus, the Daily 
News warned the government after Magersfontein that future setbacks would not be 
readily tolerated by the public: 
British ministries which faltered and paltered with great emergencies have often 
found the country behind them in a different sense—the sense which Tennyson 
intended when he wrote: “You, you, if you shall fail to understand What England 
is . . if you should only compass her disgrace. . . . the wild mob’s million feet Will 
kick you from your place.”171 
 
Such criticism, however, did not initially extend to the performance of the military.  For 
example, the Liverpool Mercury insisted that the reverse at Stormberg was not Gatacre’s 
fault, but that “he was placed in a situation…in which he was merely a sheep for the 
slaughter.”172  Meanwhile, after Colenso, the Glasgow Herald called upon the public “to 
keep its head and trust the great soldier who commands Natal to repair his loss.”173  The 
public’s confidence in the military and its expectation that the government would respond 
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appropriately to the turn of events was bolstered with the announcement that Buller was 
to be replaced as commander in chief by Lord Roberts, who was to have as his chief of 
staff the much younger Kitchener of Omdurman fame.
174
  Observing that their 
appointments were greeted with “universal satisfaction,” the Liverpool Mercury asserted 
that their past resourcefulness justified “the country in forming the highest expectations 
of the effect which their advent will produce upon the course of events in South 
Africa.”175 
 Before Roberts arrived, however, Buller launched one further attempt at breaking 
through to Ladysmith in order to redeem his reputation.  Much like Colley’s ill-fated 
operation at Majuba Hill in 1881, the resulting battle atop Spion Kop (24-25 January 
1899) was another ignoble British defeat.
176
  After the arrival of Roberts in early 
February a series of British victories in quick succession turned the tide of war.  In the 
west, French broke through and relieved Cecil Rhodes and the British garrison in 
Kimberley on 15 February.  On 18 February French forced Cronje and his commandos to 
surrender at Paardeberg.  Ten days later, Buller, whom Roberts had retained as a field 
commander, finally succeeded in relieving Ladysmith, and on 13 March Bloemfontein, 
the capital of the Orange Free State, fell.  After taking time to secure the southeast part of 
the country, British forces renewed their northward march on 4 May.  Two weeks later 
British forces breached the last line of Boer defenses and relieved the very much 
beleaguered forces under Colonel Robert Baden-Powell at Mafeking on 17 May.  
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Johannesburg then fell on 31 May, and Roberts captured Pretoria five days after that.  
Over the next several months the last vestiges of organized Boer resistance were 
systematically hunted down, and on 26 October, the Transvaal was formally annexed.  
Afterward, the war descended into nearly two years of tedious and costly guerrilla 
warfare.
177
 
 The conditions within Mafeking had become appalling over the course of the 197-
day siege. Food was scarce and strictly rationed, with Baden-Powell ultimately diverting 
part of the rations from blacks to the white garrison.
178
  The details of the conditions 
within Mafeking were unknown to the British public, but news of the relief of the city 
caused an outburst of celebrations all across Britain nonetheless.  Writing to Milner, 
James Rendel reflected that when London heard the news, it was “mad with joy,…people 
were shouting, cheering, and singing in the streets in the High Street for half the night, 
and the scene at [the] Mansion House was quite extraordinary.”179  London’s Daily News 
reported that the news quickly spread from the city to the West End and resulted in the 
“wildest enthusiasm.”180   
Noting that the “unparalleled demonstrations” did not cease until daybreak 
Saturday morning, the Times speculated that Sunday would only be an intermission and 
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not the end to the exuberance.
181
  Of the celebration itself, the paper reported that on 
Saturday, “by common consent a public holiday had arranged itself, nemine 
contradicente.”  At 10 am on Saturday a crowd had begun to gather around the Mansion 
House and from noon to 3 pm throngs of people packed the area “singing, cheering, and 
throwing their hats in the air.”  At the same time, the celebrations did not emerge 
uniformly:   
Westward the scene was less noisy, but not less remarkable.  The striking feature 
of the proceedings was not enthusiasm, not excitement, and certainly not passion.  
It was the sense that however extravagant this conduct might have been at any 
other time, it was perfectly proper now in harmony with the spirit of the hour.  
White-haired old ladies, betraying no sign of emotion, were to be seen inspecting 
the shop windows of Holborn carrying a large Union Jack in each hand, and 
young women had the colours pinned across from shoulder to shoulder.
182
 
 
Poor children dressed in rags formed small regiments and marched in columns of fours 
up and down the street, and there was hardly anyone who did not display some form of 
the Union Jack either on their person or on their carriages.  Such displays 
notwithstanding, the Times insisted that the “real celebrations of Mafeking Day did not 
occur in Mayfield.”  The real celebrations emerged in the City up to the Strand and 
Trafalgar Square, in the suburbs, and in Whitechapel, Bloomsbury, Cambden-town, and 
Southwark.  “It was here,” the Times wrote, “that scenes were witnessed which have 
never been seen before in the history of the country:   
Perhaps a Roman triumph was something like this; yet there has been no triumph 
of war, and there was no vaulting over a defeated enemy; only the universal 
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spontaneous rejoicing at the happy end of the long seige of a little town of no 
strategic significance.  Women and boys were more demonstrative than many of 
the men.  Well-dressed young women of usually proper demeanor traversed the 
roadways arm-in-arm, six abreast, carrying flags, and occasionally bursting into 
song.  Ear-splitting sounds issued from every sort of raucous instrument, and 
noises which would have been offensive at any other time were quite agreeable to 
all concerned…Gutter children not satisfied with their performance on impromptu 
kettledrums, commandeered long broom-handles, to which they attached cloths 
and constructed a clever imitation of an ambulance corps, finishing the picture by 
laying the smallest of their number in the ready-made hammock and carrying him 
through the streets.
183
  
 
Outside Hyde Park, the home of Mrs. Baden-Powell, mother of the hero of Mafeking, 
was another center of public attention. Crowds decorated it with Union Jacks and a 
picture of the colonel, which was framed by newspaper bills which read “Three Cheers 
for Baden-Powell” and a banner with the word “Mafeking.” In the Thames, British ships 
docked from the Tower eastward were dressed.  Amid this release of pent up emotion, the 
Times reported that such celebrations belonged entirely to the general public and were 
devoid of any official display of celebration, as “Whitehall displayed never a flag.”184 
In Oxford, where the “glad tidings” arrived around 10:15 pm on Friday night, a 
large crowd gathered in the city center within the hour and engaged in singing patriotic 
hymns, carrying soldiers about on their shoulders, and bonfires and fireworks were set 
alight outside Exeter College and at numerous other locations around the city.
185
  In 
Bristol the celebration took on a more formal tone, as a “monster demonstration” 
numbering in the thousands turned out to support the lord mayor in doing honor to the 
“invincible Baden-Powell.”  In a tribute that the Bristol Mercury said could only be 
compared with a visit from the queen, 
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The whole city gave itself up to rejoicing, and right heartily did it go through with 
it.  There was necessarily very little time for arranging a programme, but what 
mattered that when everybody meant taking part, and was determined to do his or 
her share in fittingly celebrating the freedom of the heroes of Mafeking.  
Enthusiasm ran high on Friday night, but it was really only a rehearsal for the next 
day.  The deep feelings of pride and patriotism aroused by such a rare event in 
British history could not be spent in a few hours.  People woke up on Saturday 
morning—in many cases after a very short night’s rest, and the bright sunshine 
enhanced the gladness which reigned everywhere.  Flags were flying on all sides, 
and church bells rang merrily.  Being Saturday most of the shops opened as usual, 
but as a rule business was at a standstill.  Purchases were confined chiefly to flags 
and other decorative material.
186
 
 
Scenes in Scotland were equally stirring.  In Edinburgh, news of the relief of 
Mafeking was highlighted by a massive torchlight procession which marched from the 
Royal Mile across Waverly Bridge through the commercial district of Princes and George 
St. and concluded in the Castle Esplanade.
187
  In Kirkaldy, the occasion was marked by 
the ringing of the town and church bells.   
There was an unprecedented demand for flags, and before nine o’clock all dealers 
were sold out, while coloured ribbons and other fabrics suitable for decorations 
were also quite unobtainable.  By breakfast every shop on High Street was 
bedecked with flags and streamers.
188
  
 
Throughout the day the streets were filled with dancing and pipe music, and the 
celebratory revelry continued well into the night, with the town council contributing to 
the festivities by spending £20 on fireworks.  To a certain extent, in Scotland such 
displays took on a decidedly provincial bent.  One banner was “displayed in the shape of 
an old tunic from the Cameron Highlanders,” and another, being owned by the Gallstown 
Apron Society, was styled after a banner flown by Scottish soldiers at Flodden which 
bore the motto: “Fear God, honour the King with a long life and prosperous reign.”189 
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Not only did such celebratory expressions persist beyond the weekend of 18-21 
May, but they were not limited to the major metropolitan districts.  Donald Hodge, who 
was five years old in May 1900, recalled in a 1995 interview that in his village of East 
Peckham in Kent: 
We had a day's holiday from school, and the village celebrated it in due style.  
Some of the village men had old tire bells which they set alight, and poked them 
down the village street with poles.
190
 
 
Moreover, the general public was well aware that their local celebrations were part of a 
much larger national and indeed imperial phenomenon, as London and provincial papers 
alike noted their breadth and scope.  For instance, the Hampshire Telegraph reported that 
the jubilations were seen in “distant colonies, as well as in the smallest villages of the 
land.”191  More demonstrably, in an extra-large edition for 26 May, the Graphic 
highlighted the celebratory displays that had erupted across London, in Portsmouth, 
Glasgow, Liverpool, Hampstead, and Godalming.
192
  As details of the sieges became 
more fully known, at least for some the war had a sobering effect.  Rachel Cadbury, who 
was about six years old when the Boer war broke out and had been born into a wealthy 
Quaker family, recalled later her reaction to details of the siege of Ladysmith: “If war 
makes people eat rats, I am not for war.”193 
The exuberances surrounding Mafeking Night have traditionally been seen as 
spontaneous and a quintessential example of mass imperial support and pride in the 
empire.  Paula Krebs, however, has challenged this interpretation by emphasizing the 
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significant role played by the press in encouraging the public toward that reaction.  Her 
overall assessment of the events of Mafeking Night was that they were as much a 
demonstration of the power and ability of the press to influence the public and drive it 
toward a desired goal, as they were an outpouring of public support for imperialism from 
within the general populace and across the social spectrum.
194
  For instance, she points 
out that the relief of Mafeking rose to such an importance in the eyes of the Daily 
Express that it printed the first ever across-the-page headline by a London newspaper.
195
  
Moreover, as Jacqueline Beaumont’s study on the press coverage of the sieges has 
demonstrated, any manipulation of the public by the British press was in part due to the 
material being fed to them by the correspondents on the ground in South Africa.  In 
particular, in converging on Mafeking at the onset of the war, it was the correspondents 
who were responsible for focusing the attention of the press, and by extension the 
country, specifically onto Mafeking and its beleaguered commander at the expense of the 
other besieged towns.
196
  When vetted information was not readily available due to 
censorship or other reasons, in reviewing surviving reporters notebooks, and news 
accounts, Beaumont and Krebs have persuasively argued that the public interest in the 
sieges around Mafeking, Kimberley, and Ladysmith, made it easy for the correspondents 
and their papers to sensationalize reports from the South Africa and to “invent” news by 
speculating and reporting rumors and half-truths.  As, Beaumont has pointed out, on 
occasion this entailed the false reporting from the front of “brilliant victories involving 
                                                 
194
 Paula Krebs, Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire, Cambridge Studies in Nineteenth Century 
Literature and Culture, volume 23 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-31, 36-37. 
195
 Krebs, Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire, 13. 
196
 Jacqueline Beaumont, “The British Press During the South African War: the Sieges of Mafeking, 
Kimberley, and Ladysmith,” in War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, 1900-1930, ed. Mark 
Connolly and David Welch (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 2-6. 
212 
 
massive Boer losses, which later had to be retracted.”  Moreover, the dearth of hard 
information pertaining to the besieged towns only heightened public anxiety and interest 
in the sieges.
197
  
A NEW STYLE OF WARFARE AND PUBLIC OPINION, JUNE 1900-1902 
As the British offensive under Roberts slowly but surely forced the collapse of 
formal Boer resistance, the press and the public believed that the end of the war was in 
sight.  Indeed, Conan Doyle concluded his narrative history of the Great Boer War with 
the fall of Pretoria.  Even as the war with the Transvaal government came to a close over 
the summer of 1900, recalcitrant Boer commanders such as Christiaan de Wet were 
moving combat in a new direction via guerrilla campaigning.  Consequently, although 
Kruger went into exile and Britain formally annexed the Transvaal in October, the war 
itself would not officially end until the final surrender terms were signed on 31 May 
1902.    
The later portion of the war stands beyond the chronological scope of the present 
study, and has been the subject of several outstanding investigations.  Nonethless, a brief 
overview of a few of their conclusions is warranted.  In studying the war correspondents 
in the Boer War, Raymond Sibbald has observed that the press’s and the public’s 
attachment to the war noticeably declined as the war descended into a guerilla conflict.  
In the first place, papers such as the Times had seemingly grown bored with the war, as 
the outbreak and drama of the Boxer Rebellion and the siege of the foreign legations 
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supplanted and pushed the Boer War “from the forefront of the public consciousness.”198  
Maintaining positive public interest in the Boer War was made all the more difficult as 
the British government sanctioned measures, such as the construction of concentration 
camps and the internment of Boer civilian women and children, in order to reign in the 
defiant commandos.  Many, however, considered these measures to be morally 
questionable and to conflict with Britain’s time-honored traditions of “peace, good 
government, and the indivisible world rights of Englishmen.”199  The public’s access to 
information about such practices was also impeded by Kitchener’s decision to impose 
greater censorship on the press in order to demoralize the Boers.
200
  But even when 
information was available, many papers seemingly preferred to ignore the objectionable 
measures as much as possible.  For instance, while humanitarians such as Emily 
Hobhouse and Millicent Garrett Fawcett attempted to raise public awareness of the harsh 
realities of life within the concentration camps, the Times was largely disinclined to 
address the camps and did so only begrudgingly.
201
   
It is with some reluctance that we revert once more to the controversy of 
concentration camps for Boer refugees, which has been revived in the last few 
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days by the letters which have been sent from South Africa since the arrival in 
that country of Miss Hobhouse’s “Report.”  But in view of the misunderstanding 
as to the whole situation in South Africa which seem to possess the minds of Boer 
sympathizers in this country and elsewhere it is necessary to set forth once again 
the true aspect of the case, which have been too much obscured by mistaken 
sentimentalism and by an astonishing incapacity or unwillingness to recognize the 
necessities imposed by the peculiar character of the war in its recent stage.
202
 
 
In this instance, the Times insisted naively that the camps had largely been necessitated in 
order to provide effectively for the humanitarian needs of the Boer civilians who had 
been abandoned by the Boer commandoes.
203
   In fact, the Times only grudgingly 
addressed these controversial tools of war.  For instance, on 31 October the paper 
acknowledged that it would not be publishing a leading article about the justifiability of 
the camps.  It would instead present letters representing both sides on the question and 
thus allow its readers to make up their own minds as to which position was more 
convincing.
204
  But while the volume of war coverage declined in the summer of 1900, 
this should not be seen as a sign that the press or the general public were necessarily 
losing interest in imperial matters as a whole.  Instead, as Sibbald points out, in the 
summer of 1900 the public merely turned from the war in South Africa with a new 
international crisis—the Boxer Rebellion and the siege of the foreign legations in 
Peking.
205
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CONCLUSION 
The coverage of imperial politics by London and provincial papers between 1877 
and 1900 strongly suggests that the British public was not only well-versed in the issues 
pertaining to the country’s presence in the Cape to Cairo corridor, but that it was well 
aware of the debates concerning imperial policies during that period.  Moreover, the 
public formed its own opinions about such matters and voiced them accordingly.  While 
that voice may have been less pronounced at times when the empire was not imperiled, 
such relative quiet does not mean that the people had no opinion.  As we have seen, the 
newspapers did register their indulgence to the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 and 
their opposition to those who would stand in the way of the imperial civilizing process.  
But as the proclamation did not immediately result in a war or other serious calamity, the 
public’s engagement in the matter can be easily overlooked.   
Quite naturally, it was in times of crisis that public opinion became the most 
vocal.  As divergent (and closely held) ideological positions were brought to bear, the 
public digested the situations.  With conflicts of various sizes continuously popping up 
throughout the 1870s, ʼ80s, and ʼ90s throughout the empire, there were plenty of 
opportunities for the public to demonstrate its engagement in imperial matters.  To that 
end, public opinion was often fractured as political parties and the provincial press 
debated the merits of supporting or resisting imperial interventionism.  Although 
imperialism proved to be a highly divisive issue, both within Parliament and among the 
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general public, those experiences also served to bind the nation together through the 
collective experience of demonstration and debate.   
In examining the public expressions concerning the imperial conflicts which 
emerged between 1870 and 1900 in the Cape to Cairo corridor, it becomes clear that the 
degree to which the British press voiced its approval of a given military action depended 
largely upon how well the arguments for such intervention could be justified.  Moreover, 
we see that such justifications had less to do with economic opportunism, and more to do 
with the advancement of civilization, the preservation of British honor, the projected cost 
of the enterprise (both in blood and capital), and the pursuit of imperial security, both at 
the regional and the global levels. 
In the case of the annexation of the Transvaal, Carnarvon justified his actions on 
the grounds that such an action would lead to greater security for the Cape Colony and 
improve the civilization of the natives.  Given that the Boers proved incapable of 
mounting an effective defense, the British public largely acquiesced to the action with 
little opposition whatsoever, despite the questionable legality of Shepstone’s action.  It 
was only with the outbreak of the Zulu and the First Anglo-Boer wars that the public 
began to reconsider seriously the action orchestrated by Carnarvon and Shepstone.   
In turning the focus northward to the British presence in Egypt and Sudan, we 
have seen that similar issues again drove the public discussion. Wavering on whether its 
presence in Egypt was worth the financial and military investment, public sentiment 
became galvanized, but only to the point of relieving Gordon as a matter of national pride 
and honor.  It was only after thirteen years of observing Mahdist rule in the Sudan that 
the British public—as differentiated from military commanders—became convinced that 
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for reasons of imperial and international security British rule in the Sudan was preferable.  
Likewise, although the public was divided over the issue of whether or not to intervene in 
the domestic affairs of the Transvaal in the late 1890s, after the British government was 
able to redirect the focus from Jameson’s illegal interference to the defense of British 
honor in the face of Kruger’s intransigence, the majority of Britons—with the notable 
exception of a vocal pro-Boer lobby—united in favor of the war.  That unity would break 
down in the war’s latter stages.  
In the present review, the most explicit instances of public engagement occurred 
when popular sentiment factored in Gladstone’s decision to take action to save Gordon, 
and during the celebratory reactions to the relief of Mafeking.  In regards to the latter, 
there is much to be said for Krebs’s analysis and interpretation of that event.  And while 
the public jubilation may not have been “spontaneous” in the sense that the press had 
drawn the public into the sieges in such a way as to foster an enthusiastic response to 
their relief the newspapers did not send the people into the streets.  Although informed by 
the press, the public celebrations themselves were not manufactured by the press.  
Additionally and in looking beyond Mafeking Night, the press was not wholly 
responsible for manufacturing interest in the war, as the public took some ownership of 
its fascination in the war.  For instance, although the demonstrations following the relief 
of Mafeking focused largely on Baden-Powell, the predominant hero of the working class 
remained, as George Sturt noted in his journal, Sir Redvers Buller, despite his failures to 
turn the war during Black Week and afterward at Spion Kop:  
At 11 o’clock my men left off work, and could scarce wait to take their wages, in 
their eagerness to be off to Aldershot in time for the public reception of General 
Buller. 
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     Of all the men in the Transaal War, not even excepting Baden-Powell, General 
Buller is the favourite among our working men.  Their regard for him is almost 
passionate, in its jealousy for his honour.  They are determined that from them he 
shall have justice, whoever else may belittle him…the working class see a 
resemblance between Buller’s fate and their own.  At any rate he is their hero: not 
Roberts.  And so Farnham town is half empty today: even the fair looks a sort of 
desert.  The men have tramped off devotedly, to pay their tribute of admiration 
where they think it due.  It is but one more of many instances that the War has 
afforded, that our working people are hungry, starving, for a stimulus to their 
imaginations, to their emotion.
206
 
 
In following the war as a child, Donald Hodge, the son of a wheelwright, was also an 
enthusiast for Buller but for a more personal reason:   
One of the generals, who was operating in South Africa at that time, was General 
Sir Redvers Buller and his birthday coincided with mine.  So he was, if not my 
hero, a center of my interest in the Boer War.
207
 
Such hero worship was not entirely self-motivated.  Nor was it the sole province of the 
music halls, for as we shall see more fully in chapter five, the celebration of the British 
military as a symbol of the empire was deliberately encouraged by grammar schools and 
the press in an effort to instill imperialism and nationalism into the public’s 
consciousness.  
At the same time, the public displays on Mafeking Night did not suddenly emerge 
in the vacuum of the Second Anglo-Boer War.  Rather, in taking a longer-term view of 
the press’s attention to imperial matters in southern and northern Africa, one sees that 
frequent attention to imperial affairs had cultivated a public interest for at least thirty 
years.  Moreover, that interest was interwoven into a greater framework of public concern 
for and interest in the British military, both as an extension of British imperial politics 
and as the quintessential symbol of the British empire.  Just as Krebs and Beaumont note 
how the half-pennies and mainstream presses did much to foster an intimate connection 
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between the British home front and the besieged garrison at Mafeking, we have seen over 
the course of the last three chapters that further attempts were made at engendering the 
connection between soldiers and citizens.  To varying degrees, this was done by the 
mainstream presses, but certainly by illustrated presses, such as the Graphic and Penny 
Illustrated Paper.  Among the most prominent of these, as Robert MacDonald has shown, 
was arguably that which surrounded General Charles Gordon for his stand at 
Khartoum.
208
  But as we have seen, it could also easily include Wolseley, who was 
affectionately referred to by the country as “Our General,” and, to a much lesser degree, 
afforded to the slain at Isandhlwana and the survivors at Rourke’s Drift.   
In taking into account the broad spectrum of press coverage and the public’s 
awareness of imperial affairs in the Cape to Cairo corridor, Mafeking Night should thus 
be seen as a culmination of public interest in imperial matters, especially those involving 
the military.  As we shall see in the next two chapters, the public’s engagement in the 
politics of imperial interventionism transcended political questions about events on the 
imperial periphery and involved a concern for the place of the military establishment in 
British society.  Since at least the 1850s, the public was well aware of the impact of 
imperial interventionism on the military and the consequential need to reform its 
institutions.  As we will see, the content of the press and popular culture also suggests 
that imperial and military issues were becoming distinctly engrained, both on the national 
and the provincial level.      
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Figure 3-1: “Mafeking is Relieved,” Graphic, 26 May 1900, 759. 
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PART II 
MILITARY-CIVIL RELATIONS AND POPULAR CULTURE 
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 CHAPTER 4: 
IMPERIAL AWARENESS AND MILITARY REFORM: 1856-1900 
Public discussions about military institutions, which were critical components of 
interventionist ambitions, offer yet another window into conceptions of Britain as an 
imperial power.   Scholars have frequently emphasized the detachment of the British 
public from its armed forces.  Noting the paradoxical nature of that detachment, Gwyn 
Harries-Jenkins has contended that, while the public collectively celebrated the military’s 
victories and mourned its defeats, that interest did not translate into concern for the 
military’s well-being.  This apparent detachment was also noted by Cecil Norton in the 
Commons on 5 February 1904 when he stated: 
Over and over again when attempting to improve Army conditions they had had 
to speak to a practically empty House, empty press gallery, and unsympathetic 
public, and his sympathies had been altogether with the gentleman who had had 
the misfortune to be in charge of the War Office.
1
 
 
The public’s apparent disengagement from military issues also factored into Bernard 
Porter’s assertion that the repercussions of the empire did not “necessarily [affect] 
Britons’ ways of thinking.”2  Pointing to the Second Boer War as an example, he insisted 
that imperial circumstances, beyond offering a warning of future dangers, factored little 
into the calls for military reform.
3
  The supposed separation of the British public from the 
military has also been used to advance the argument that Britain, in contrast to Germany, 
was a non-militaristic society.
4
  But an examination of the national and provincial 
newspapers, as well as of more general interest magazines, demonstrates that discussions 
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about military matters and reform efforts received extensive coverage, calling into 
question assertions that the public remained oblivious to those issues. 
In pursing this inquiry, I have made the deliberate decision to focus specifically 
on matters pertaining to the British army.  This is not to minimize the place of the Royal 
Navy in matters pertaining to imperial and national defense.  The primacy of the navy in 
imperial and domestic defense was made abundantly clear in an 1867 Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine article entitled “Our Naval Defences: Where Are We Now?”.5  
However, as suggested by a piece in the London Society just six years later, the public 
was equally aware of the pressures on the army and the need to implement consequential 
reforms in that branch of service: 
In these days of Woolwich Infants, Bismarcks, and Affghan [sic] Boundary 
Questions, we are compelled to take more than a passing interest in the efficiency 
of the British Army.
6
 
 
Moreover, given that it was the army that bore the brunt of the fighting in the theatres 
discussed in the previous chapters, it is logical to focus on that branch of the service to 
tease out links between the military and imperial affairs.     
In fact, in the four decades after the Crimean War, army reforms received 
widespread coverage in the national and provincial presses.  The British Library has 
digitized more than fifty newspapers in print during those years, and a cursory review of 
that collection demonstrates that they carried almost four thousand articles containing the 
narrow phrase “army reform.”  Broken down by decade, the majority, some 2034 articles, 
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appeared between 1871 and 1880, years during which Secretary of State for War Edward 
Cardwell worked to reorganize the army.
 7
  In the Times, which has been digitized 
separately, hundreds of articles, letters to the editor, and editorials on army conditions 
and army reform likewise appeared in print between 1856 and 1899.  Such articles 
addressed, among other things, the readiness of the army, army organization, military 
spending, and marksmanship.  Not limiting their attention to reform issues, the national 
and provincial press also consistently covered more mundane military matters such as 
promotions, military reviews, and technological advances with military importance, and 
the results of inter-regimental shooting competitions, including those held annually on the 
outskirts of London in conjunction with the National Rifle Association.
8
  This coverage 
was provided not only by syndicated columns from the London Gazette, the official 
journal of the government, but by locally driven pieces as well.  The latter quite naturally 
paid particularly close attention to developments of significance in the papers’ 
distribution areas, but they also included matters that transcended a narrow geographical 
focus.
9
 
Another examination of the articles catalogued through the Periodicals Archive 
Online produced similar results, as hundreds of articles concerning contemporary army 
matters appeared in magazines and journals between 1856 and 1899.  The overwhelming 
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majority of these articles appeared in the Spectator.  Not surprisingly, other publications 
of note included those with an editorial focus on military issues such as the Journal of the 
Royal United Services Institution, but more general interest publications, such as the 
Society of Arts Magazine, Macmillan’s Magazine, and Contemporary Review, also 
carried relevant material.  Beyond the purview of that select index of periodicals, other 
periodicals of general and popular interest—including Fraser’s Magazine for Town and 
Country, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, and Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine—devoted 
space to a wide range of military and defense matters.
10
  If, therefore, the public was 
indeed disinterested in the military, it was not due to a lack of coverage in the leading 
newspapers and magazines of the day.  Of course, press attention to military matters and 
the empire, does not necessarily signify that the public was actively invested in those 
discussions.  But the volume of coverage indicates that the British public either chose 
deliberately to ignore the material and refrained from engaging it on an individual level, 
or that the public was not as ignorant about the goings on in the military as Porter, and 
others have maintained.  Indeed it is quite probable that the press was devoting 
substantial coverage to such matters in response to popular demand.  
Given the expansive nature of civil-military relations in the late nineteenth 
century, the present chapter focuses on a specific question: the extent to which imperial 
concerns entered into the public discussion on the need to reform the regimental system 
of the British Army.  The next chapter will explore how the military, as a symbol of the 
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British Empire more generally, became manifest in Anglo-Scottish popular culture.  
Aside from merely assessing the presence of imperial issues within British society, 
attention to the relative success of the Cardwell-Childers reforms serves as a window on 
distinct inflections of Britishness, as English and Scottish subjects expressed 
overlapping—if differing—conceptions of their roles as members of the wider empire.  
In the early twentieth century, historians such as John Morley, J.W. Fortescue, E. 
L. Woodward, R. C. K. Ensor, G. M. Trevelyan, and David Thomson, argued that Britons 
became aware of the need to reform their military after studying Continental wars, 
including the crushing defeat of France by Prussia in 1871.
11
  More recently, Thomas F. 
Gallagher, Brian Bond, and David French have placed greater emphasis on two other 
factors that drove home the need for army reform, i.e., Britain’s first-hand imperial 
experiences and the emerging inadequacies and limitations of the regimental system that 
became evident in the 1850s and 1860s.
12
  While the present author is sympathetic to that 
latter view, the specific prompts leading government officials to enact reform is a 
secondary concern here.  Instead, I seek to use an examination of the popular magazines 
and news presses from 1870-1899 to demonstrate that the British public was cognizant of 
both the full range of imperial, continental, and political concerns that called into 
question the effectiveness and efficiency of the country’s imperial defenses and of the 
consequent need to enact corrective reforms.   
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THE BRITISH PUBLIC AND ARMY REFORM, 1856-1871 
Prior to Cardwell’s reorganization of the military in 1871, the Crown forces 
consisted of four major bodies: the Regular Army, the Militia, the Yeomanry, and the 
Volunteer Forces, all of which were filled with volunteers.  To be sure, press gangs at 
various times resorted to compulsory practices and contrivances to “encourage” 
individuals to take the king’s shilling; those instances notwithstanding, as a matter of 
tradition—and after 1852 as codified law—the British military was firmly grounded on 
the principle that military service should be voluntary.
13
  In 1866-67 the Regular Army 
stood at roughly185,000 men divided into 31 regiments of Guards and Line Cavalry, 113 
regiments of Foot Guards and Line Infantry, and 2 Corps regiments of Royal Artillery 
and Royal Engineers.  Within their respective branches, Guards and Line regiments were 
then arranged according to a hierarchical order of prestige based on longevity of service 
and subdivided into battalions. For the infantry, the King’s Rifle Corps and Rifle Brigade 
contained four battalions.  The Foot Guards Regiments and the first twenty-five Line 
Regiments were comprised of two battalions, and the remaining Regiments embodied 
only one.  Enlistment in the Regular Army obligated a man to 10 years of service, but 
enlistees had the option of serving a further eleven years and receiving a pension.  
Regular Army regiments could be posted overseas at any time.  In keeping with the 
longstanding practice, a soldier could not be transferred to a different regiment without 
his consent.  Consequently, there was very little cross-over of non-commissioned and 
commissioned officers between regiments, and when it came to handing out promotions, 
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non-commissioned and commissioned officers were almost always promoted up through 
the ranks of the regiment to which they were originally assigned.  Taking into account 
that a great many commissions were purchased and not earned meritoriously, the quality 
of the officers from one regiment to the next could be uneven.  Thus, in addition to the 
challenge of filling out the ranks of the army with willing volunteers, the regimental 
system itself was rife with weaknesses.
14
 
The regiments of the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteer Forces supplemented the 
Regular Army.  The Militia served primarily as a home defense unit, and as such it could 
not be compelled to serve overseas.  Between 1752 and the mid-1800s, it experienced a 
number of transformations in terms of recruitment and length of service, such that in 
1866-67, the Militia had a strength of some 115,000, organized into 125 infantry 
battalions and 31 artillery units, the latter of which were relegated to coastal defense.
15
  
Recruitment was handled strictly on a county basis through the use of paid bounties, 
although the government reserved the right to use compulsion in the event of a national 
emergency.  Serving enlistments of five years, Militia members underwent several 
months of initial training, after which their regiments were required to report annually for 
a few weeks of refresher training.  Organizationally distinct from the Militia, but 
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operating under essentially the same principles, the Yeomanry in 1866-67 provided a 
reserve cavalry force of 49 corps, numbering about 14,000 men.
16
 
Last in terms of prestige came the Volunteer Forces, which had fallen into 
abeyance after the conclusion of the Peninsular War in 1814.  The government 
resurrected the Volunteers in 1859 amid mounting military and public fears of an 
impending invasion by Napoleon III’s Second Empire.17  Providing a secondary level of 
home defense, the Volunteers in 1866-67 numbered roughly 140,000 riflemen, 32,000 
gunners, 4,800 engineers, and 1,200 light cavalry and mounted rifles.  Like the Militia, 
the Volunteers were recruited on a county or local basis, a feature that had organizational 
implications: the recruits drawn from the country’s more populated urban centers formed 
86 fully manned “consolidated” battalions, while Volunteer leaders placed those from the 
more thinly populated rural areas into 134 “administrative” battalions.  Targeting married 
individuals who could not afford to leave their places of employment for even the 
relatively short time required by the Militia, the Volunteer force required evening training 
sessions and a couple of weeks of training each year.
18
  By the 1870s, the Volunteers 
numbered some 200,000, which included a sizeable working-class component.  This 
feature, Cunningham rightfully insisted, could not be ignored and required the older 
preconceptions about Victorian society and the patriotism of the working-class to be 
revisited.  The existence of the Volunteer Force, in such substantial numbers, did not go 
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unnoticed by newspapers such as the Illustrated London News, which insisted that its 
growth was a testament to the public’s awareness and dedication to national defense.19   
This then was the organizational structure of the British Army at the onset of a 
renewed age of imperialist ambition during the mid- to late-nineteenth century.  The well-
recognized and touted strength of the system was that the long terms of service of the 
Regular Army combined with the solidarity and insularity of the regiments to create a 
highly experienced military with a deep-rooted sense of esprit de corps.  Military 
commanders regarded these elements as crucial components of any effective military 
force.
20
 
Throughout the 1850s and 1860s, however, a number of weaknesses and 
inadequacies of the regimental system became apparent and raised concerns in relation to 
the actions of Continental powers.  The military’s poor performance in the Crimean War 
and slow response to the Sepoy Rebellion, and the country’s inability to engage the issue 
of German unification exacerbated existing concerns about Britain’s readiness to respond 
overseas, including especially the need for an effective reserve system that could 
supplement the Regular Army when it went abroad.
21
  The disastrous charge of the Light 
Brigade at Balaclava dramatically demonstrated that the practice of purchasing 
commissions rather than promotion on the basis of merit could have fateful consequences 
on the battlefield.
22
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While the discussion regarding national defense and the need for military reform 
had begun as early as 1852 and had occurred primarily within military circles, numerous 
articles and reviews in popular publications enabled interested general readers to remain 
abreast of those discussions.
23
  In 1857 the Literary Gazette reviewed General Henry 
Wyndham’s recently published pamphlet “The Army and the Militia: a Letter” that 
maintained there was a need to abolish purchase and award commissions based on 
merit.
24
  That same year in July, Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country thought it 
prudent to provide its readers with a “brief historical sketch of the problems plaguing the 
militia system.”25  As a “nursery for army,” the Militia had been woefully ill prepared to 
lend its support to the forces fighting in the Crimea when called upon.  While the 
Continent’s reliance on conscription had no place in Britain, the author believed that the 
Swiss model of drilling the Militia in the towns and villages, instead of in regional 
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depots, would likewise engender greater military spirit among the British populace, and 
“secure a sufficient force to defend our shores.”26   
That Britain’s performance in the Crimean War illuminated the need to reform 
was also not lost upon the conscientious press and general public.  During the war, the 
connection had been made in two February 1855 editorials in the Conservative Aberdeen 
Journal, which boasted of the advancements already being undertaken by Lord Panmure, 
and opined that “no man living had done more to reform the British army than [Lord 
Panmure] the present war minister.”27 Proof of this claim included the improvements to 
the transport services and commissariat services, the appointment of a chief of the staff to 
oversee the efficiency of the service, the call for an official inquiry into the state of the 
army in the Crimea, and of the recent discussion in parliament about shortening the terms 
of service.  That same month, however, “A Retired Officer” wrote to the Daily News 
maintaining that, while the organization of the British Army was superior to that of the 
French, the forces were undermined by the practice of purchase.  It “saps the very vitals 
of the service, stagnates its blood, paralyzes its limbs, degenerates and degrades its mind, 
and fills it with corruption.”28  Less than a month later, “A Foreign Observer,” also 
writing to the Daily News, strongly disputed the soundness of the organization of the 
British Army:   
I can of course only smile when it is imagined that great improvements in this 
branch can be made by Palmerston, Panmure, and others.  All these do not see 
where the fault lies.  It is in the constitution, in the infatuation of your own 
perfection, in the slavery to fashion, in the want of nerve and intelligence in the 
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aristocracy, and in the general disorganization of the higher authorities, in all that 
relates to the army, and in the army itself.
29
 
 
Moreover the writer firmly doubted that any significant military reform could be enacted 
while the government was in the hands of Palmerston and Panmure.  The “Observer” 
blamed the Duke of Wellington for neglecting to reform the system and keeping the army 
as an “aristocratic institution for younger sons of nobility,” which he then did not 
properly train. The aristocracy, he argued, had proven “itself inadequate in the army, 
imbecile in parliament, infatuated in ordinary life, and it will now show itself incapable to 
save the country from loss of dishonor.”30 
Having been aroused by events in the Crimean War, the press continued to wade 
into the issue of military reform.  Writing to the Daily News, on 12 March 1857, one T. 
M. W. commended the government’s taking up the matter of low pay for enlisted men, 
but he deplored its inattentiveness to the “niggardly” pay for officers that had remained 
unchanged since the Restoration.  This oversight, he maintained, compounded the 
worrisome state of the officer corps, which did not know whether they would have a 
pension or advancement.  If remedied, however, the reforms would “increase the 
popularity of the military with the working classes.”31  Marveling that the “random 
manner in which the British army has hitherto been officered,” had “not become a 
reproach instead of one of the glories of the country,” the editors of the Scotsman argued 
that there was some value in striking a balance between those who saw reform as 
offensive and those who welcomed it.  To that end, they agreed with the position 
advanced by Lord Stanley that the practice of purchase should remain, but that some 
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commissions should be available for merit.  In this fashion the officer corps would be 
protected from being wholly overwhelmed by bookworms, and those who lacked the 
vigor for military service.
32
  Musing on the decision by the Duke of Cambridge, the 
commander in chief, to turn the senior department at Woolwich into a staff college in the 
winter of 1858, and anticipating future advantageous reforms, the editors of the Bristol 
Mercury specifically noted that the grumbling and debate over army reform likely would 
have continued for decades had the Crimean War not occurred.  That war had made it 
clear that going forward the military was to be much more than merely a force to silence 
the annual threats to domestic tranquility, but would be “the right arm of national 
security.”33 
In the decade following the Crimean War, these collective concerns led to a 
number of uncoordinated and ultimately ineffective attempts at reforming the army.  In 
1857, a parliamentary investigation recommended abolishing purchase and instituting 
meritorious promotions, but Parliament took no deliberate action at the time.
34
  Incentive 
for military reform was reignited after Prussia’s shockingly efficient victory over Austria 
in 1866.  Weighing in on issues surrounding military recruitment that November, the Pall 
Mall Gazette saw the debate over conscription as an example of the “political impotence” 
which had plagued Britain.  It argued the country risked showing signs of “conscious 
weakness and cowardice” by preferring to make minute policy changes rather than 
tackling the broader questions.
35
  While not fully endorsing conscription, the Gazette 
maintained that it would do much to raise the “moral tone not only of the army but of the 
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nation at large.”36  In light of the Continental developments, numerous military officers, 
such as Lt. Colonel T. St. Leger Alcock, argued that there was a need for the British 
Militia and Regular Army to account for the power of this new Continental force and to 
reform the nation’s national defenses accordingly.37  Fraser’s Magazine likewise 
revisited the problems plaguing the British military in a five-part series that ran between 
December 1866 and August 1867.
38
  In so doing, the anonymous author honed in on the 
short supply of recruits, which in his opinion was due to “the scandalous system of 
recruiting and the falling behind of the soldiers’ condition in comparison with that of his 
fellows of the same rank of life outside the army.”  Recruitment would continue to be a 
problem, he insisted “till we make the soldier’s position so valuable that without cheating 
or cajoling, men of the right stamp will voluntarily apply to be enlisted faster than 
vacancies occur.”  The solution was to raise the soldier’s status, improve their physical 
condition, and give them “more mental and moral freedom, and greater opportunities for 
distinction.”39   
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 In that environment Parliament passed the Army Reserve Act of 1867, which 
established a two-tiered reserve system that was meant to establish a total force of 
80,000.
40
  The initiative, however, utterly failed to produce the forecasted number of 
enlistments, largely because the meager enlistment bounties simply could not compete 
with civilian wage rates and were thus insufficient to offset the unpopularity of foreign 
deployment.
41
  This failure did not go unnoticed by the public.  Bemoaning the fractious 
and unprofessional nature of the British Army in comparison to the cohesion of the Royal 
Navy, “Centurion” reasoned in a letter to the Scotsman in November 1869 that because 
the various branches of the service were not trained together, they lacked uniformity.   
There were also “too many club-room generals who are a dead loss,” and the “true-
hearted duty officer” did not receive the encouragement or pay due to him.  At the same 
time, the author insisted that despite being awash in a mass of confusion, as it had been 
during the Crimean War, the country lacked “a military chaos, out of which a Carnot or 
Stein would speedily evolve an efficient system of national defence.”42   
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IMPERIAL WARS AND MILITARY REFORM 
Thus, despite their efforts, by the end of the 1860s advocates of reform, who—for 
more than a decade—had raised alarms about its performance in the Crimean War and 
who feared the potential threats of imperial France and, increasingly, the emerging 
Prussian-dominated German state, remained concerned about the condition of the British 
Army.  Numerous factors continued to inhibit the army from tapping into support from 
middle-class Britons.  Among the most salient were the lengthy terms of service required 
and the real prospect of overseas deployments, but a further issue discussed widely was a 
weakening connection between the civilian population and the military.  The result was 
that, as C. E. Trevelyan colorfully claimed in 1871, the Regular Army was drawn from 
“the froth and the dregs” of British society.  The “froth” consisted of the aristocratic 
officer corps, while the “dregs” from the lowest rungs of society filled out the rank and 
file.
43
  The deplorable performance of volunteer forces at the onset of the American Civil 
War compared to that of the Prussian conscripts in the initial phases of the German Wars 
of Unification caused still more questioning of the volunteer-based British regimental 
system.  Administratively, the nation’s finances also were severely strained by the costs 
associated with sustaining a pension program for retired noncommissioned and 
commissioned officers who had served for 21 years.  Next to the national debt, the Army 
and Ordnance expenditures were the largest part of the budget between 1864 and 1869, 
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exceeding Royal Navy expenditures by £4 million.  The bulk of these expenditures went 
to service the pension program.
44
 
Assuming control of the War Office in 1868, Edward Cardwell threw himself into 
addressing these concerns by pushing through a series of acts and Royal Warrants toward 
that end.
45
  The Army Enlistment Act of 1870 reduced terms of service from twenty years 
to twelve, six years in the Regular Army and six years in a newly organized reserve.
46
  In 
addition to creating a much needed veteran reserve, Cardwell also believed that the 
measure would prove an incentive to a “new class of recruit…entirely different from that 
which was now entering the army largely with a view to an eventual pension.”47  
Consequently, the act sought to decrease the financial strain on the annual budget 
incurred by the pension payments.  Further, with the passage of the Regulation of the 
Forces Act of 1871, Cardwell sought to improve the image of the army by allowing 
soldiers of bad character to be discharged.
48
  That same year, after much controversy, 
Cardwell eliminated the coveted privilege of purchase with a Royal Warrant.
49
 
The culmination of Cardwell’s efforts, however, was inspired by organizational 
elements from the Prussian Army.  The broad reorganization further facilitated short 
                                                 
44
 French, Military Identities, 12-13. 
45
 Cardwell was aided in this task by a team of progressive officers, whose names would become 
inseparable from Victoria’s Little Wars of the nineteenth century.  These officers included Colonel (later 
Field Marshal Viscount) Garnet Wolseley, Captain (later Earl Cromer) Evelyn Baring, Captain (later Sir 
Edward Bulwer, Captain (later General Sir) Henry Brackenbury, Captain (later Major General Sir) George 
Colley, Captain (later Major General Sir) John Frederick Maurice.  Some of these had served together with 
Wolseley as a part of the Red River Expedition in 1870.  Reunited by Wolseley in 1873, the group saw 
action in West Africa against the Ashanti.  Remaining associated thereafter, these officers comprised the 
core of the so called “Ashanti” or “Wolseley Ring” of officers.  Owen Wheeler, The War Office Past and 
Present (London: Methuen, 1914), 220-21; Field Marshall Viscount Garnet Wolseley, The Story of a 
Soldier’s Life, vol. 2 (Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1903), 255-56.  
46
 Army Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 67. 
47
 Wheeler, The War Office, 215-16. 
48
 Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 86. 
49
 Arvel B. Erickson, “Abolition of Purchase in the British Army,” Military Affairs 23 (Summer, 1959), 65-
76. 
239 
 
service recruitments and brought the Regular Army, Reserve, Militia and Volunteer 
Forces under the Crown.
50
  The result was the Military Forces Localization Act of 1872, 
which was augmented by General Order 32 of the War Office the following year.
51
  
According to the scheme, there were to be 66 recruiting districts, largely drawn along 
county lines.  Within each district, a pair of Regular Army battalions was to be linked 
together with two Militia battalions and the Volunteer Forces therein as an administrative 
brigade and serviced by a “Brigade depot.”52  The Brigade depot was to then serve as the 
recruiting center for the district and also function as a barracks for the Regular Army 
battalions and the Militia when the latter reported for training.  One intention for linking 
battalions was to encourage inter-battalion camaraderie; as such, the plan also allowed 
officers and men of linked battalions to be interchanged with no cost to the individual.  
At the same time, however, battalions were to retain their individual number and 
identity.
53
 
The Cardwell Reforms proved to be only the first in a series of ongoing reform 
efforts.  The imperial experiences of the 1870s in western and southern Africa, as well as 
in Afghanistan, highlighted the continuing problem of lack of preparedness in Army 
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battalions, which were losing their battle-hardened veterans due to the expiration of their 
terms of service and becoming increasingly comprised of young and unseasoned short-
service recruits.
54
  Coordinating the ties between Regular Army and Militia regiments 
also proved problematic, as evidenced in 1879 when, during the Zulu War, the vacancies 
that were created in British barracks by the departure of Regular troops were not filled by 
Militia regiments as Cardwell had envisioned.    
The practical problems associated with incompletely fusing the paired battalions 
together lingered until Secretary of State for War Hugh Childers completed the 
integration process in 1881.
55
  As a disciple of Cardwell, Childers, however, first had to 
reject the conclusions of a parliamentary commission that had recommended undoing the 
scheme entirely.
 56
  Instead, he proposed reforms which he thought would improve 
recruitment, professionalism and coordination.  He called for the age of enlistment to be 
raised from 18 to 19, with the expectation that it would subsequently be raised to 20.  
Although he kept the terms of service at twelve years, he addressed the question of 
professionalism by increasing the time spent in the Regulars from six to seven years, and 
reducing the Reserve commitment to five years.  All men liable for service in India would 
be required to serve eight years, after which they would serve four years in the Reserves.  
Childers formalized the connections between the Regular Army, Militia, and Volunteer 
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regiments by transforming those bodies into regiments comprised of four battalions, with 
two “line” battalions and two “militia” battalions.  The numerical system of organizing 
regiments was to be abolished and thereafter the regiments were referred to either by the 
county affiliation or other regimental moniker of the senior battalion.  The primary 
exemption was that four line battalions of the King’s Rifle Corps would remain intact.57  
For example, under the Cardwell reforms the 29
th
 (Worchester) Regiment of Foot had 
been linked to the 38
th
 (Herefordshire) Regiment of Foot.  Under the Childers reforms, 
which were finalized on 1 July 1881 with the issuance of General Order 70, the regiments 
were reconstituted as the 1 and 2 Battalions of the North Staffordshire Regiment.  At the 
same time, regimental ornamentations were redesigned to reflect the union of the two 
regiments and their respective traditions.  In this regard, special considerations were 
extended to some of the Scottish regiments; namely, the number of kilted regiments was 
increased from five to nine.
58
   
 Still later, Wolseley, as adjutant-general of the forces (1885-1890), was especially 
outspoken on the need to modernize equipment and arms, and in 1890, the Hartington 
Commission recommended that the position of commander-in-chief of the forces be 
replaced with a general staff which would be tasked with planning military operations 
and preparing the army for war.
59
  These efforts were effectively blocked by the the Duke 
of Cambridge, whose outlook toward the military had a staunchly pre-industrial bias.
60
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With Britain’s experiences in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) still fresh, two 
secretaries of state for war, St. John Brodrick and H.O. Arnold-Forster, tried 
unsuccessfully to overhaul the command and organizational structure.  Ultimately, Lord 
Haldane succeeded in carrying forward a reform program in 1909, just five years before 
the Great War broke out, placing military matters at the forefront of governmental 
attention.
61
 
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IN MILITARY REFORM, 1871-1881 
Although the fear of a French invasion all but disappeared with the demise of the 
Second French Empire, continental and imperial developments kept the question of army 
reorganization and imperial defense in the public eye.  Indeed, as the Aberdeen Journal 
noted in 1881, the public had been engaged in the issue of army reorganization for over 
fifty years.
62
  Ten years earlier, reacting to Cardwell’s plans in the politically charged 
environment of the Franco-Prussian War, the Bradford Observer, asserted that:    
The existing army organization is hedged in and fortified by innumerable 
privileges, and abuses strong with the strength of antiquity.  But the events of the 
war have so aroused public opinion that the government had no alternative save 
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to grapple with this difficult question.  And not even the most ardent enemy of 
bloated armaments will regret this, when he has mastered the leading features of 
the bold and comprehensive scheme of military reorganization which Mr. 
Cardwell unfolded to the House of Commons last night.
63
  
 
The paper optimistically reported that forthcoming reforms would be more expansive 
than had been previously anticipated.
64
  For the Birmingham Daily Post the key issue of 
the reform effort was not whether or how the Militia should be expanded.  In its opinion, 
those issues were being duly addressed.   Instead, a lingering and much overlooked 
concern was that the Militia needed to be effectively armed, supported, and officered:  
If the 120,000 men were called out to take the field, not a single battery would be 
ready to accompany them; nor could they reckon upon supply services of any 
kind, except in so far as assistance could be spared from the establishments 
provided for the Regular Forces…Consequently, to render our Militia effective, 
we should require at the least forty more batteries of field artillery, with other 
supports in proportion. 
The truth is that in the Militia we have literally not taken a single step 
beyond enrolling the men in regiments and putting rifles in their hands.  We say 
nothing about the difficulty respecting officers, because we hope that may be 
found to disappear in proportion as the Militia becomes a real army.
65
 
 
Four years later, however, the lack of progress remained troubling.  The London 
correspondent for the Bradford Observer expressed its regret that the patronizing 
comments made by the Duke of Cambridge at a public dinner on behalf of army reform 
would lead to nothing upon his return to the Horse Guards:    
That this is so is the unanimous verdict of every one, civilian or military man, 
who has attempted to obtain the duke’s help to lift the army question out of the rut 
into which it has fallen.  The truth is that His Royal Highness, the commander in 
chief of the forces, loves red tape, pipe-clay and routine as only a German, who 
has never been scared by Moltke or Blumenthal can love them.  He hates any 
change which will in the least disturb the peaceful system of seniority by which to 
govern and promote requires but the diligence of an ordinary clerk.
66
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That the army was in desperate need of reform and could ill afford to permit any 
disorganization was also not lost upon the Bristol Mercury: 
The state of Europe is at present full of dangers to the maintenance of peace, and 
it is impossible to deny that events may arise which may force us to consider the 
condition of our armaments.  Next year, moreover, the first batch of soldiers 
enlisted for short service will be entitled to the discharge…and nearly 30,000 
fresh recruits—or about double the number previously needed—will henceforth 
be required annually to maintain the forces at their present strength.  If the War 
office has hitherto found it almost impossible to get more than 17,000 men yearly, 
it is obvious that the task of obtaining 30,000 is likely to prove insuperable.
67
 
 
While the Mercury observed that the War Office had not neglected the needs of Her 
Majesty’s forces, it insisted that more needed to be done to address “the economical [sic] 
and social advance of the forces that has taken place of late years in the condition of the 
working classes generally.”68  Speaking at a public gathering about the present standing 
of the army in Manchester on 10 January 1876, John Holms, a Liberal MP for Hackney 
and a leading advocate for reform, expounded on the “muddle and mess” concerning the 
realization of the process:    
As regards mere numbers, this scheme will involve an increase of one-fifth of our 
regular army and it will more than double our militia.  Now, what prospect have 
we of obtaining this large additional number of men?...But let us grant that the 
men can be got.  I will show that this scheme of mobilization is no more than a 
delusion and a sham.  Three-fourths of these army corps are to be composed of 
militia, which are thrown about in the most grotesque manner, as if to make 
annual trainings in the army impossible, and to ensure the wildest confusion in 
case of invasion…Are we to understand that the War Department seriously intend 
that all these regiments of militia from the extreme corners of Scotland and 
Ireland are to travel to Dorking and back, 1000 miles each every year, for their 
annual training?  If so, what a scandalous waste of time and money this must 
involve…Could you image a schoolboy concocting a scheme of mobilization 
more silly or more absurd?
69
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Three years later, in February 1879, when the Duke of Cambridge reviewed the 
six regiments being deployed to fight in the Zulu War the occasion offered a poignant 
illustration of the army’s continued ill-preparedness.    According to the Times, men who 
had been moved from one regiment to another in order to fill out that regiment’s ranks 
remained in their old uniforms.  The effect was that many of the 91
st
 Highlanders had not 
yet been issued their customary trews.   Aware that the lack of uniformity did more than 
just create a less-than-smart appearance, the Times vocalized what many throughout the 
country likely thought about Britain’s military readiness.  It granted that a redistribution 
of troops to handle the Ashanti War in 1874 was perhaps to be expected and tolerable, 
coming as it did on the heels of the so-called “Short-Service Act” of 1870.  Now, almost 
nine years after that legislation, it asserted that “we have a right to expect that a certain 
proportion of our troops should be maintained effective for active service, so when a 
sudden call is made we shall not be compelled to adopt the shifty expedient of begging 
draughts from every regiment in the United Kingdom in order to dispatch a half-dozen 
infantry regiments out of the country.”70 
MILITARY REFORM AND PUBLIC REACTION TO MAJUBA HILL 
 AND THE ANGLO-BOER WAR (1880-1881) 
We have already seen in chapter one that the Anglo-Boer War of 1880-81 
affected the public’s outlook toward Britain’s colonial presence in the African sub-
continent.  In addition to raising questions about Britain’s imperial policies, the war also 
amplified awareness of several lingering weaknesses in the army.  The first of these was 
rash overconfidence.  Following the defeats at Laing’s Nek and Ingogo respectively, the 
Trewman’s Exeter Flying Post editorialized that Colley had made a mistake similar to the 
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one the army had made against the Zulus. He was guilty of fatally “despising a foe who 
can keep him chained to one spot, and kill or disable half of his troops whenever he 
commences action.”71  The Western Mail arrived at a similar conclusion after surveying 
Colley’s recent campaigns in the wake of Majuba Hill.  In an editorial entitled, “What 
Our Military Disasters Teach,” the writer mused that overconfidence alone did not 
account for recent failings.  Britain’s forces had been outnumbered and suffered from 
poor generalship, but the army was no stranger to such circumstances and had usually 
prevailed despite them.  The deeper truth, the Mail insisted, was based on years of 
fighting against outgunned foes, and it made the argument in racialized terms: Colley’s 
poor tactical decisions had been induced by “long years of easy victories over savages 
and Orientals.” These had consequently led to a general “deprecation of the enemy” and 
an overconfidence in the army’s ability to “undertake operations with insufficient 
numbers.”72  That being said, given the fact that the army was engaged with the “best 
marksmen in the world,” the Mail expressed confidence in the British soldier, insisting: 
The conduct of our troops appears to have been all that could be desired, and 
provided they are only properly handled, we have little to fear for the future.  But 
we cannot afford any more mistakes.
73
 
 
Other newspapers were not so optimistic about the overall performance and 
management of the army.  Even before Majuba Hill, where the accuracy of Boer 
marksmanship was put on full display, the author of the “What the World Says” column 
for the Hull Packet noted the sharp distinction between the British and Boer abilities and 
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wondered why the army did not draw together its best sharpshooters to meet the Boers.
74
  
Continuing in his observations, he fully recognized that “an old military power was being 
taught a lesson by a despised and presumably inferior foe.”  Quoting from the testimonies 
of soldiers in the field in South Africa, he wondered that the British soldier had not 
deserted because of their inferior equipment: 
The muzzle-loaders are simply a disgrace to the government; it is sheer murder to 
send men into the field with such… a newspaper would keep out more wet than 
the [tents, waterproofs, and uniforms]…the top-boots are already done for; and 
the men receive no pay since they were called out.
75
 
 
In the aftermath of Majuba Hill, such criticisms spread throughout the national 
and provincial press.  In an editorial entitled “Lessons the Boers Taught Us,” Reynolds’s 
Weekly Newspaper asserted that the blame did not reside with the individual soldier.  
Rather, it condemned the Duke of Cambridge and “those terrible barrack-square warriors 
with whom he is surrounded” for being “utterly destitute of the elementary requirements 
of warfare and even of the commonest of common sense.”76  Contrasting inept British 
training practices to those of the Boers and Germans, Reynolds’s insisted that it was 
imperative that all British soldiers be effectively taught how to shoot, but held out little 
hope that any soldier’s skill would improve so long as “royal dukes and brainless 
aristocrats [were] permitted to chalk out his course for him.”77   
The deplorable performance of the British solider in the field quite naturally drew 
the attention of military personnel.  “A. N. S. M.,” a self-described “old volunteer,” 
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concluded that if soldiers spent as much time in learning how to shoot as they did on 
goose-stepping and “other absurdities,” the performance of the army would be very 
different. 
How is it possible for mere lads,—callants—who have hardly ever used a rifle to 
meet in skirmishing such death-shots as the Boers, who have been trained to 
firearms from their very childhood?  They cannot do it—no, nor never will!78 
 
A. N. S. M.’s letter to the Glasgow Herald elicited a response from another “Volunteer” 
who likewise asserted that the British army should not become engaged on the Boers’ 
terms. 
The only thing is to take advantage of our superior resources, and provide each 
man in the skirmish line with, say, a hand grenade…I see no use of opening up 
the ‘goose-step and other absurdities’ at present.79  
 
Responding to a similar column in the Times, which insisted that Britain could make no 
graver mistake than to suppose that its troops required less training in shooting than those 
of continental powers, a military respondent expressed his hope that “our authorities have 
been awakened to the defects in this, now the most important position of the soldier’s 
drill.”80   
As we have seen, the reform of British marksmanship was not readily 
forthcoming.  The public had to wait for “Our Only General” (Wolseley) to be named 
adjutant-general in April 1882 for specific training reforms.  His appointment to that 
position came as no surprise to anyone.  Indeed, anticipating this action, the Pall Mall 
Gazette editorialized in November 1881 that his appointment would be a necessary 
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consequence of “the current state of the army.”81  At a celebratory dinner for naval and 
military officers of the Egyptian campaign, Wolseley admitted that his attention to 
military reforms had been delayed by his presence in Egypt.  He noted that there was 
much one could learn from that recent campaign, as it was the first in a quarter of a 
century that Britain had fought against an “army who was armed and disciplined 
according to modern ideas.”  While he could assure the public that the military had 
performed admirably and that the reforms already enacted had “made it the finest in the 
world,” preliminary steps were already under way to increase the efficiency of the 
services.
82
  The news that Wolseley had issued a syllabus for musketry training, which 
would be required of all ranks and officers, and which would include oral as well as 
practical examinations, was reported by provincial papers such as the Aberdeen 
Journal.
83
 
The list of grievances pertaining to the performance of the army, however, was 
not limited to poor marksmanship.  Reporting on the Army and Navy Gazette’s recent 
assessment of the performance at Majuba Hill, the Bristol Mercury seemingly concurred 
with the conclusion of its contemporary that British troops had ceased to be hardened 
soldiers and instead were performing as “boy-regiments.”  Accusing the authorities of 
“deliberately slaying esprit d’ corps, so that there is no moral influence to unite in a solid 
whole the stray and individually inferior atoms [of] which it is composed,” the author 
saw this as proof of the “evil results of Cardwellianism.”84  The defenders at Majuba 
were not entirely undeserving of criticism.  But the criticism was especially biting, 
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considering that among those at Majuba Hill were three companies of Gordon 
Highlanders, a unit that was regarded as being among the country’s best troops having 
been hardened by the wars in Afghanistan, the criticism was especially biting.
85
 
PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE CHILDERS REFORMS  
Nevertheless, the announcement of Childers’s reform program in March 1881 
elicited a hostile response from the military community, which made its objections 
widely known.  The Army and Navy Gazette charged that they would lead to the 
“demolishing of the British Army.”86  Localization had failed in the past, and the Gazette 
was confident that it would prove to be an equal failure in the future.  Moreover, in the 
paper’s opinion, the character of the scheme was “a pale copy of the organization of the 
German army.”87  Writing to the Morning Post, in what was probably an attempt to curry 
public sympathy for himself and to rally opposition against Childers, “A Major-General” 
sorrowfully claimed that his ability to achieve further promotion was being blocked and 
that his sizeable annum of over £1100 was to be reduced to £700.
88
    
Yet such lamentations apparently made little impact on politicians.  As the Liberal 
Pall Mall Gazette noted:  
Ministers and committees of all parties have agreed to the principle of short 
service with the colours and the formation of a reserve; and the slight change by 
Mr. Childers, for the sake of economy in relieving India, affirms the principle.
89
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The Conservative Aberdeen Weekly Journal concurred and wrote that “among rational 
and well-disposed members of the legislature there will be little demur to their 
acceptance,” and that “there should be slight difficulty in overcoming all opposition to 
the proposals.” 90 Recognizing the scheme’s popularity in Parliament, the Army and Navy 
Gazette admitted that for those who opposed the measure, their only hope lay in the 
continued uncertainty of the Gladstone administration and that upon being replaced by a 
Conservative, the next administration would then restore the “impaired efficiency and 
tarnished reputation of the British Army.”91   
The press, both Liberal and Conservative, also generally approved of the scheme 
in principle if not in its details.  The Pall Mall Gazette agreed with Childers that “the old 
system of long service in the army was dying out for want of recruits, while more than 
enough than are required can be got by short recruitment,” and decried the Airey 
commission’s conclusions as being completely warrantless because Cardwell’s scheme 
had never been given an adequate chance to succeed.
92
  The Bristol Mercury 
congratulated Childers for having “the mind of a true reformer” and for “steering a 
middle course between long-service and short-service:  
Upon the whole, Mr. Childers’s proposals must, we think, commend themselves 
to the common-sense of the nation.  The civilian mind is, of course, not able to 
comprehend the length and breadth of the right hon. gentlemen’s scheme; but 
there is a wise moderation about it which everyone can understand.  The army is 
not an institution upon which to try rash experiments; and Mr. Childers has 
entered upon his task with no revolutionary spirit…The proposed changes could 
not have come a moment too soon, and could not have been prudently delayed.
93
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The Aberdeen Journal insisted that the reforms were “important and well-judged 
changes,” which would immediately “enhance the comfort and efficiency of the men who 
fight our battles, and afford an additional guarantee for the loyalty and affection of our 
time-expired soldiers—a most valuable element in every civic community.”94    
The Daily Telegraph analyzed the proposal and dismissed the accusations of long-service 
advocates that short-service had proven its inadequacies on the battlefields of 
Isandhlwana, Maiwand, and Laing’s Nek.  Instead, the paper emphasized that Wolseley 
had the utmost confidence in the men who had served under him, and “found young 
troops equal to the work he has required of them, and that he is ready to go anywhere and 
do anything with them.”95 
Despite seeing the reforms as “a move in the right direction,” some papers, from 
both ends of the political spectrum, remained skeptical that they would achieve their 
stated goals.  Taking a decidedly Liberal view, the Birmingham Daily Post questioned 
Childers’s insistence that reform was necessary, since the apparent problems of previous 
years stemmed from imperial conflicts that should have been avoided in the first place.  
“The strong case against the Conservative ministry,” the paper argued,    
was that the wars and expeditions in which they had involved the country were 
without exception avoidable and unnecessary.  That the contests in which we are 
now engaged are unavoidable is true in a limited sense only, so far as they are 
compulsory and unwelcome inheritance of previous bad policy; but Mr. Childers 
or any other minister would seek in vain for popular sympathy or encouragement 
in any justification of the origin of the wars of late years, or any plea of their 
necessity.
96
   
 
The Times, meanwhile, approved of Childers’s proposals but insisted that the real matter 
at hand was in their implementation: 
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In design the changes may be pronounced worthy of approval; but to a certain 
extent, it is upon the loyal and thorough spirit in which they are to be carried out 
by the military authorities that the satisfactory realization of last night’s 
programme must depend.
97
 
 
The Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper, which approved especially of the decision to 
abolish flogging, was concerned that the measures did not go far enough to provide 
sufficient financial incentives to encourage enlistment.
98
  Drawing upon a report 
published by the independent-minded Statist, an article in the Conservative Belfast News-
Letter similarly argued that they were “entirely inadequate, and barely [touched] the 
surface of the defects of the existing system.”99  In its opinion, Childers made no attempt 
to “add materially to [the army’s] strength,” and thus it remained “absurdly small for the 
duties it is called to perform.”100  For proof of this, the News-Letter insisted the public 
needed to look no further than Childers’s decision to increase the eligible age of service 
to nineteen, and the lack of sufficient inducements to ensure that the requisite number of 
recruits enlisted.  At the same time, the News-Letter believed that the Regular Army 
needed to be expanded by a corps, and that further reforms should be implemented in 
order to improve the battle efficiency of the army, such as marksmanship.  Moreover, in 
response to Childers’s “decision that the country would bear the expense of such 
expansion,” the paper declared that it “did not believe one word of it.”101  
Notwithstanding the possibility that Conservatives may have been inclined to oppose 
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Childers’s scheme for political reasons and to win political points, that both Conservative 
and Liberal papers voiced similar reservations about Childers’s scheme and argued that 
the reforms did not go far enough, suggests that partisan politics may not have been the 
primary motivation for the press’s skepticism and criticism. 
The reorganization of the army created some tensions within the military, as 
junior battalions became fully amalgamated with senior ones.  One private of the 73
rd
 
(Highland Light Infantry) Regiment lamented that as a Londoner he did not wish to have 
his regiment joined with the 42
nd
 (Black Watch) Highlanders, simply because he objected 
to being forced to wear a kilt, and a sergeant in the 69
th
 Regiment declared that “we hate 
the 41
st
 already because we are joined to them.”102   
The loss of military tradition was a particular concern in Scotland, where the issue 
was not only important within the military community, but also among the general 
public.  Prior to the presentation of Childers’s scheme, rumors abounded that the 
Highland regiments—in addition to losing their regimental number and moniker—would 
be forced to exchange their traditional tartans for a newly designed and issued 
“government” tartan.  Taking the lead in opposing this measure, the Gaelic Society wrote 
to the queen on 9 February 1881.  Claiming to speak on behalf of the army and of the 
country, the Society petitioned: 
We the undersigned believing that we represent the national feeling of Scotland 
humbly petition that the tartan dress hitherto worn by the various Highland 
regiments as distinctive of the districts in which they were raised and in which 
dress they have fought with honour and glory in every part of the globe be not 
changed believing that such distinctive tartans add to the esprit de corps and that 
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such changes as are contemplated are contrary to the instincts of every true 
Highlander.
103
 
 
Two weeks later Mr. Frasier-Macintosh, one of the Society’s leading members, inquired 
of Childers whether a change of regimental tartans was being considered.  Childers’s 
response was that while any such change would only occur after full consideration, 
pragmatism and cost-effectiveness necessitated changes.
104
  When pressed further as to 
whether such changes would be brought before the House for debate, Childers replied 
that he hoped the explanations for the combining of two regiments would be sufficient 
and “would not render a lengthened debate on Tartans necessary.”105  Believing such a 
response to be completely unsatisfactory, the Society continued its efforts to impede the 
changes.  They were joined in this endeavor by civilian Highlanders who compiled a 
petition containing over 16,000 signatures in just five days, which included “his Royal 
Highness the Duke of Edinburgh, 66 other Scottish noblemen, a large number of 
members of parliament, the provosts and chief magistrates of 124 cities and towns in 
Scotland and upwards of 50 associations and societies of Highlanders in Scotland and 
England.”106 
 Such a development also did not escape the scrutiny of the Scottish press.  On 15 
February 1881, the Glasgow Herald maintained that “the strength of an army lies in such 
traditions as much as in its rifles and bayonets”: 
Take away the bagpipes and the tartan and you unnerve the right arm of the 
Highland regiment.  These things are to the Scotch soldier—be his native place 
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north or south of Tay—the emblems of all the gallant past, whose honour is in his 
keeping.
107
   
 
On 22 February the Conservative Aberdeen Journal charged that the elimination of the 
traditional military tartans in favor of a single government tartan would be a direct assault 
on military morale.
108
  Condemning the war minister for regarding the kilt “simply as a 
dress of cloth having curiously coloured squares,” and for not having any appreciation for 
the sentiments of the Highland soldier, the Journal went a step further by using the issue 
to illuminate the “despotism” of the Liberal Party:   
It is strange indeed to notice how despotic Liberalism invariably is when strong, 
compared to the reviled Conservatism, which is tenacious of old customs and old 
sentiments and of the rights even of the humblest.  The tyranny of the party comes 
out in unexpected ways, just as it has done in the tartan question at present…In 
short a Liberal with a majority at his back thinks he can do anything.  What is 
tartan that the Treasury should be bothered with varieties of it? or that clerks and 
storekeepers should have the “sweet simplicity” of wholesale entries in their 
books interfered with?  It was acting on theories of this sort which led the nation 
to be disgusted with the previous Liberal administration, and it is not to be 
wondered at that already in Scotland the attempt to “simplify” our army uniforms 
by abolishing all tartans but one has arrayed men of all parties against the 
proposal.
109
   
 
The Glasgow Herald also expressed concerns about the apparent lack of attention 
to the regimental histories.  In particular, it worried that the Childers reforms would unite 
the 26
th
 Cameronians and 79
th
 Cameron Highlanders for the sole reason that they both 
had Clan Cameron roots.  Although it admitted that to the uninformed observer such a 
union would be only natural, the Herald insisted that “a more ludicrous travesty could not 
be found.”  It asserted that every Scottish school boy knew that the Cameron Highlanders 
traced their lineage back to Jacobite Camerons, who had sustained 800 casualties at 
Killicrankie in following their chief Lochiel, the “Bonnie” Dundee, and the Stuart cause.  
                                                 
107
 Glasgow Herald, 15 February 1881, 4. 
108
 Aberdeen Journal, 22 February 1881, 4. 
109
 Ibid. 
257 
 
The lowlander Cameronians, on the other hand, had proven their loyalty to King William 
III at Dunkeld in 1689, a battle, which, as the paper reminded its readers, was equally as 
devastating to Highlanders as was the Battle of Culloden in 1746.   Despondent that the 
War Office was apparently not taking such issues into consideration, the Herald was 
nevertheless optimistic that the queen would not adopt any measure that would “do 
violence to the feelings of her Scottish soldiers.”110   
Much to the satisfaction of the Gaelic Society and the Scottish public, when the 
formal plan was presented in early March as a part of the Army Estimates, their earlier 
apprehensions proved to be wholly unfounded.  The amalgamated Highland regiments 
were formed from units which had agreed to become joined and to share a tartan that 
drew upon a shared heritage.  In the case of the Argyll and Sutherlanders, which had been 
formed from the 91
st
 (Argyllshire) and 93
rd
 (Sutherlandshire) regiments, the tartan chosen 
was closely associated with the region from which those battalions recruited and more 
accurately reflected the regiment’s Campbell heritage than had the former tartan worn by 
the 91
st
.
111
   
At the same time, Scotland’s military heritage was further enlivened in another 
way.  In 1809, believing that the kilt was distasteful among Lowlanders and detrimental 
to recruiting, six out of the eleven “Highlander” regiments were de-kilted and ordered to 
adopt the breaches worn by the rest of the British army.
112
  This essentially stripped them 
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of their Highland identity.
113
  Since then, these regiments sought to regain their Highland 
identity, but only did so in a piecemeal and partially successful fashion.
114
  It was only in 
1881 with the Childers’s Reforms that these regiments more fully regained their lost 
identity, as the number of kilted battalions was expanded from five to nine.   In turn, the 
financial cost associated with this change of uniform was mitigated by replacing the 
costly Highlander headdress, which “had no national origin,” with the “true national 
head-dress—the bonnet.”115   
The Scottish public was likewise pleased that the rumors that a Jacobite 
Highlander regiment was to be joined with a Lowlander and Covenanter regiment were 
also false.  Recognizing that under the Cardwell Reforms, the lowlander and Covenanter 
26
th
 (Cameronian) Regiment had been linked to the Highlander 74
th
 Regiment, the War 
Office committee subsequently joined the Cameronians with the 90
th
 (Perthshire 
Volunteers) Regiment to form the 1 and 2/Scotch Rifles.  Meanwhile, the Cameron 
Highlanders, refusing to adorn the tartan of the 42
nd
 Black Watch Regiment, were 
returned to their original 1750 status as an unlinked single battalion regiment.
116
 
The specific handling of the Highland regiments in regards to organization and 
dress is not insignificant, as it speaks to a number of key questions regarding the 
relationships between the military, government, and the public.  In the first place, it 
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illustrates the close ties that existed between the military and civilian communities.  It 
exemplifies that the Scottish public was concerned that the central administration would 
effect changes that would diminish local symbols of those connections.  It further shows 
that the central administration recognized such ties, took such concerns seriously, and 
worked to enhance those ties while still reforming the army. 
IMPERIAL AWARENESS AND THE “NATION AT ARMS”  
Alongside these sometimes heated discussions about how to realign the army, 
intellectuals and politicians also raised questions intermittently about whether Britain 
should implement some form of conscription and universal military training.  The belief 
that the public should receive some military training if not be compelled into armed 
service had been advocated as early as the 1850s.  Indeed by the end of the 1850s, 
individual headmasters began adopting military drill exercises in public schools, and a 
new organization, the National Rifle Association, formed for the “encouragement of the 
Volunteers rifle corps and the promotion of rifle shooting throughout Great Britain.”117  
Such developments caused William Ewart, a Liberal from Dumfries, to inquire in 
February 1860 whether Palmerston’s government had the power to implement such 
measures universally throughout the country’s schools.  The government responded that 
it had no such power, and that decisions relating to curriculum choices resided in the 
“local committees.”118   
Subsequently, some members of Parliament, intellectuals, and military officials 
endorsed the benefits of military drill and insisted that it should be more widely 
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incorporated into the country’s schools.  Addressing the National Association for the 
Promotion of the Social Sciences in 1870, Lyon Playfair, a former chemistry professor at 
the University of Edinburgh and at that time a Liberal MP for the Universities of 
Edinburgh and St. Andrews, maintained: 
School drill in military and naval exercises, besides their educational value in 
discipline and united action, sow the seed of the national strength in an 
economical way.
119
 
 
In 1875, in the wake of Cardwell’s reforms, the earls of Lauderdale and Richmond joined 
the Marquess of Landsdowne in a discussion in the House of Lords about military 
capabilities.  They expressed specific concerns about the physical fitness and military 
preparedness of young Britons and advocated drill as the “best form of gymnastics.”  
Lauderdale maintained, for instance, that it would most certainly prepare the nation’s 
young men for military service by instilling the “ideas of order, regularity, and discipline 
without which it was difficult to obtain fully-qualified soldiers and sailors.”120  He 
continued: 
If boys were to undergo a simple system of military training, the country would 
have a better class of men.  There was nothing boys liked best than playing at 
soldiers and sailors, and the effect of military drill in schools was to promote 
order, regularity, and cleanliness among boys.
121
 
 
More than a decade later, Wolseley addressed a Birmingham audience about the 
threats facing the Empire and the condition of its defenses.  And he declared his full 
support for universal military training:  
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We are too easy to believe that as in past centuries so we should in the future have 
ample time provided for us to enable us to create an army and navy when danger 
comes upon us…I earnestly pray that you will take home this one great fact—that 
you have looming over you at this moment a heavy war-cloud which threatens 
Europe as a nation…It is not that we wish for the professional enjoyment of 
seeing large armies and navies that we ask the military forces increased.  It is 
because we know how terrible and dreadful are its consequences, that we ask you 
to make this increase…I wish you to understand I am not advocating universal 
military service on military grounds, I am advocating universal military discipline 
and training on physical grounds, and therefore on essentially national grounds.
122
 
 
Wolesley was, in fact, a recent convert to the idea of conscription, but in addition to the 
purely military benefits of such a system, he spoke to the broader social and physical 
benefits that would accrue from its adoption:  
Those who would otherwise have grown up in unwholesome homes to be 
weaklings, poor, miserable creatures, with narrow chests and undeveloped 
muscles, leave their barracks, as I have said, healthy, well-developed men, sound 
in body, and fit to stand the physical strain of modern existence under its most 
trying conditions, and above all things, calculated to be useful members of society 
for the rest of their lives…The young man passes his two years in acquiring habits 
of attention, of order, and above all things, in acquiring that respect for law and 
order, which is the outcome of obedience to superiors, and of that practical 
training of the temper which obedience necessarily brings with it. (Cheers.)
123
 
 
During the 1880s and 1890s, such issues continued to be raised as the British 
military was engaged in various spheres throughout the empire.   As we have seen, from 
1882-1885 Britain was involved in Egypt and the Sudan.  Thereafter, in the context of its 
imperial rivalry with France in South East Asia, Britain was at war in Burma from 1885-
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1887.
124
  In 1893 a brief war broke out between Cecil Rhodes’s British South African 
Company and the Matabele in South Africa.  Britain fought a third war against the 
Ashanti in West Africa from 1893-1894 to establish its dominance in the area and to 
guard against German encroachment from Togo.  In 1898 concerns for the beleaguered 
position of the Italian colony of Eritrea at the hands of the Mahdiya spurred Britain to 
once again enter the Sudan.  And only weeks after the Mahdists were crushed at 
Omdurman, Britain found itself nearly at war with France over the strategically important 
fort at the headwaters of the Nile at Fashoda.  Throughout those years there were 
numerous other expeditions as well.    
Still, with the prominent exception of the Second Anglo-Boer War, these events 
did not directly lead to another push to overhaul the British military because the army 
handled these challenges without any major mishap.  True, Wolseley’s relief force 
arrived too late to save Gordon at Khartoum.  Its tardiness notwithstanding, the rescue 
force nevertheless performed admirably.  Although seriously tested and delayed, the 
camel corps had pressed on to Khartoum.   Moreover, despite Gladstone’s attempts to 
blame Wolseley for the failure to rescue Gordon, others blamed Gladstone for a 
vacillating policy and for delaying the army’s departure.   
But if the public was somewhat lulled by the commonplace nature of Britain’s 
“little” imperial wars in these years, as Farwell has maintained—the broader geo-political 
developments focused attention frequently on matters pertaining to imperial defense.  
That environment became ever more dangerous.  Britain’s longstanding imperial 
dominance in Africa was incrementally threatened, directly and indirectly, as the major 
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powers of Europe scrambled to carve up resource-rich tracts for themselves, and the 
empty spaces between imperial boundaries disappeared.  In addition, whereas France and 
Russia had been Britain’s chief imperial rivals throughout much of nineteenth century, in 
the latter quarter of the nineteenth century an industrially and commercially powerful 
imperial Germany was rapidly presenting itself as a serious threat to Britain.  Under 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, who sought international recognition of Germany as a world power, 
the seriousness of the German threat increased all the more with the commencement of 
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s plan to create a so-called “Risk Navy” in 1897.  
Despite the performance of the British military in the “small” wars of the 1880s 
and 1890s, therefore, alarmists saw the rise of Germany and the changing geo-political 
environment as having monumental ramifications.  Throughout the nineteenth century 
imperial rivalries, such as that which existed between Britain and Russia, had mostly 
provoked conflicts between European states and indigenous communities as the powers 
jockeyed for spheres of influence.  The key exception to this was, of course, the Crimean 
War.  But with the imperial holdings of the Great Powers coming into much closer 
proximity, the likelihood that a major war would directly involve the major powers and 
their colonies was believed to be increasingly likely.
125
   
In this environment a number of paramilitary youth organizations arose as 
products of disparate public interests—empire, national defense, and the humanitarian 
reformation of British society, the last of which was particularly an interest of the middle 
class.  The first such organization was the Boys’ Brigade.  Established in 1883 by 
William Alexander Smith, the Boys’ Brigade was intended to rectify the declining 
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attendance in church-related activities and to counter the perceived rampant hooliganism 
of working-class youths.  In order to attract interest and maintain order, Smith 
deliberately utilized military themes, such as company organizations, military drill 
instruction, military-style uniforms, parades, and marching bands, in addition to Sunday 
Bible classes.  Aside from being influenced by popular interests in the military, Smith’s 
choice to incorporate military motifs in his organization was almost certainly due to his 
own involvement in a Glasgow Volunteer Regiment, the 1
st 
Lanarkshire Regiment.
126
  
Other religious-based organizations soon followed: Gordon’s Boys Brigade (1885), 
formed in honor of the General Charles Gordon who died defending Khartoum earlier 
that same year; the Church Lads Brigade (CLB) and the London Diocese Church Lads 
Brigade (1891); the Jewish Lads Brigade (1895); the Catholic Boy’s Brigade (1896); and 
the Church Nursing and Ambulance Brigade (1901).
127
   
The first wholly secular youth organization appeared in 1899 when Lord Meath 
established the Lad’s Drill Association for the expressed purpose of arousing “the British 
nation to the serious nature of the problem of imperial defence.”128  By 1911 the military 
component and function of the Boys’ Brigade and Church Lads Brigade were recognized 
by Lord Haldane in the War Office, who extended to both organizations offers to become 
incorporated into Britain’s Territorial Cadet Force.  While the Boys’ Brigade declined the 
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offer, due in part to Smith’s influence in maintaining the organization’s character as a 
predominantly religious organization, the CLB readily accepted.  It subsequently became 
specifically linked to the King’s Royal Rifle Corps and a strong supporter of compulsory 
military service legislation.
129
   
In the competitive international environment at the turn of the twentieth century, 
imperial alarmists such as Sir Charles Dilke and Spenser Wilkinson encouraged the 
formation of the Navy League in 1894.  And shortly after, George Shee and the fourth 
Duke of Wellington established the National Service League (NSL) in 1902.
130
  To be 
sure, as Porter has noted, active participation in such organizations was very much a 
middle class activity, given the prohibitive costs and time involved.
131
  Nevertheless, the 
pageantry of these groups, such as the celebration of Trafalgar Day with the full 
participation of the Navy League after 1894, was conducted in full sight of the public and 
was duly reported by the press.
132
  To that end, membership and active participation in 
organizations of that type were only one, albeit a very visible, sign of the public’s interest 
in matters pertaining to imperial defense.   
At the same time, as organizations like the NSL pressed for the introduction of 
universal military service and encouraged the nation to become a “Nation at Arms,” they 
raised serious questions that transcended issues of military preparedness and challenged 
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Britain’s time-honored tradition of maintaining a volunteer-based army.133  They thus 
called for a complete rethinking of the relationship between the public and the state, 
which continued into the years of the Great War.  As parliament debated whether to pass 
conscription legislation in January 1916, Sir John Simon asked his colleagues if they 
were “prepared to begin an immense change in our society?”134  He was joined in this 
regard by Sir William Byles who likewise queried, “If we surrender our liberties, if we 
Germanise our institutions, will the war be worth winning?”135    
It is beyond the scope of this study to delve into the culture of Britain in the early 
twentieth century, but with such vital transformational questions at stake, it seems 
unlikely that Britons would be largely disengaged from such issues in the years leading 
up to 1914 as Porter contends.  An examination of the public discourse in regards to 
conscription throughout the mid- to late-nineteenth century strongly suggests that the 
public was not disengaged from the propagandizing efforts of alarmists to sway opinion 
in the years preceding the First World War.  As E. S. Beesly remarked before the 1892 
annual meeting of the Positivist Society, the general public both recognized imperial 
dangers and remained opposed to conscription: 
A war with one of the Great Powers to-day would throw us into the most terrible 
disasters.  Our vast empire not only did not give us strength, but was the cause for 
our weakness.  Our army was in India; for the purpose of defending this island we 
might just as well have no army at all, and keep the money in our pockets.  We 
had three choices before us; we must either have twice as large of an army, or we 
must forgo our empire, or we must be content to run a constant risk of ruin which 
might come upon us at any time in two or three weeks. The masses would not 
have conscription; the classes would not have the restriction of the empire; 
therefore we must have the constant risk of disaster.
136
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That the imperial alarmists were not speaking to a pliant audience, but one that had a 
mind of its own and thoughtfully rejected such measures, becomes apparent in surveying 
the reception that conscription and compulsory military training received in the 
provincial presses over the course of the mid- to late-nineteenth century.  
Responding to the attempt to create a ballot system in accordance with the Militia 
Act of 1852, Liberals such as Sir Frederick Peel, William Cardwell, Henry Rich, and 
William Williams viewed that provision to be akin to “conscription.”  As such, they 
maintained that it “should not be endured by the people of the country.”137  Insisting that 
he was more attuned to the sentiments of the industrious class than anyone else, Samuel 
Morton Peto, a Radical, assured his fellow members that they “regarded the ballot with 
great jealousy and dislike.”138  In addition to members of Parliament speaking on their 
behalf, members of the general public clearly engaged in the debate.  Not only were the 
parliamentary debates routinely covered by the provincial presses, but the public 
participated in numerous meetings devoted to the subject.  These included gatherings at 
Bristol on 24 February and 13 April 1852, in Manchester on 11 March, in Marylebone on 
13 April, and in Liverpool on 21 April.  And the press covered all of these events in 
detail.
139
  For instance, at the Marylebone meeting, which featured Richard Cobden as a 
keynote speaker, the attendees resoundingly passed a petition in favor of two resolutions 
which denounced the bill as “oppressive to all classes of the community and injurious to 
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morals of the people,” and which deemed it as an unnecessary and “serious evil.”140  At 
Manchester, meanwhile, the public’s disapproval of the ballot measure resulted in a 
petition that was submitted to Parliament containing 30,000 signatures.
141
   
Fears that the government might implement conscription were heightened as 
advocates began emphasizing that the general public should receive some elementary 
military training in order to remedy the nation’s unpreparedness.  Such alarms were 
raised in 1875 amid rumors that Disraeli’s government intended to introduce legislation 
in the forthcoming session that would render all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 
and 40 into military service in order to resolve the ongoing recruiting problems.  While 
acknowledging that conscription would certainly correct the errors of Britain’s reliance 
on volunteers, the Ipswich Journal maintained that such a system was wrought with 
shortcomings of its own.  It would assault the nation’s productivity and would not, in and 
of itself, sustain military efficiency.  Finally, it constituted “a grave menace to the 
prestige of England.”142  On 1 June 1875 the Council for the Working Man’s Peace 
Association issued a warning in the Glasgow Herald which reminded all working men of 
the United Kingdom of what the “infamous institution” of conscription meant.  It entailed 
the “immorality of barrack life, the liability of foreign service in deadly climates, the 
slavish subordination of the soldiers to his officer, [and] the possibility of being called on 
to fight in quarrels in which you have no interest whatsoever.”  Conscription was, the 
Association concluded, “the deadly foe of industry, morality, peace, and liberty.”143  The 
Northern Echo likewise expressed its hope that “Englishmen still detest[ed] the principle 
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of compulsory military service; and that conscription is now, as of yore, a word at which 
every English heart revolts.”144    
Although some, such as Wolseley, insisted that universal military training was not 
conscription, the general public remained unconvinced.  In December 1872, Lloyd’s 
Weekly Newspaper responded to the calls by Lord Elcho and the National Rifle 
Association for universal military training to resolve the nation’s military unpreparedness 
by warning that such measures were nothing more than a deliberate step towards 
conscription.
145
  The link between military drill in schools and conscription was also 
addressed in a Penny Illustrated Press illustration which depicted Wolseley speaking at 
the Birmingham town hall while ranks of school boys carrying rifles and exercising on 
gymnastic apparatuses appeared in the background.  It was captioned: 
Lord Wolseley ‘hopes the day is not far distant when every school in the country 
will have a gymnasium attached’…Lord Wolseley Favoring Conscription in 
Birmingham.
146
 
 
The intended meaning of the Penny Illustrated Paper could not be clearer.  While 
Wolseley talked of gymnasiums, the implication and inference was that such activities 
were necessarily meant to prepare the country at large for military service and, 
ultimately, conscription. 
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Despite the assertions by advocates of compulsory military training or service, the 
public remained vocally opposed to it.  The Leeds Mercury argued in an 1886 editorial 
that it was premature to consider requiring military training because “the manhood of 
Great Britain” had never shrunk from military service when “the conditions of a political 
crisis proved that the use of the armed hand might be necessary to protect those things the 
man and the patriot holds most dear.”147  Although the Ipswich Journal contended in 
1888 that Britain ought not “allow our defenses to become less efficient than those of 
other nations,” it insisted that “Englishmen would certainly object to see this country take 
an ostentatious part in the now too favourite international game of brag.”  “Any great 
addition to our already costly armaments,” the paper concluded, “would certainly create 
an outcry against extravagant expenditure.”148  Responding to Wolseley’s call for 
universal military training in Birmingham less than a month before, and to an even more 
recent statement by Lord Goschen that “the patriotism of the country…would not refuse 
any necessary demand” for military expenditures to put “the defenses in a proper 
condition,” many of Birmingham’s citizens convened on 18 February 1889 to protest “a 
proposal for an enormous increase in military and naval expenditure and the imposition 
of forced military service.”149 The chairman of the meeting, Alderman W. H. Hart, 
insisted that military expenditures had only led to the great loss of life over the past fifty 
years, and to treaties that could have been signed without such costs.  He maintained that 
the greater danger to the country was “from the social conditions of many thousands of 
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the people in the large towns.”150 Less than a week later a similarly well-attended 
meeting in Leeds passed a resolution expressing its 
disapproval of compulsion in military service, believing it has seriously burdened 
the nations of the European continent, and is opposed to the liberties and the 
feelings of the British people.
151
   
 
In passing a second resolution against the “raising of war scares,” the attendees deemed 
that the current level of military expenditure was sufficient and condemned the proposed 
increases as being unnecessary.
152
  
Nevertheless, as two letters to the Morning Post published on the same day in 
1890 suggest, the debate about conscription remained part of the public discourse.  In the 
first, the pseudonymous writer “Non Sibi Sed Patriae” asked why, since the country 
already had compulsory education, it should not then require the men of the country to 
serve universally in a National Home Defense Corps.
153
  In the second, Lt. Colonel 
Aubrey Maude insisted that the military had to recruit men of better character who would 
then stay in the colors instead of leaving the service at the first possibility.
154
  Seven years 
later, a correspondent named Woolmer White wrote to the same paper, contending that 
“most satisfactory solution” to the question of conscription “would be for every man, say 
between the ages of 18 and 25, to be compelled to drill for two hours weekly, allowing 
him the choice of four days, which he would not be allowed to alter without proper 
notice.”155  
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Consequently, the public generally saw conscription as unwarranted, though there 
were those who recognized that some measure of military reform was warranted.  In this 
latter group was General J. H. Gascoigne, who wrote in the Morning Post in 1893 that 
conscription was entirely out of the question “except in the case of a threatened 
invasion.”  It would be much more effective, he maintained, to expand the Militia by 
means of a ballot to 500,000 men for the purpose of home defense.
156
  With an editorial 
entitled “An Alternative to Conscription” in 1898, the Pall Mall Gazette announced its 
support for Secretary of War Arnold-Forster’s proposal to increase the pay of enlisted 
personnel and to allow reservists to serve, at their request, in the line battalions of the 
regiment.
157
  Later that same year, the Aberdeen Journal acknowledged that voluntary 
enlistments were not meeting expectations, but it concluded that circumstances still had 
not yet reached the point at which a drastic measure like conscription was needed.  This 
was not a denial of the dangers threatening the empire; of those, the paper insisted it was 
well aware.  Rather, volunteerism had not been utilized to its fullest potential.  In the first 
place, more could be done to exploit the “martial spirit” of Scotland which had 
contributed so much to the empire, but had recently not fully contributed its share to the 
army.  In addition, it argued that the attention lavished on recruiting in London had 
overshadowed recruiting opportunities in the smaller towns and villages throughout 
England.
158
  
For still others, the matter of conscription was seen as an extension of the pursuit 
of ill-conceived imperial policies. In September 1895, shortly after Lord Salisbury 
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formed his third administration, the leading article in the Leeds Mercury responded to 
Joseph Chamberlain’s indication that conscription might be considered with the warning 
that:  
Nothing is easier or more childish than to treat such possibilities with levity.  The 
military party in this country is tremendously powerful and after the recent Tory 
victory at the polls it may lose its head completely.
159
 
 
The leader writer went on to remark sarcastically that, “Certainly the sort of 
foreign policy illustrated by the retention of Chitral will ultimately need the conscription 
and will double the national debt.  Imperial lying and stealing is a very costly business, as 
all history proves.”160  Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper echoed these sentiments when, in 
March 1898, a leading article lamented the imperial policies of the “Big Englanders” of 
the 1880s and 1890s.  By expanding the empire and Britain’s military responsibilities in 
Africa, Asia, and the Mediterranean and pursuing an “insane policy” toward Ireland, their 
actions had increased international threats, frightfully elevated war expenditures, made 
the poor still poorer with taxation, and drifted the country toward conscription.
161
    
The public’s standoffishness on the issues of conscription and compulsory 
military training can be extrapolated from the number of schools that adopted drill by the 
turn of the century.  Penn has calculated that in 1899 only about one-third of the nearly 
31,200 elementary departments had introduced some form of drill into the curriculum.  
Of these, only 2,659 (just over 8.5 percent) had chosen to implement military drill.  The 
rest resorted to various programs of physical education.
162
  Although individual members 
of Parliament and others continued to press for compulsion until and even after the 
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outbreak of war in 1914, the National Board of Education effectively closed the door on 
the debate in 1914 when it determined that “ordinary” drill, consisting of calisthenics, 
was the preferred method to be taught in school.
163
   
Given the public’s long-standing attention to military reform efforts, it is almost 
certain that the public remained engaged in the reforms that emerged in the wake of the 
Second Anglo-Boer War, which culminated with the issuance of Haldane’s 
reorganization of the army and War Office in 1909.   Moreover, a cursory review of the 
British government’s and the public’s reaction to the outbreak of war in 1914 is further 
suggestive of public awareness.  In the first place, in 1914 even the British government 
was stunned by Kitchener’s prediction that the European war would last far longer than 
the presumed couple of months, and that it would necessitate the introduction of 
measures, radical or otherwise, to raise hundreds of thousands of men for military 
service.
164
  Despite his shock at Kitchener’s assessment, Prime Minister H. H. Asquith 
had been deeply concerned about imperial matters and the maintenance and efficiency of 
the armed forces.
165
  Even if one could maintain that the public’s “absent-mindedness” 
about the empire had caused them to ignore the alarmists, then it was certainly 
remarkable that so many heeded Kitchener’s call to arms in August 1914.  Calling for 
volunteers, Kitchener hoped that 200,000 volunteers could be raised by the end of 
August; in fact, nearly 300,000 had responded.  In the week between 30 August and 5 
September, nearly 175,000 signed up.
166
 In the month of September more the 460,000 
more recruits had been raised, before sharply dropping off to the low- to mid-100,000s 
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over the next nine months.
167
  To be sure, as Niall Ferguson has pointed out, the rush to 
the colors was not fully representative of the nation as a whole, as some classes and 
regions of the country joined more readily than others.
168
  Nevertheless, taking the sheer 
number of recruits as a whole, the response definitely warrants a much closer look at the 
public discussions concerning the empire and imperial defense in the years and months 
preceding the First World War.  
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Figure 4-1: Penny Illustrated Paper, 2 February 1889, 73. 
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CHAPTER 5 
NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL CONNECTIONS WITH 
THE BRITISH MILITARY AND EMPIRE 
Up until now, most of the present work has been concerned with the press and 
parliamentary discourse concerning imperial and military politics.  In assessing that 
discourse, the continuity of political opinions from one side of the Anglo-Scottish border 
to the other suggests that the variances in perspectives regarding the politics of imperial 
intervention and war had more to do with the political and ideological alignment of the 
press and general public than with specific geographical or cultural considerations.  As 
the Glasgow Weekly Mail insisted after the declaration of war against the Boers in the 
October 1899: 
We have now to stand shoulder to shoulder, one solid nation, vindicating the 
imperial title to supremacy in South Africa.
1
 
 
Such rhetoric surrounding the imperial engagements in the Cape to Cairo corridor from 
the 1870s to the 1890s demonstrate that both English and Scottish commentators were 
concerned about maintaining national and imperial prestige, as well as with the 
ramifications of engaging in armed conflict.  Even as divisions emerged, they largely fell 
along party lines and were relatively unaffected by geographical considerations.   It is 
arguable, therefore, that variances in the reactions should effectively be considered as 
part of a broader “British” dialogue.   
On the other hand, the public discourse regarding military reform from the 1870s 
onward suggests that there were indeed some nuances in the way people in the different 
kingdoms approached the issue, and that the public’s engagement was not entirely 
uniform.  To be sure, there was a great deal of common ground as the respective 
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communities debated the necessity for reform, the type of reform, and the costs 
associated with reforming the military.  However, distinctions between the English and 
Scottish papers—and presumably their readers—became much more apparent as the 
ramifications of military reform impinged on areas deemed culturally significant.  The 
prime example of this noted in chapter four was the significant concern raised regarding 
the merger of battalions and the re-kilting of Highlander regiments as a part of Childers’s 
reform initiatives.  While questions about consolidation were raised by constituencies on 
both sides of the border, the cultural and historical implications were more loudly 
vocalized by the Scottish public.  In contrast, the concerns and protests which emerged 
from England over the matter generally came from those within the military 
establishment.   
The works of John MacKenzie and other contributors to his “Studies in 
Imperialism” series have done much to demonstrate that Victorian culture was replete 
with messages pertaining to the empire and to the military as a manifestation of national 
power and prestige.  In surveying that scholarship MacKenzie concluded:  
By the 1890s, it is clear, British society was saturated with nationalist and 
militarist ideas.  The queen and the army were moved to the centre of the imperial 
stage, a cult of heroes and a heroic national history was celebrated in popular 
literature and had infiltrated school textbooks, and the music-halls exploited the 
patriotic sentiment in songs and tableaux.
2
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As the above quotation implies, however, these works have tended to present British 
culture as monolithic rather than seeing it as a product of distinct regions that may well 
have viewed the empire through different lenses.  The result has been that, although the 
British public as a whole engaged with the same subject matter, the manner in which 
different audiences consumed, interpreted and considered those imperial messages to 
have meaning has been overlooked.  To be sure, that trend has begun to shift as recent 
scholarship has become focused on exploring and deconstructing the concept of identity 
in the British Isles.
3
  In turn, those studies have led to inquiries about how the British 
public connected to the empire at the provincial level.
4
   
For instance, Heather Streets has recently addressed the nineteenth-century 
concept that certain races were “biologically or culturally predisposed to the arts of 
war.”5  Specifically, she focused on questions of why Highlander, Sikh, and Gurka 
regiments attained a reputation for being among the empire’s fiercest warriors, and how 
that collective perception translated into a general ideology in Britain.  Examining 
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Roberts’s use of the popular press to advance the army’s initiatives, Streets has concluded 
that the military and the concept of martial races formed an integral part of late-Victorian 
culture.
6
  Building off of this insight, it stands to reason that differences would exist in 
the manner in which civilian communities related to the military.  As such, in addition to 
surveying the broad spectrum of popular culture and the integration of martially 
suggestive imperial motifs, this chapter will pay particular attention to the following 
questions:  How did the popularization and consumption of the imperial and military 
motifs manifest themselves on both sides of the Anglo-Scottish border to the other?  
Were there in fact, significant cultural distinctions at play regarding the integration of the 
military into the public sphere, as the discourse on military policy suggests?   
NATIONAL POPULARIZATION OF THE MILITARY 
Beyond the political discourses of the daily and weekly newspapers, as Jeffrey 
Richards has persuasively contended, British imperial juvenile literature legitimized, 
glamorized, and romanticized the wider societal interest in empire.  Designed to entertain 
and instruct its readers, juvenile fiction arguably had a deeper impact upon the reading 
public than any other direct forms of communication, such as speeches, sermons, or 
school lessons.
7
  As both Richards and Kathryn Castle have pointed out, the genre of 
adventure stories was particularly concerned with exemplifying evangelical and racial 
messages, and over the course of the nineteenth century, those messages became 
increasingly militaristic.
8
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Beyond juvenile literature, works aimed at an adult or general audience—
including those of poets, novelists, and journalists—were influential in highlighting the 
military’s exploits on behalf of the empire, even in instances of death and defeat.  
Tennyson’s epic poem “The Charge of the Light Brigade,” along with some of his lesser 
known works, including “The Charge of the Heavy Brigade” and “Epitaph on General 
Gordon,” stand out for their telling of British military actions in the Crimean War and 
Sudan operations.  
When can their glory fade? 
    O the wild charge they made! 
         All the world wonder’d. 
    Honor the charge they made! 
    Honor the Light Brigade, 
         Noble six hundred!
9
 
 
  Glory to each and to all, and the charge that they made! 
  Glory to all the three hundred, and to all the Brigade!
10
 
 
Warrior of God, man’s friend, and tyrant’s foe 
        Now somewhere dead far in the waste of Sudan, 
   Thou livest in all hearts, for all men know 
        This earth has never borne a nobler man.
11
 
 
Likewise, Thomas Campbell, Lord Macaulay, and Feclia Heman all wrote stirringly of 
past and present wars, while Rudyard Kipling’s barrack-room ballads such as “Hymn 
Before Action” and “Ford O’ Kabul River” did much to promote sympathy for the 
common soldier and the military profession in their efforts to defend Britain and the 
empire.
12
  In particular, such poetry found its way into literature that purposefully 
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targeted young boys, such as Frederick Langbridge’s Ballads of the Brave (1890), 
William Henley’s Lyra Heroica: a book of verse for Boys (1891), Arthur Stanley’s 
Patriotic Songs: a book of English Verse (1901), William Knight’s Pro Patria Regina 
(1901), William Caton’s Songs of England (1902), and James Fawside’s The Flag of 
England, Ballads of the Brave and Poems of Patriotism (1914).  While their titles 
conveyed their purpose succinctly, Henley stated explicitly that his ambition was “to set 
forth, as only art can,   
the beauty and joy of living, the beauty and blessedness of death, the glory of 
battle and adventure, the nobility of devotion—to a cause, an ideal, a passion 
even—the dignity of resistance, the sacred quality of patriotism.13 
  
And William Knight characterized his “small contribution to a patriotic purpose” as one 
that revealed “what is ‘true, and beautiful, and good’” about the Anglo-Saxon race.14   
The notions of duty, honor, sacrifice, and national pride that these refined writings 
articulated were supplemented by a plethora of music-hall songs such as “By Jingo,” and 
numerous paintings, such as Richard Caton Woodville’s “The Charge of the Light 
Brigade,” Lady Butler’s “Scotland Forever,” and Robert Gibb’s “Thin Red Line.”15  The 
combined effect of these expressions was the creation of what some referred to as a 
“fount of patriotism” and others as “mob passion” that permeated popular discourse and 
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transcended class divisions.  These forms of media effectively celebrated British 
imperialism and justified the United Kingdom’s colonial wars, all the while conveying 
the notion that it was not the British way to seek out war purposefully but to fight when 
the empire was challenged.
16
  As Krzysztof Cieszkowski has contended, Lady Butler’s 
piece “Floreat Etona!” visually exemplified Henry Newbolt’s call for Britons to “Play 
Up! play up! and play the game!”17  However, Carolyn Wynne has cautioned that 
Butler’s works—which the public received enthusiastically as celebrations of the empire, 
the army, and the common soldier—did not directly advance the “crude jingoism” of the 
day.  In fact, by her frequent focus on the suffering and tragic results of war, Butler’s 
works were “not always in harmony with the imperial Zeitgeist of the late nineteenth 
century.”18  An example of such a work would be “The Remnants of the Army, 
Jellalabad, January 13th, 1842” (1879), which depicted the disastrous retreat taken by 
General Elphinstone during the First Afghan War.
19
  The disconnect between Butler’s 
more complex engagement with military realities and public sentiment can perhaps be 
crudely measured.  As her biographers have noted, after making her initial splash with 
her breakout masterpiece “Roll Call” (1874), Butler’s reputation declined in the 1880s, as 
the more complex imperial themes of her works apparently affected public perceptions of 
                                                 
16
 Penny Summerfield, “Patriotism and Empire: Music-Hall Entertainment,” in Imperialism and Popular 
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her.
20
 Her story is an important reminder that scholars must be cautious about how we 
utilize art and literature as source material when drawing conclusions about issues as 
complex as imperial sentiment. 
 
 
 
 Figure 5-1: Engraving of Lady Butler’s “Floreat Etona!”21 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
20
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285 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Engraving of Lady Butler’s  
“The Remnant of an Army”22 
Imperial messaging of a martial nature was thus aimed at all ages and delivered in 
multiple media, including music halls, paintings, newspapers, and elite and popular 
literature.  Likewise, picture books brought such themes home to British youths even 
before they entered primary schools.  For instance, Frank Green’s Pictures for Little 
Englanders: a Companion to ABC’s for Baby Patriots, included rhymes such as: 
     The Union Jack          The Girl He Left Behind Him 
Wave John Bull Junior,   Little Boy Blue, go blow your horn, 
  Wave our British Flag!     To cheer up this Maiden all forlorn; 
The Terror of the Foreigner,   For her soldier laddie will soon return, 
  Despite his noisy brag.     But first his foes have a lesson to learn. 
 
The Army      The Navy   
When I was young and a grenadier,   Here are some British ironclads—   
  The sound of the drum was ever dear,       You must not mind a bit,        
But the only tunes that I could play    That taxes should grow heavier  
  Were “Forward! Boys,” and “Lead the Way!”      If but our Navy’s fit.23 
Similar lines also appeared in Mary Frances Ames’s ABC’s for Baby Patriots. 
                                                 
22
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 A  is for the Army     B  stands for Battles 
      That dies for the Queen;         By which England’s name 
   It’s the very best Army      Has for ever been covered 
      That was seen.          With glory and fame. 
      
  
D  is the Daring     N  is the Navy 
       We show on the field         We keep at Spithead; 
    Which makes every enemy      It’s a sight that makes foreigners 
       Vanish or yield.           Wish they were dead. 
     
Figure 5-3: ABC’s for Baby Patriots24 
Once in school, youths were exposed to texts, such as Cyril Ransome’s Elementary 
History for Schools and Charlotte Yonge’s Westminster Reading Books.  As Chancellor 
has shown, such works preached the idea that all citizens of the British Empire had a 
spiritual obligation and duty to defend its principles: 
Whoever does his or her duty to God, man and to the country is helping to keep  
our beloved old England in honour and safety.
25
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Taking the issue of patriotism one step further, C. R. L. Fletcher and Rudyard Kipling 
published a history textbook in 1911 aimed at young Britons that waded into the issue of 
universal military service, which we have already seen had not won general approval 
from their parents.  According to Fletcher and Kipling, one’s duty to God and country 
required all citizens to undergo military training and service in the nation’s armed forces: 
 But I don’t think that there can be any doubt that the only safe thing for all of us  
who love our country is to learn soldiering at once and be prepared to fight at any  
moment.
26
 
 
Most texts refrained from going as far as this, but they still spoke of duty and service to 
the nation in general terms, and as Chancellor has documented, history textbooks were 
highly jingoistic and ultra-patriotic in their language and subject matter.
27
   
That such messaging was indeed consumed by Britain’s youth is indicated by the 
recollections of Donald Hodge, a World War I veteran who grew up in the years after the 
Boer War:  
War had been a part of our background, in every sense of the word really.  When 
we learned history, it was a succession of kings, queens, and battles.  When we 
learned geography, the maps we saw were covered by crossed swords, which 
indicated a battle. … The Battle of Hastings, Napoleonic Wars, up to the Boer 
War. ... And when it came to learning poetry, school was all by rote.  We had to 
learn a psalm every week and periodically a piece of poetry.  And the poetry was 
actually scattered with battles ... We started with 'How Horatio Captained the 
Bridge.'  We went on to the 'Battle of Hastings,' and then to the Napoleonic Wars, 
and then the Crimean War, and then at that time the Boer War.”28 
 
As indicated by Hodge’s testimonial, elementary and secondary primers and history 
textbooks indeed proved quite effective in spreading martial sentiments to British youth.  
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By the turn of the century, history readers, textbooks, and juvenile literature consistently 
glamorized the exploits of military figures, such as Admiral Horatio Nelson and the Duke 
of Wellington, while elevating generals such as Henry Havelock and Charles Gordon to 
martyr status.  The consequent message was that such individuals were to be revered and 
emulated.
29
  In addition, Wolseley came to be regarded by the country as “Our Only 
General,” and the phrase “All Sir Garnet” became equated with success.30 
 British society’s draw toward military pomp is also evidenced by promotional 
materials for a variety of commodities.  Such themes frequently adorned advertisements 
for items such as Pattison’s Scotch Whisky.   That Pattisons’ whisky advertisements 
invariably depicted a kilted-Highlander regiment is a graphic illustration of Streets’s 
contention that the British public considered the military through a racial lens.
 31
  Aside 
from advertisements for commodities, military imagery was also the subject of articles in 
popular magazines if not the primary focus of the magazines themselves.  One example 
of such a publication was the monthly magazine The British Realm, whose cover 
consistently put provocative military images on full display.  The cover for the January 
1899 edition was representative of these images; it depicted a myriad of soldiers and 
sailors wearing uniforms from across the empire, effectively and vividly placing the 
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concept of a “British Realm” in a martial and imperial context.32  The magazine also 
addressed a variety of other popular cultural topics during its run from 1897 through 
1904.  While the attention to military matters in the immediate context of the empire 
might be fully expected, the public’s fascination with military pageantry was further 
suggested by the British Realm’s nonchalant inclusion of a photograph of nine-year-old 
Hugh Trevor Dawson striking a martial pose in its piece on the activities and membership 
of the Prince’s Skating Club.33  
 
 
Figure 5-4: Pattisons’ Whisky Advertisement34 
 
                                                 
32
 For example, British Realm 2 (January 1899), cover. Appearing alongside one another and against a 
backdrop of a militant image of Britannia and a naval vessel were a kilted Highlander, British soldiers 
wearing sun-helmets, and native soldiers from the Egyptian and Indian armies.  See Figure 5-4 on page 
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 British Realm 5 (February 1902), 48. See Figure 5-5 on page 291. 
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Figure 5-5: British Realm, 3           Figure 5-6: “Master Hugh Trevor  
(January, 1898), cover.           Dawson as the ‘Handy Man.’”  
        British Realm 5 (February, 1902), 48. 
The proliferation of such martial attitudes and sentiments in British society led the 
social historian J. A. Mangan to conclude that, by the turn of the twentieth century, war 
was widely viewed as a “sacred path to moral purity, ascendancy and domination.”35  
Indeed, according to such materials, war was seen as a natural part of human interaction, 
not as something to be shunned, but rather as something to be accepted as a legitimate 
part of international politics. Despite those in society who frowned upon the cultural 
manifestations of militarism—including the pro-Boer factions discussed in Chapter 
Three—Howard has maintained that many in Victorian and Edwardian Britain had, by 
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the outbreak of the Great War, become largely desensitized to the horrific side of war and 
instead had embraced warfare as a determinant of the fittest nation and its right to rule.
36
  
Truly, so long as military institutions or outbursts of bellicism did not infringe upon the 
cherished notions of personal liberty and the British sense of fair play, military motifs 
had become incorporated into British culture.  
Provincial Relations with the Military and the Empire, 
 and the Return of the Iconic Highlander 
While there was much continuity in the way that the Empire and the British 
military were popularized and consumed, there were also some distinct regional 
manifestations of martial sentiment.  On the broadest level this was revealed in the 
language used by the press and public to discuss the nation in imperial contexts.   As 
innumerable instances in the past four chapters have shown, this involved the frequent 
conflation of “England” and “English” with “Britain” and “British” in English 
newspapers.  As Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose have contended, this conflation was one 
that was deliberately advanced as early as the late 1840s with Thomas Macaulay’s 
immensely popular History of England, a work that emphasized the rise and dominance 
of a distinct and heralded English nation.  Marked by a constitutionally limited 
government, free press, free speech, and the Protestant religion, Macaulay’s imagined 
English people and nation arose as homogenous entities.  Through its dominance of 
Ireland and a Union with Scotland, new groups were grafted onto England and became 
assimilated as English, with the periphery then being the contemporarily established 
Empire in the New World, the Caribbean, and India.
37
  With that understanding in hand, 
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subsequent investments in the Cape, the Transvaal, Egypt and the Sudan were to be seen 
and widely described and understood as English enterprises.   While this was to be 
expected from English newspapers, such conflations were also made by non-English 
writers as well, such as Sir William F. Butler, the Irish-born army officer who wrote 
extensively on his own military experiences in South Africa, Egypt, and Canada on 
behalf of “queen and country.” Butler consistently conflated “England” with “Britain,” 
and more often than not, showed a preference for the former over the latter.
38
  For 
instance, in addressing his role in the Second Ashanti War (1873-1874), Butler stated: 
A general and some thirty or forty officers of various abilities had landed on the 
most pestilential shore in the world for the avowed object of driving back a horde 
of forty thousand splendidly disciplined African savages, who had invaded British 
territory.  All the hopes founded upon the idea that the native races who lived 
under our protection in the forest lying between the sea and the River Prah—
Fanits, Assims, Abras, and others—would rally under English leadership to do 
battle against their hereditary enemies, the Ashantis, had proved entirely 
fallacious.
39
   
 
Writing about what the government’s reaction should be to the threat posed by the Mahdi 
to the stability of the Sudan in 1883, he contended: 
The English government were now alarmed.  One of two things must happen—
either the Sudan must be fought for with English troops and paid for with English 
gold, or it must be abandoned.
40
  
 
Later, in writing his history of Wolseley’s Nile expedition in late-1884, he referred to the 
mission as a “purely English matter,” despite the fact that Wolseley’s force included a 
number of prominent non-English battalions, specifically the1
st
 Royal Highlanders, the 
“Black Watch,” and the Gordon Highlanders.  Also present were battalions from the 
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Royal Irish and West Kent Regiment.
41
  At the same time, Butler also showed a 
pronounced preference for “England” over “Britain.”  In recalling the enormous weight 
and responsibility on his shoulders, Butler wrote: 
My wrong, if it was to be my wrong, meant the death of hundreds of men, the loss 
of millions of money, the utter failure in the eyes of the world of the most 
remarkable effort made by England in our generation.
42
 
 
In fact, in his account, The Campaign of the Cataracts, Butler referred to “England” 
twenty-eight times, but used “Britain” only twice.43  In Butler’s other works, such as his 
biography of Gordon, “Britain” appeared just as infrequently and almost never apart from 
the joined term “Great Britain.”44 
In stark contrast, as Esther Breitenbach explained in her recent work on Scottish 
missionaries, Scots consistently used the designate of “British” or “Britain” in 
conjunction with the activity of Christians and imperial administration.
45
  For example, 
she notes that the Free Church of Scotland Quarterly characterized Havelock’s efforts to 
suppress the Indian Mutiny as being “the noblest deed that ever God put into the power of 
a British soldier to do.”46  At the same time, the “English” descriptor in Scottish 
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discourses was distinctly different and only used when specifically referencing the 
language, though it might also be used in connection with the broader culture of the 
United Kingdom.  Breitenbach concluded that references to “English” society and culture 
included Scots and, where differences did exist, they highlighted those distinctions.
47
   
Indeed as Christopher Harvie has contended, the use of “Britain” and “British,” while 
politically correct was “too cumbersome a formulation for diplomats, merchants, and 
publicists to deal with.”  As a result, the use of “English” and “England,” which 
referenced the language and the predominant state became a “default position” that 
“Scots had to live with.”48  Moreover, he contends that the labels of “Britain” and 
“British” carried significant provincial connotations that were utilized by local chapters 
of country-wide organizations and clubs to designate their affiliation.
 49
   
Consequently, although “England” and “English” may have been the predominant 
label for the nation and its people, when it came to imperial affairs, the empire was very 
much a British enterprise.  As Paul Ward has argued, such language allowed Scots to 
emphasize their contribution to the nation and empire, of which many were fiercely proud 
and defensive.
50
  Thus, Breitenbach detected relatively little tension over the use of labels 
such as English, British, or Scottish while Scots served abroad, but she noted that 
sensitivity did manifest over their use within the United Kingdome itself.
 51
  As we will 
see shortly, many Scots expressed that sensitivity in the pages of the Scots provincial 
presses.  There, when labels pertained to Scotland’s place in the empire, Scottish papers 
preferred to use the word “British” rather than “English.”  
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Moreover, when looking at coverage of the military and its relationship to the 
general public, one can detect several patterns in the press.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
aside from giving attention to active military campaigns, my survey of the leading presses 
digitized by the British Library Newspapers, found that Conservative, Unionist, and 
independent papers in England were much more likely to offer coverage of the 
promotions, deployments, shooting competitions, and other happenings of district or local 
units and the Volunteers than were Liberal papers.  When they did, however, it was 
generally information gleaned from the London Gazette, the official government organ, 
and not resulting from locally generated reportage.  To that end, when they did cover the 
peacetime actions of the military, papers such as the Evesham Journal, Gloucester 
Standard, and Dereham and Fakenham Times, often focused on matters of national 
attention such as the grand scale maneuvers conducted on the Salisbury Plain in 
September of 1898 and 1899.
52
  When they mentioned noteworthy general officers or 
regiments, such as the reception of new regimental colors by the Scots Guards, the 
coverage of the English provincial papers generally reflected the national interest.
53
  Even 
so, some English papers, such as the Cheshire Observer, the Derby Mercury, the 
Hampshire Telegraph, and the Isle of Wight Observer, did consistently cover 
developments in the local Volunteer units, which frequently involved reports on shooting 
matches.  While such reports were certainly geared to informing the neighborhood about 
an event of local interest, the reports themselves were not necessarily written to engender 
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public affection toward the military.  More often than not they were merely statements of 
fact.
54
   
Such barebones coverage does not in itself mean that the English public was 
uninterested in military activities; indeed, scattered comments in local stories indicate 
that men and women were interested in military spectacles if nothing else.  The Pall Mall 
Gazette’s report on the recruiting march of the 2nd Battalion Devonshires in August 1895 
mentioned that such developments were “being watched with great interest in the 
country.”55  The brief notice on the Devonshires’ activity was subsequently carried 
verbatim by provincial papers such as the Yorkshire-based Huddersfield Chronicle, 
which served a readership well outside the unit’s recruitment area.56  Particular attention 
was paid to the Volunteers, because of the defensive character of the organization.  
Cunningham and, more recently, Walton have shown that men and women from all parts 
of the country and from all political backgrounds came out to watch Volunteers drill and 
train, and at times bestowed gifts upon the units.
57
  The personal and beneficial attention 
paid to military units by individuals notwithstanding, as Ian Beckett’s recent work on the 
Volunteers has concluded, public interest in the Force largely depended on international 
events.  As a result, in times of peace, the public was frequently indifferent to the 
Volunteer Force and derided those who were a part of it.
58
  At the same time, the tone and 
general substance of the press coverage suggests that the English public engaged 
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individual military units more as part of the national institution and less so for their 
distinctive provincial and/or local identity.   
 In contrast, Scottish papers of both Conservative and Liberal persuasions 
frequently covered such military activities, seemingly fostering warm connections 
between the military and the civilian communities. That attention may indicate that the 
bonds between the military and the community were particularly strong and particularly 
important in Scotland.  For instance, when the 2
nd
 Battalion of the 78
th
 Seaforth 
Highlanders, known as the “the Ross-shire Rifles,” marched into Dingall (Ross-shire) in 
August 1899 as a part of their annual recruiting tour, the Northern Weekly devoted nearly 
three full columns to the festivities surrounding the battalion’s arrival.  The battalion 
marched into town with their brass band playing “Rothesay Bay,” and the paper reported 
that they were welcomed by civilians who sang songs of “older days” that lauded the 
grandness of the regiment. Moreover, according to the report, many people were 
disappointed that they had missed the regiment when it took an unexpected route to the 
camping grounds on the far side of town.  In addition to covering the details of the event, 
the Northern Weekly reminded its readers of the lengthy and proud heritage of the 
regiment that traced back to 1777, listing the times and places since 1835 where they had 
been engaged.
59
  Similarly, the Liberal Fife Free Press announced the activities which 
were to accompany the Fife Artillery Regiment’s annual two-week training session, while 
the Unionist Edinburgh Evening Dispatch printed a full itinerary of the 1
st
 Battalion of 
the Gordon Highlanders when it left on a wide-ranging publicity tour.
60
  In the case of the 
former, the Fife Free Press berated the “unpatriotic” actions of certain members of the 
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Kirkcaldy Town Council, who had refrained from coming out in support of the regiment 
as it passed through.  The paper insisted that without the auxiliary forces, the country 
would be forced to bear the “yoke of conscription” and “bear the enforced militarism that 
was now part of the national life of the Continental states,” implying that to slight the 
Volunteers was a tremendous disservice to the country’s ideals, including the ideal of 
volunteerism itself which they ought to defend.
61
      
It is possible that such receptions and such coverage were mere testaments that 
Cardwell’s localization and linked-battalion reforms of 1853 had been more successful in 
tying the civilian population to the militia and regular army communities in Scotland than 
in England.  Indeed, the provincial press in Scotland was not oblivious to the connection 
between fostering that relationship and yielding new recruits.  Still, according to the 
Weekly Free Press of Aberdeen, translating that rapport to recruitment remained dubious 
at best nearly fifty years after those reforms were enacted:  
Everywhere the gallant regiment has been received with enthusiasm, and 
hospitably entertained.  It now remains to be seen whether the real purpose of the 
march, the acquisition of recruits, will be attained. There can be no doubt that an 
intelligent, well-behaved young fellow, on entering the army, may rely on 
securing speedy promotion, and may confidently hope to raise himself … to a 
very fair position.  Unfortunately … there still lingers throughout Scotland the 
feeling that a man who becomes a soldier is drifting downwards, and the great 
improvement that has taken place during the past twenty years in the treatment of 
the rank and file is not fully realised.  By-and-by prejudices will be dissipated … 
if only some assurance of steady employment could be held out to soldiers of 
good character on their discharge.  Certainly it is that Highland lads who think of 
enlisting could not possibly do  better than join the Seaforths—a regiment that has 
long been as highly distinguished for excellent conduct at home as for valour on 
the field.
62
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What is equally likely is that while personal aversions to taking the king’s shilling 
remained, the bonds linking the civilian and military communities in Scotland exceeded 
those in the sister country to the south.
63
  
A measure of this connection was the voluminous coverage of peacetime military 
happenings that transcended occasions where local life literally intersected with the 
military.  Papers such as the Unionist Aberdeen Weekly Journal, Aberdeen’s Liberal 
Weekly Free Press, and the Liberal People’s Journal, which circulated in various editions 
all around Scotland, all had serial columns dedicated to Scottish regiments for the 
purpose of keeping “the Scottish soldiers in touch with the people of Scotland, and to 
keep up that interest and connection which will tend largely in favour of recruiting.”64  In 
the case of the Aberdeen Weekly Journal’s coverage of the Highland Brigade, that 
coverage was not limited to the Gordon Highlanders, who were principally stationed in 
Aberdeen, but also included the Cameronians, Seaforths, Black Watch and other Scottish 
regiments who were barracked across Scotland.  And while these columns most certainly 
touted military exploits, they were also concerned with “sports and recreations, their 
barrack-room relaxations, and their shooting and marching exercises,” promotions, and 
other regimental items of interests.
65
   
Serials, such as James McKnight’s “Highland Battles and Highland Arms” in the 
Weekly Inverness, brought to the forefront incidents of Scotland’s more distant but still 
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treasured military past.
66
  Other serials brought attention to less well-known persons who 
may not have had ties to the local community.  These included individuals like Lt. A. M. 
Price of the 2
nd
 Lancers, who grew up in Aberdeen and received a Distinguished Service 
Order in 1898 for gallantry at Omdurman, or Mike, “an Irish private in Squadron M,” 
who recounted his exploits at the Battle of Omdurman.
67
  The People’s Journal likewise 
formed a serial around soldiers like Captain Henry MacDonald and Lt. Colonel Abraham 
Boulger, who had successfully risen through the ranks and were awarded with 
commissions.
68
  Such accounts not only served to personalize the military achievements 
of Scots and Scottish regiments, but since Boulger was Irish and had served in English 
units, it is arguable that such accounts helped to personalize the entire institution of the 
British army.
69
   
More significantly, after reading through some thirty Scottish newspapers, 
another genre that emphasized military themes became evident—the serial novel.  
Appearing in papers such as the People’s Journal, the backdrop for these romantic 
history and adventure tales was often events such as the campaigns in the Sudan, the 
Crimean War, or Waterloo, and their titles smacked of adventurism: “Fields of Fire,” 
“The Captain’s Bride,” “Into the Jaws of Death,” and “Field and Fight.” 70   However, 
much older themes, such as the Jacobite Uprising were also used for stories such as 
“Battle of Sheriffmuir,” “Kilmarnock’s Hussars, and “The White Rose – A Romance of 
‘Bonnie Prince Charlie’.”71  These themes were particularly prevalent in the Celtic 
                                                 
66
 Weekly Inverness, 3 June 1897, 3. 
67
 Weekly Free Press (Aberdeen), 5 August 1899, 4. 
68
 People’s Journal (Edinburgh), 22 July 1899, 3; 29 July 1899, 3. Price and Boulger were additionally 
acclaimed for being recipients of Victoria Crosses for gallantry in the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny. 
69
 Boulger served in the 84
th
 Regiment of Foot and 2
nd
 Battalion, York and Lancasters. 
70
 People’s Journal (Edinburgh), 1898; Bridge of Allan Gazette, August 1899. 
71
 Weekly Inverness, June 1897; Weekly Free Press (Aberdeen), July 1899; People’s Journal (Edinburgh) 
301 
 
Monthly, a magazine which ran from 1892-1917 and was devoted to the “History, Folk-
lore, Archaeology, Poetry, Biography, Antiquities, Art, etc. of the Highlands.”72   
These works were hardly unique creations of the late-nineteenth century.  On the 
contrary, they were reminiscent of one of Scotland’s greatest men of letters, Sir Walter 
Scott, who had similarly romanticized Scotland’s martial past in works like Waverly, The 
Black Dwarf, and Rob Roy in an effort to engender appreciation for the Highlands among 
his fellow Lowlanders.  As noted by Linda Colley and Hugh Trevor-Roper, Scott’s 
efforts fell short in the near term.  Lowlanders of the early nineteenth century generally 
sought recognition as gentlemen by adopting the ways, fashions, and customs of London 
society, and they were taken aback by the “tartanized” Highland clans who welcomed the 
visit of George IV to Edinburgh in 1822.
73
  Indeed, as Graeme Morton has argued, in 
stark contrast to the rest of Europe, nineteenth-century Scotland suffered a noticeable 
lack of nationalism.
74
  By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the frequent 
appearance of Highland themes, not only in Highland publications, where one might 
expect to find it, but in Lowland ones as well, pointed to a realignment in the self-
identification of the Lowlanders that coincided with the emergence of Scottish nationalist 
                                                                                                                                                 
July 1899. 
72
 Celtic Monthly: a Magazine for Highlanders, 1 (1892), 8. In celebrating culture of the Scottish Highlands 
and the Highlander diaspora, the magazine was keen to emphasize a Gaelic cultural revival.  However, the 
issue of Home Rule was seemingly not a driving interest of the publication.  Few if any articles were 
devoted specifically to the issue.   While the magazine mentioned the the issue of Scottish Home Rule in 
passing while commenting upon the broader contributions of Theodore Napier a prestigious member of the 
highland community, another article by one William MacKay, in an article that discussed teaching Gaelic 
in schools, specifically refuted charges by the Times that the Celtic Monthly was intent upon advancing 
Scottish Home Rule.  Mackay’s reasoning was that given Scotland’s small size, such a move was simply 
untenable and impractical.  “Theodore Napier,” Celtic Monthly 4 (April, 1896): 121; William Mackay, 
“Teaching Gaelic in Schools,” Celtic Monthly, 14 (September, 1906): 238. 
73
 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 15; 
Hugh Trevor-Roper, “The Highland Traditions of Scotland,” in The Invention of Tradition , ed. Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 29-31. 
74
 Graeme Morton, “What if? The Significance of Scotland’s Missing Nationalism in the Nineteenth 
Century,” in Image and Identity: The Making and Re-making of Scotland Through the Ages, ed. Dauvit 
Broun, R. J. Finlay, and Michael Lynch (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1998), 157-76.  
302 
 
organizations, such as the Scottish Home Rule Association (1886).
75
  Whereas 
Highlanders had once been shunned by Lowlanders for their martial ways, by the 1890s 
many Lowlanders gladly attached themselves to that identity and proudly claimed it for 
their own.
76
  In fostering this identity, the People’s Journal was arguably one of the more 
influential newspapers, as regional editions were published throughout the country from 
Aberdeen, Cupar, Dundee, Edinburgh, Forfar, Glasgow, Inverness, Perth, and Stirling, 
and its pages consistently celebrated and melded Scotland’s martial past and present 
contributions to the British imperial experience.   
Even while a romanticized heritage of the Highlands had begun to permeate the 
self-consciousness of Lowlanders via provincial publications at the turn of the century, 
the presses unique to the Highlands lauded Scottish regiments more avidly.  This 
distinction should not be surprising.  Ever since the union of 1707, the Highlands had 
been more closely identified with exuding a military culture than the Lowlands, an 
association that contributed to the concept of martial races.
77
  In the aftermath of the 
Union, Lowlanders largely relied on the model of England in their attempts to modernize 
the country, and their dedication to the Covenanting movement displaced soldiering as a 
central pillar of Lowlander identity.  The demise of any Lowlander militarism can also be 
accounted for by the Royal Navy’s drain on Lowland manpower and the fact that 
Highland regiments were much more homogenously filled with Scots, than were non-
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Highland Scottish regiments.
78
  Indeed, in a March 1898 article, the Weekly Inverness 
lamented the extra-Scots makeup of many “Scottish” regiments.79  
On this point, many Scots were fiercely proud of their martial contributions to the 
empire and were concerned that those actions should not be undermined by those who 
insisted that Britain was in reality Greater England.  Highland presses—more so than 
their Lowland counterparts—reacted stridently to English attempts to subvert, appropriate 
or otherwise minimize Scotland’s contributions to the empire and its place as a coequal 
partner of Great Britain.  Much to the consternation of thousands of Scots, including 
Scottish Secretary Alexander Bruce, 6
th
 Lord Balfour of Burleigh, Lord Salisbury was 
frequently and deliberately interchanged the term “England” for the broader term 
“Britain.” His blatantly prejudicial response to the 1897 Scottish Petition on this issue 
was particularly astounding:
80
 
The advantage of the use of the words ‘England, English, and Englishmen’ is that  
it has not any strict geographical interpretation, but is generally used for any 
inhabitants.  Its use is traditional and based on a long course of history.  It has 
followed the development of our literature … [and] it carries a clear idea to 
anybody’s mind, and it rests upon no interpretation of a statute, but upon a long 
established custom, it raises no jealous question of honour or pre-eminence 
among the various populations of the two islands.  While agreeing that the formal 
phrase ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland’ should be employed in all 
documents of strictly formal character,  
 
 
I do not think any advantage would be gained by attempting to modify the laxer 
practice which is instinctively followed by writers and speakers upon public 
questions.
81
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For patriotic Scots like Bruce, such slights and deliberate expressions of English 
hegemony could not be ignored.  On 17 February 1898, the Weekly Inverness raised 
objections to “English” being used interchangeably with “British,” which prompted the 
question of whether Scotland was losing its identity.  Coincidentally, but fittingly in the 
present discussion, the paper protested accounts where massacres of the 78
th
 and 93
rd
 
Highlanders in the Sepoy Rebellion and at Lucknow had been referred to as “English” 
massacres.
82
   
Likewise, in the Edinburgh edition of the People’s Journal from 23 July to 1 
October 1899, a series of letters appeared that debated the “Britain over England” issue.  
Driven by the ardent nationalism of John S. Rae and Malcolm MacGregor Campbell, 
much of the discussion emphasized Scotland’s contributions to and sacrifices on behalf of 
Britain, which were minimized by treating the nation as Greater England.
83
  Reflecting 
upon the celebrations surrounding the American day of independence, Campbell 
lamented the absence of such a day in Scotland. With a subtle reference to Scotland’s 
victory at Bannockburn, he called for Scots to demand the right to observe a national 
holiday on its “day of deliverance from the English yoke.”84  While the points of Rae and 
MacGregor were welcomed and appreciated by many, others—such as “Rob Roy,” a Scot 
from Perth, and A. E. Parker, an Englishman from Aberdeen—insisted that such “bluster” 
served very little purpose whatsoever.  The issue of a distinct Scottish identity was best 
set aside for the sake of national fraternity and unity.   Indeed, “Rob Roy,” an ardent 
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supporter of Scottish Home Rule, argued that that cause would be better served by 
dismissing the subject instead of fanning the flames of animosity toward the “hated 
English.”85    
That Malcolm MacGregor Campbell was a secretary for the Scottish Home Rule 
Association may suggest that this discussion and the broader effusion of military themed 
articles were fundamentally linked to the efforts of the Home Rule movement which 
arose between 1880 and 1914.  To this end, the press coverage of the Scottish regiments 
and their soldiers transcended the mere purpose of covering current events and providing 
public interest stories, as such topics also engendered a greater appreciation for 
Scotland’s participation in the empire and the British nation.  The product was the 
marketing of a self-conscious Scottish identity deeply grounded in Scotland’s military 
past and present, to a degree that in England was either minimized or completely non-
existent.   
Thus, in delving into the links between the public and the military, the provincial 
dynamics of British cultural militarism, and its manifestation in the provincial press, we 
find that those sentiments and connections may well have been much more deeply rooted 
in Scotland than in England.  As we have seen, both English and Scottish presses 
certainly reported on military happenings.  However, the attention devoted to recruitment 
marches and social occasions in Scotland was both quantitatively greater and 
qualitatively warmer, suggesting a different bond between the civilian and military 
sectors than existed in England.  Moreover, to the extent that martial attitudes and 
sympathies emerged particularly strongly in Scotland, they were notably molded and 
characterized by a strongly romanticized strain of Highlanderism, ironically using the 
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trope of a “martial race” in service to the Crown to undercut the very connection that 
such a race was meant to preserve.
86
  Thus, while the connection between the British 
public and the military received heightened attention in the cultural expressions of the 
later nineteenth century, those links were expressed distinctively in Scotland in order to 
serve, simultaneously and paradoxically, both regional and national purposes. 
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CONCLUSION 
 In surveying the public discourse concerning imperial events in the Cape to Cairo 
corridor and imperial military reform, we have seen that the issues of empire and national 
defense were interwoven and certainly not confined to the polished offices of Whitehall, 
the smoking rooms of the elite’s social clubs, or even the parlors of the middle class.  
They loomed large in the eyes of the public, evidenced by discussions in the provincial 
press and the manner in which Britain’s imperial army became fused into the fabric of 
Victorian society.  While Porter acknowledges that such messages became more 
prevalent after 1870, his central question remains whether those messages were enough 
to pull an “absent-minded” public out of its slumber and infuse it with a “general imperial 
consciousness.”1   
The present survey of national and provincial papers—a resource that Porter did 
not consult in his work—demonstrates that newspapers and popular journals, and by 
extension the reading public, were consistently attentive to imperial matters.  
Specifically, in matters concerning the Cape to Cairo corridor, there was robust 
commentary about Britain’s actions in South Africa, Egypt, and the Sudan across the 
political spectrum.  Furthermore, tangible evidence of the public’s engagement in 
imperial questions included the significant results of the 1880 parliamentary elections, an 
election rooted in Gladstone’s anti-imperial Midlothian platform, as well as the numerous 
public demonstrations that were held in response to imperial events such as the siege of 
Gordon in Khartoum, the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War, and most notably the 
relief of Mafeking. 
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Throughout these events, Conservative, Liberal, and Radical voices spoke of the 
need to defend the nation’s prestige and not to lose face in the eyes of its Continental 
rivals.  British prestige involved a myriad of principles associated with classical 
liberalism, security, and economic and diplomatic supremacy.  For the imperialists, the 
perpetuation of these elements often necessitated a vigorous foreign and imperial policy.  
It was on these grounds that Carnarvon and Shepstone coordinated the annexation of the 
Transvaal in 1877, a move generally supported by the press and politicians across the 
political spectrum.  In the 1880s, the need to uphold British prestige was at the heart of 
intervention in the Sudan, the public’s perception surrounding Gordon’s mission to 
Khartoum and the public’s demands for his relief.  In the 1890s, British prestige was 
again invoked by Milner and his allies to support the Uitlanders in the Transvaal and to 
legitimize the Second Anglo-Boer War.  Equally concerned about the nation’s standing, 
Liberal leaders and their press allies frequently opposed imperial interventionism on the 
grounds that it was detrimental to British prestige, as it proved to be an unnecessary 
distraction to the government, diverted resources, and pulled Britain away from its 
principled abhorrence of war, conflict, conquest, and subjugation.   
Looking at the spectrum of efforts at reforming the military and the engagement 
of the public, we find a great deal of continuity in the public’s engagement in such 
matters as far back as the mid-1850s.  To be sure, as international circumstances and the 
geopolitical landscape evolved, the potential consequences of military inefficiency and 
ill-preparedness became all the more serious.  The British government was forced to shift 
its attention from having to contend mostly with pre-industrial armies on the imperial 
periphery to the highly industrialized powers of continental Europe.  The result was that 
309 
 
the consequences of military inefficiency and ill-preparedness became all the more 
apparent and led some to advocate more radical solutions, such as conscription.  To that 
end, Porter saw the propagandizing of Britain’s imperial perils by the imperialists in the 
early 1900s as an effort to awaken the British public out of a slumber.  He concluded that 
the sheer weight of their effort was indicative of the new imperial threat and the 
unsatisfactory state of the public’s attention to it.  As to the question of whether the 
public was convinced by it, Porter offered two possible and admittedly contradictory 
deductions.  While he allowed that it was possible that the public did become convinced 
of the threat given the pervasiveness of the imperial message, he contends that it was far 
more likely that the public largely remained unconvinced of the threat because imperialist 
propaganda continued unabated for a lengthy period of time and because it did not 
apparently effectively penetrate the working class.
2
 
However, if we examine the 1890s from the perspective that the public had for 
decades been keenly engaged in questions concerning military efficiency and military 
preparedness, along with their imperial implications and connotations, the imperialist 
propaganda of the 1890s which was geared toward heightening the awareness of national 
defense takes on quite a different meaning.  In the first place, it is hardly surprising that 
as the perils to the British Empire increased, the calls for a national response did as well.  
In addition, so far as the imperialist propaganda was directed towards encouraging 
attention to national defense in the late 1890s, this messaging was very much in keeping 
with the previous efforts to encourage patriotism and increase voluntary enlistment in the 
services.  The “paramilitary” organizations of the 1890s and early 1900s were certainly 
outgrowths of these efforts.  By the mid-1890s, some imperialists believed that more 
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drastic solutions might be necessary: compulsory military service and conscription.  For 
that solution to be implemented, however, Britons would have to reassess their personal 
and national identity, and redefine themselves and their nation socially, politically, and 
above all militarily.  For a nation and people whose military traditions had been so deeply 
rooted for centuries, this was a momentous challenge.  That the imperialists and 
militarists did not fully succeed to their satisfaction in bringing the country to that level 
of awareness prior to the First World War should thus be hardly surprising.  The failure 
of groups such as the National Service League to harness the public to their cause was not 
necessarily an indication that the country remained oblivious to imperial needs.  In the 
light of the robust attention paid to imperial affairs at least since the annexation of the 
Transvaal, the public’s reluctance to respond to the NSL suggests just the opposite:  the 
nation remained attached to its longstanding commitment to voluntarism as a 
fundamental British institution.  Even amid the stark reality of an imperiled empire 
during the First World War, Britons were reluctant to part ways with such national 
principles.  At the same time, the volunteerism of the British public in the first weeks of 
the war argues that they were already aware of the imperial implications of that conflict 
and were well-prepared to answer Kitchener’s call to arms.  Indeed to a certain extent, the 
public was more cognizant of those needs than some of the nation’s leaders.3  
In examining the public discourse on a provincial level, we find that by the end of 
the nineteenth century the martial aspects of the empire were being propagated by 
nationalist-minded Scots who sought to emphasize the Britishness of the British Empire 
by highlighting Scotland’s unique contribution to it.  Despite frequent conflation of 
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“England” and “English” with “Britain” and “British” by the national and English 
provincial presses in addressing imperial politics, these Scots could thus assert that the 
empire was not English, but was most certainly a British construction and enterprise.  At 
the same time, the discussions concerning military reform for the benefit of the nation 
and the empire became incorporated into broader narratives concerning Scotland’s 
martial and Highlander identity—elements that were deeply felt by the general Scottish 
public.    
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